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Emerging infectious diseases continue to represent serious threats to global 
human health. Novel zoonotic pathogens are continually being recognised, and some 
ultimately cause significant disease burdens and extensive epidemics. Research and 
public health initiatives often face emerging pathogens with limited knowledge and 
resources. Inferences from empirical modelling have begun to uncover the factors 
determining cross-species transmission and emergence in humans, and subsequently 
guide risk assessments. However, the dynamics of virulence and transmissibility 
during the process of emergence are not well understood. Here, I focus on RNA 
viruses, a priority pathogen type because of their potential for rapid evolution. I use 
comparative trait-based analyses to investigate how aspects of both host and virus 
ecology contribute to the risk of virulence and transmissibility within human RNA 
viruses. To explore these questions, data were collected via systematic literature 
search protocols. 
In the first half of this thesis, I focus on viral determinants of virulence and 
transmissibility. I ask whether virulence can be predicted by viral traits of tissue 
tropism, transmission route, transmissibility and taxonomic classification. Using a 
machine learning approach, the most prominent predictors of severe virulence were 
breadth of tissue tropism, and nonvector-borne transmission routes. When applied 
to newly reported viruses as test set, the final model predicted disease severity with 
87% accuracy.  
Next, I assess support for hypothesised routes of adaptation during 
emergence using phylogenetic state-switching models. Propensity for adaptation in 
small ‘stepwise’ movements versus large ‘off-the-shelf’ jumps differed between virus 
taxa, though no single route dominated, suggesting multiple independent trajectories 
of adaptation to human hosts. In addition, phylogenetic regressions showed vector 
and respiratory-transmitted viruses to be more likely to progress through early stages 
of emergence. 
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In the second half of this thesis, I focus on how dynamics of virulence and 
transmissibility differ with respect to nonhuman host diversity, identity, and ecology. 
Using a regression framework, I observe that viruses with a broader mammalian host 
range exhibited higher risk of severe virulence, but lower risk of transmissibility, 
which may reflect potential trade-offs of host specificity. Furthermore, viruses with 
artiodactyl hosts exhibited lower risk of severe virulence and viruses with bat or 
nonhuman primate hosts exhibited higher risk of transmissibility. 
Next, I test hypotheses that mammal species with faster-paced life history 
may be predisposed to host viruses with greater virulence and transmissibility. 
Mammal body mass was used as an established proxy for pace of life history. In 
regression analyses, mammals with faster-paced life history hosted more viruses with 
severe virulence, though evidence for a relationship with transmissibility was limited. 
The broad-scale associations presented in this thesis suggest the evolution of 
virulence and human-to-human transmissibility during zoonotic emergence is a 
multifactorial, highly dynamic process influenced by both virus and host ecology. 
Despite this, general characteristics of high-risk emerging viruses are evident. For 
example, severe virulence was associated with broad niche diversity of both tissue 
tropisms at the within-host scale, and host species at the macroecological scale. 
However, risk factors for virulence and human-to-human transmissibility often did 
not coincide, which may imply an overarching trade-off between these traits. These 
analyses can contribute to preparedness and direction within public health strategies 
by identifying likely candidates for high-impact emergence events among previously 
known and newly discovered human viruses. The inherent connectivity between 
RNA viruses, their nonhuman hosts and the resulting implications for human health 
emphasise the holistic nature of emerging diseases and supports the One Health 
perspective for infectious disease research.  
 




One of the biggest priorities for global health programmes is to understand 
when and where new infectious diseases are likely to emerge. The recent emergence 
of RNA viruses such as SARS-related coronavirus, Ebola virus, and H5N1 influenza 
virus have all caused significant costs to human health as well as economies. A clear 
need to predict and prepare for virus emergence is now widely acknowledged. 
Although models have improved our understanding of the process of virus 
emergence from animal to human hosts, little is known about what determines an 
emerging virus’ ability to cause severe disease or transmit efficiently between 
humans. Using an array of statistical models, this thesis aims to identify 
characteristics of RNA viruses, their hosts, and their wider ecology that increase the 
risk of severe disease and transmissibility in humans. 
Among virus characteristics, the strongest predictors of severe disease were 
the ability to infect a broad range of cell types, and transmission via respiratory 
routes, faecal-oral routes, or direct contact. My model correctly predicted severe 
disease among a group of newly reported viruses with 87% accuracy. I also found that 
viruses do not adapt to humans exclusively via small evolutionary steps or large 
evolutionary jumps as previously predicted. Instead, I observed a mixture between 
these types of adaptation, dependent on taxonomic classification. Finally, viruses 
with transmission via respiratory routes, or insect or tick vectors were more likely to 
infect and transmit between humans. 
Among host characteristics, viruses infecting a greater diversity of mammal 
species were more likely to cause severe disease in humans, but less likely to transmit 
between humans. Ability to cause severe disease or transmit between humans was 
also dependent on which specific mammal taxonomic orders were infected. 
Furthermore, I found that mammal species hosted more viruses causing severe 
disease in humans if they had a ‘faster’ life strategy with shorter lifespan and rapid 
reproduction, as indicated by a smaller body mass. 
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The characteristics I find to be associated with risk of severe disease and 
transmissibility in humans suggest ways to improve our understanding of how 
emerging viruses evolve. For example, I often found severe disease and 
transmissibility to be predicted by different characteristics, suggesting an antagonistic 
relationship where evolution towards one may inhibit evolution towards the other. 
This thesis also demonstrates the critical need for future research to consider viruses 
in the context of their wider ecology. The findings of this thesis can contribute to 
identifying viruses with high potential risks for public health and ultimately, guide a 
more preventive global health strategy.  
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Chapter 1. General introduction 
 
 
1.1. The global status of emerging RNA viruses 
“It is time to close the book on infectious diseases,” was the pronouncement 
believed to have been declared in the late 1960s by the United States Surgeon 
General, Dr. William H. Stewart. Although now discredited as a misquote (Spellberg 
and Taylor-Blake 2013), this statement nevertheless captures an important scientific 
perspective held by some at the time. However, nearing fifty years later, infectious 
diseases remain a serious global challenge and a major cause of human morbidity and 
mortality, with developing nations disproportionately bearing the greatest disease 
burdens (Mathers et al. 2008; GBD 2013 Mortality and Causes of Death 
Collaborators 2015). Infectious diseases also cause significant economic burdens 
(Fonkwo 2008); the total cost of seasonal epidemic influenza in the USA alone is 
estimated to be $87.1 billion US dollars annually (Molinari et al. 2007).  
A primary reason the proverbial “book” has remained open and is likely to do 
so for the foreseeable future is the continual appearance and impact of emerging 
infectious diseases (EIDs) and their causative pathogens. To clarify, I use the term 
“pathogen” to refer to any infectious agent, including all microparasites and 
macroparasites, regardless of their level of pathogenicity or fitness costs to hosts, if 
any. In this thesis, I focus on RNA viruses as a key type of pathogen among emerging 
infectious diseases and the cause of multiple human pandemics with exceptionally 
high impacts on public health, e.g. SARS coronavirus, HIV, pandemic influenza 
viruses. The World Health Organisation recently declared a list of seven priority 
emerging pathogens posing the greatest immediate risk to global health (WHO 
2015), all of which are RNA viruses.  
The term ‘emerging’ is often used to refer to a range of epidemiological 
dynamics, for which there are recent and globally significant examples of human 
viruses for each. Primarily, emerging viruses are considered to be those not 
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previously recognised as human pathogens that are newly transmitted from non-
human animal sources, referred to as ‘zoonotic’ transmission (Morse 1995; Jones et 
al. 2008), e.g. MERS coronavirus, which was first recognised as a human infection in 
the Middle East in 2012 (Zaki et al. 2012), where outbreaks have caused over 600 
fatalities to date (WHO 2016). Additionally, those viruses recurrently appearing after 
their initial outbreaks have subsided may also be considered emerging, or ‘re-
emerging’. For example, Zaire ebolavirus initially emerged in the 1970s and caused 
several outbreaks in the 1990s and early 2000s (Groseth et al. 2007), before re-
emerging in West Africa in 2013, resulting in the largest and most geographically 
widespread Ebola virus disease outbreak yet (Spengler et al. 2016). Finally, emerging 
may also refer to those viruses significantly expanding in geographic range or 
incidence (Morse 1995), which often involves epidemics within a novel context 
following release from endemic patterns e.g. the Aedes mosquito-borne Zika virus 
was previously endemic to Sub-Saharan Africa, but has spread to the Yap Islands of 
the Pacific and to South and Central America, where outbreaks are ongoing and have 
potentially reached totals of several million cases (Gatherer and Kohl 2015; Weaver et 
al. 2016). A more mathematical definition of emergence based on the rate of change 
in incidence has been advocated (Funk et al. 2013). However, incidence data is 
deficient for many emerging viruses, therefore I use the term ‘emerging’ as inclusive 
of all types of dynamics discussed above, except where otherwise stated. 
RNA viruses are noted as a pressing priority among all types of emerging 
pathogen for several reasons. Although some appear to be ancient human pathogens, 
e.g. rabies virus (Steele and Fernandez 1991), RNA viruses are acknowledged as 
posing a particularly high risk of emergence, as they are consistently overrepresented 
amongst emerging and zoonotic pathogens (Cleaveland et al. 2001; Taylor et al. 2001; 
Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005; Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007). This risk is 
thought to be partly due to their high evolutionary lability, as RNA viruses lack 
genetic proofreading mechanisms during replication (Belshaw et al. 2008; Parrish et 
al. 2008). However, it must be acknowledged that the range of substitution rates 
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across RNA viruses covers several orders of magnitude and overlaps with some DNA 
viruses (Holmes and Drummond 2007; Duffy et al. 2008). A continuous rate of 
human RNA virus emergence has been observed, such that discovery curves estimate 
approximately 2 new human virus species/year are recognised (among pooled counts 
of RNA and DNA viruses) (Woolhouse et al. 2008, 2012). The number of viral 
emergence ‘events’ has also increased between successive decades (Jones et al. 2008), 
though a fraction of these reflect novel discoveries of much older, existing human 
viruses, through increasing sensitivity of viral detection methods (Delwart 2013). 
The diversity of human RNA viruses is vast, comprising a great variety of 
genetic and ecological characteristics. Although all RNA viruses rely on host cell 
translation machinery to replicate, their genomes vary in structure, which forms one 
basis of their classification: either single-stranded positive-sense (hereafter '+ssRNA’; 
also referred to as Group IV), single-stranded negative-sense (‘-ssRNA’; Group V), 
double-stranded (‘dsRNA’; Group III), or single-stranded reverse-transcribing 
(‘ssRNA-RT’; Group VI). Within these four genome types, there are 48 recognised 
taxonomic families of RNA viruses (King et al. 2011). Among these, 19 families are 
known to infect mammals, with 17 of these 19 containing at least one human-
infective virus species (Woolhouse et al. 2013); only the Arteriviridae and 
Nodaviridae have not yet been reported to infect humans. The majority of emerging 
human viruses are ultimately classified under existing genera and families, though 
the possibility of discovering novel human-infective RNA virus families remains 
credible (Woolhouse et al. 2008, 2012). Note that throughout the thesis, I follow 
standardised guidelines for formatting of virus nomenclature (King et al. 2011), 
which distinguishes a conceptual species (e.g. “Rabies virus was classified as a 
zoonotic species”) from a virus in its physical context (e.g. “rabies virus was isolated 
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1.2. The process of RNA virus emergence 
In order to identify their underlying causes and predict their consequences, 
there is a clear need to understand the origins and processes involved in the 
emergence of RNA viruses. The majority of human viruses have their immediate 
origins in non-human animals (Wolfe et al. 2007), and several viruses known only to 
infect humans are traceable to evolutionary divergence from animal viruses, such as 
HIV-1 and HIV-2 from primate SIVs (Hahn et al. 2000). Intuitively, it follows that 
zoonotic status is a major risk factor for pathogens to emerge, particularly among 
viruses (Taylor et al. 2001). Human viruses appear to be almost exclusively shared 
with other warm-blooded vertebrate hosts (not considering arthropod vectors as 
hosts), and predominantly with other mammals over birds (Woolhouse and Gaunt 
2007; Woolhouse et al. 2012; Woolhouse and Adair 2013). 
The process of emergence from animal to human pathogen (and by 
extension, host shifts from any one host species to another) has been conceptually 
modelled in a number of schemata that all demonstrate the same core pathway 
(Childs et al. 2007; Wolfe et al. 2007; Lloyd-Smith et al. 2009; Woolhouse et al. 2012). 
Throughout this thesis I make reference to one such system in detail, the Pathogen 
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Figure 1.1. The ‘Pathogen Pyramid’ model, adapted from Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007, 
showing conceptual levels of pathogens during emergence (see main text for definitions). 
Arrows illustrate movements between levels, where blocked arrows illustrate presence of 
a genetic or ecological barrier preventing movement. Note that movements between 
levels may not necessarily occur in gradual steps and may involve ‘jumps’ to much higher 
levels (see Chapter 3). The pyramid shape results from increasingly fewer pathogens 
fitting the criteria for each additional level. 
 
Within this model, level 1 describes pathogens that are limited to nonhuman 
hosts only, where no evidence of human infection has been recognised, even if 
humans are routinely exposed. Level 2 describes pathogens that are capable of 
infecting humans, but incapable of human-to-human transmission. All human cases 
of level 2 viruses are therefore the result of zoonotic transmission, e.g. most 
hantaviruses such as Hantaan, Seoul and Sin Nombre viruses, which transmit from 
rodents to humans via aerosolised excreta. Level 3 describes human pathogens that 
are only capable of self-limited human-to-human transmission. This includes both 
rare single transmission events and short ‘stuttering’ transmission chains, and can be 
thought of in terms of 0 < R0 < 1, where R0 denotes the basic reproductive number, 
i.e. the mean number of secondary cases expected to result from a single primary 
case, assuming the population is entirely susceptible. An example is Nipah virus, 
where cases typically result from zoonotic contact with bats or pigs, though short 
chains of transmission between patients or healthcare workers may occur in clinical 
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settings. Level 4 describes human pathogens that are capable of long chains of 
sustained human-to-human transmission, which may include a variety of 
epidemiological patterns such as epidemic cycling or constant endemic transmission, 
and can be thought of in terms of R0 ≥ 1. An example is the epidemic transmission of 
seasonal influenza virus subtypes. Some schemata distinguish level 4 pathogens that 
still infect or are maintained within nonhuman animals (sometimes referred to as 
level ‘4a’) from those with humans as their only known host species (sometimes 
referred to as level ‘4b’ or ‘5’) (Wolfe et al. 2007), with the expectation these follow 
different epidemiological dynamics in humans. 
The Pathogen Pyramid model is so shaped to illustrate that the number of 
pathogens successfully meeting the criteria for each subsequent level decreases 
(Figure 1.1), as a result of failures to overcome molecular barriers within hosts (e.g. 
cell receptor availability) or ecological barriers between hosts (e.g. external 
survivability) (Kuiken et al. 2006). Overcoming such barriers often requires genetic 
adaptation. The likelihood of adaptation and ultimate emergence depends on both 
the rate of viral evolution and the adaptive distance to be traversed (Antia et al. 2003; 
Kuiken et al. 2006; Parrish et al. 2008) (and additionally, but beyond the scope of this 
schema, any antagonistic coevolution of the host, see Daugherty and Malik 2012). 
Those necessary traits to overcome barriers of adaptation may be acquired by 
selection within human hosts or the occurrence of a suitable genotype by chance 
within animal hosts (Parrish et al. 2008; Pepin et al. 2010). Phenotypically, emergence 
can therefore appear erratic and unpredictable, where some viruses progress through 
Pathogen Pyramid levels gradually over long timescales and others seemingly jump 
straight from level 1 to level 4. The transition between level 2 and level 3 appears 
subject to particular evolutionary constraints, with little empirically observed 
evidence this occurs directly (Woolhouse et al. 2016). Instead, it is likely that most 
level 3 viruses develop from independent introductions from the zoonotic source. 
However, considering opportunity for mutations to arise and accumulate, level 2 to 
level 3 progression may be more feasible for viruses causing chronic human 
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infection, such as the Retroviridae. Although they have begun to be formally 
described in the above manner by quantitative reviews (Woolhouse et al. 2016), these 
different types of adaptive movements during RNA virus emergence are not well-
studied. 
 
1.3. Understanding the determinants of RNA virus 
emergence 
Based on the conceptual models describing how RNA viruses emerge, much 
research has been devoted to understanding the subsequent question of why they 
emerge. Many emerging viruses have traditionally been investigated as in-depth case 
studies to fully map out the factors surrounding their emergence, e.g. Nipah virus 
emergence in humans was traced to indirect transmission from pigs, and in turn, pig 
infection was traced back to exposure to wild bats through shared feeding around 
date palm trees (Chua et al. 2000, 2003). Such highly localised investigations have 
contributed much to the understanding of specific disease systems.  
However, this approach is retrospective, i.e. it can only take place after human 
infections have already occurred. A more predictive approach for public health has 
been advocated (Daszak 2009; Morse et al. 2012), involving studies of which types of 
viruses are most likely to emerge, and under what conditions. Several frameworks 
have been proposed for this purpose that integrate different scales of study from 
individuals to global regions (Wilcox and Colwell 2005; Wood et al. 2012; Johnson et 
al. 2015b). These frameworks are also increasingly broadening in scope to reflect the 
holistic nature of emerging diseases - the recent ‘One Health’ perspective suggests 
that human health can only be fully understood by considering aspects of domestic 
and wildlife host health, as well as the wider ecological community (Karesh et al. 
2012).  
As a multifactorial phenomenon, it follows that a predictive approach to viral 
emergence must be interdisciplinary, where several different methodologies all have a 
role to play (Wilcox and Colwell 2005; Wood et al. 2012). For example, viral 
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sequencing efforts are now routinely employed as a clinical detection method and a 
key tool in the discovery of novel viruses (Delwart 2013; Lipkin 2013). Genomic 
sequence data also forms the basis of phylogenetic analyses, which can be used to 
assess evidence for cross-species transmission and reconstruct likely ancestral hosts 
(Holmes 2009; Kitchen et al. 2011; Drexler et al. 2012). Another example is the 
disease mapping and biogeographical analyses that have helped understand the 
environmental determinants of emerging viruses (Guernier et al. 2004; Jones et al. 
2008; Dunn et al. 2010). Study at this scale has quantified landscape-level 
anthropogenic changes, or ‘drivers’, upon the spatial patterns of disease emergence 
(Patz et al. 2004; Wilcox and Gubler 2005; Jones et al. 2008). 
Within this thesis, I focus on another essential component of predictive 
frameworks, ecological comparative analyses (or ‘trait-based’ analyses). These 
analyses aim to identify associations between phenotypic traits to infer their 
underlying relationships, typically using species-level data. Comparative analyses are 
fundamentally broad in their principle, i.e. those traits associated with successful 
emergence of viruses cannot be understood without also comparatively examining 
the traits of viruses that have not overcome biological barriers and have failed to 
emerge (Figure 1.1). The comparative perspective derives from macroecology, 
though as larger repositories of host-pathogen data are becoming available and 
statistical modelling methods for sparse and/or highly multidimensional data are 
improving, this approach is increasingly recognised as applicable to infectious 
diseases (Nunn 2012). 
Several key comparative studies have laid the foundations to understanding 
characteristics of likely emerging pathogens, including RNA viruses. As previously 
outlined, the first comparative analyses of human pathogens suggested RNA viruses 
and zoonotic pathogens were more likely to be considered emerging (Cleaveland et 
al. 2001; Taylor et al. 2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005). Emerging 
viruses are also more likely to have a broad range of nonhuman hosts (Cleaveland et 
al. 2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005), and considering specific host taxa, 
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the highest numbers of emerging human viruses are known among rodents and 
ungulates (Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005), although this may partly reflect 
differences in taxonomic classification of virus families associated with these hosts. 
The relationship between humans and nonhuman hosts is increasingly seen 
as important for zoonotic transmission and emergence. More recent comparative 
analyses have reported bat species to host a greater diversity of zoonotic viruses than 
rodent species (Luis et al. 2013). Humans also share more pathogens with nonhuman 
species that are closely phylogenetically related, though viruses often appear to be less 
subject to host phylogenetic constraints (Davies and Pedersen 2008; Cooper et al. 
2012). A greater proportion of emerging pathogens are also shared with wildlife than 
domestic animals (Cleaveland et al. 2001), though among domestic species, pathogen 
sharing is positively correlated with earlier domestication history (Morand et al. 
2014), suggesting the importance of human-animal contact in emergence. 
Other comparative studies have further expanded on these foundations by 
examining virological risk factors for emergence. For example, predictions about 
molecular viral traits likely to increase emergence risk were proposed by Pulliam 
(2008), and subsequently demonstrated in that viruses replicating in the cytoplasm 
were more likely to infect humans than those with nuclear replication (Pulliam and 
Dushoff 2009). However, there are still many open questions surrounding how other 
virological factors influence emergence, such as transmission route and tissue 
tropism. Direct contact with blood or tissue has been theorised to present the highest 
risk of emergence (Pulliam 2008), though comparative analyses have suggested no 
single transmission route dominates among emerging human pathogens (Woolhouse 
and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005; Loh et al. 2015). The relationship between transmission 
route and specific levels of the Pathogen Pyramid is not well characterised (Figure 
1.1), though from simple counts, vector-borne viruses appear more likely to infect 
humans (Woolhouse et al. 2001; Loh et al. 2015), but less likely to exhibit sustained 
human-to-human transmission (Woolhouse and Adair 2013). The influence of tissue 
tropism upon viral dynamics during emergence has received little attention, though 
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one comparative study found substitution rates to be higher among viruses with 
certain tissue tropisms (Hicks and Duffy 2014), which may in turn represent a 
predisposition for emergence (Holmes and Drummond 2007; Parrish et al. 2008).  
 
1.4. Predicting traits of RNA viruses beyond emergence 
As reviewed in the previous section, the primary focus of previous 
comparative analyses of RNA viruses has been risk of human infection (in terms of 
either emergence, zoonotic transmission, or virus sharing). However, despite the 
often-cited case studies of high-impact emerging viruses such as HIV and SARS 
coronavirus, not every emerging virus is highly pathogenic. RNA viruses exhibit 
substantial variation in virulence, which I use to refer to any costs of infection to 
individual host fitness, in order to broadly cover definitions used by evolutionary 
biology, ecology and clinical medicine (Day 2002a). Even closely related viruses can 
demonstrate very different levels of virulence, e.g. Zaire ebolavirus and other 
ebolaviruses cause extremely debilitating haemorrhagic disease with high mortality 
(Feldmann and Geisbert 2011), except Reston ebolavirus, where human infections 
have never presented with clinical disease (Morikawa et al. 2007). Similarly, neither 
does every zoonotic cross-species transmission event result in efficient human-to-
human transmissibility or pandemic spread. Only a small fraction of emerging 
viruses ultimately reach the top of the Pathogen Pyramid (Figure 1.1) and become 
established as endemic human pathogens (Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007; Woolhouse 
and Adair 2013). 
Therefore, I identify virulence and human-to-human transmissibility as key 
phenotypic traits determining the dynamics of emerging viruses and accordingly, 
representing significant importance to public health. A specific need to incorporate 
virulence and transmissibility within a wider predictive approach to disease 
emergence has been emphasised (Morse et al. 2012). Traditionally, the determinants 
of virulence and transmissibility within human RNA viruses have been studied using 
theoretical models or experimental animal models, often focusing on a single virus. 
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In contrast, such determinants have not been well-studied from wider empirical 
perspectives, though several recent attempts must be highlighted. 
Virulence has been reported to positively correlate with external survivability, 
entry through wounded skin, and a lower infectious dose in comparative analyses 
pooling all pathogen types (Walther and Ewald 2004; Leggett et al. 2012). 
Transmissibility has also been associated with pathogen traits. Geoghegan et al. 
(2016) reported greater risk of human-to-human transmissibility among 
nonsegmented, nonenveloped, nonvector-borne RNA and DNA viruses, though it 
must be noted that these traits are highly conserved within viral taxonomic families. 
Focusing on host traits rather than virus traits, greater risk of human-to-human 
transmissibility has been reported for viruses with broader ecological diversity of host 
groups and zoonotic transmission via hunting or meat consumption (Johnson et al. 
2015a). 
These previous comparative studies on virulence and transmissibility have 
often been limited in scope to small sets of viruses or pathogens (Walther and Ewald 
2004; Leggett et al. 2012), and to my knowledge, have not yet been conducted for a 
complete inventory of taxonomically-standardised human RNA viruses. Virulence 
and transmissibility of human viruses have begun to be quantified at this scale (Hay 
et al. 2013), though there are still many uncertainties and data deficiencies. Several 
fundamental questions remain regarding virus and host-based determinants of 
virulence and transmissibility. Many potential predictive traits remain unexplored, 
and among those examined in previous analyses, the influence of chosen 
measurements of traits and potential for trait interactions are still largely unknown. 
 
1.5. Thesis aims & outline 
In this thesis, I aim to predict key traits underpinning the dynamics of 
emerging viruses. Specifically, I aim to understand how virulence and transmissibility 
vary with wider ecological traits of human RNA viruses. Based on previous 
comparative analyses predicting emergence, I focus on two general types of 
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predictors – virus traits, e.g. transmission route, tissue tropism, and genetic structure; 
and nonhuman host traits, e.g. host identity, host diversity, and host life history. 
Throughout, I use data on traits of viruses at the level of taxonomic species, compiled 
via systematic literature searches, and I apply a comparative perspective by drawing 
on a range of predictive statistical modelling techniques. 
In the second and third chapters, I focus on virus traits. In the second 
chapter, I construct classification models via machine learning methods to identify 
which viral traits may interact to predict virulence. I also assess the potential for 
ascertainment biases in compiled data by examining virus discovery curves with 
respect to viral traits. In the third chapter, I assess evidence for alternative 
hypothesised routes of adaptation towards transmissibility using phylogenetic state-
switching models. I then use phylogenetic regression models to test whether 
increasing levels of transmissibility are associated with ecological or genetic traits. 
In the fourth and fifth chapters, I focus on nonhuman host traits. In the 
fourth chapter, I present an overview of where virulent and human-transmissible 
viruses are concentrated among mammalian host-virus relationships. I then 
investigate whether virulence and transmissibility are predicted by host range 
breadth and infection of specific host taxa using mixed regression methods. In the 
fifth chapter, I ask whether nonhuman mammal hosts with faster-paced life history 
are predisposed to host virulent and human-transmissible viruses. I use body mass as 
a proxy for life history and weighted regression models to account for the wider virus 
diversity of mammal hosts. 
In the sixth and final chapter, I discuss the overall implications of the thesis 
findings in relation to virus ecology and evolution. I highlight those areas where 
further work is critically needed and suggest hypotheses for future study. Finally, I 
provide a perspective on the implications of this thesis for global health programmes 
and how these findings may contribute to a more effective strategy of preparedness 
against emerging viruses. 
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Supplementary material accompanying each of the analytical chapters is 
provided in separate appendices at the rear of the thesis. Publications describing 
overviews of the data collected as part of this thesis are also included at the rear, 
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Chapter 2. Tropism breadth and transmission 





Although studies have begun to identify pathogen traits associated with the 
emergence of novel viruses, these do not address why viruses exhibit such a wide 
variation in virulence, a key determinant of risk to population health. I use structured 
literature searches to review the virulence of each of the 180 known human-infective 
RNA virus species. I then apply comparative machine learning approaches to 
determine whether virulence of human viruses can be predicted by their ecological 
traits, and whether patterns of virus discovery vary with virulence or these traits. 
Using severity of clinical disease as a measurement of virulence, I determined 
potential risk factors using predictive classification tree models. Correcting for virus 
taxonomy, the final classification tree model combining tissue tropism, extent of 
transmissibility within human populations, and transmission route described disease 
severity with 88% accuracy. Virus discovery did not vary with virulence alone, but 
showed complex relationships dependent on both virulence and risk factor traits, 
though model conclusions were robust to this variation. When applied to 30 newly 
reported human viruses as a test set, models predicted literature-assigned severity of 
clinical disease with 87% accuracy compared to a null accuracy of 50%. The risk 
factors I identify may provide novel perspectives in understanding the evolution of 
virulence and identifying molecular virulence mechanisms. These risk factors could 
also improve planning and preparedness in public health strategies as part of a 
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2.2. Introduction  
The emergence of novel infectious diseases continues to represent a threat to 
global public health. Emerging pathogens have been defined as those newly 
recognised infections of humans following zoonotic transmission, or those increasing 
in incidence and/or geographic range (Morse 1995). Recent high-profile examples of 
emerging pathogens include the discovery of the novel MERS coronavirus from cases 
of respiratory illness in 2012 (Zaki et al. 2012), and the expansion of the range of 
chikungunya virus across the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean (Charrel et al. 2014). 
The emergence of previously unseen viruses means that the set of known human 
viruses continually increases by around 2 species per year (Woolhouse et al. 2012). 
Comparative studies have begun to identify trends and ecological risk factors among 
emerging pathogens. For example, pathogens are more likely to emerge in humans if 
they have a broad host range, and are RNA viruses (Cleaveland et al. 2001; Taylor et 
al. 2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005). Here, I focus on understanding 
the ecological determinants of virulence, using all known human RNA viruses as a 
study system. 
Emerging RNA viruses vary widely in their virulence, with some never having 
been associated with human disease at all. As an example, Zaire ebolavirus causes 
severe haemorrhagic fever with outbreaks, including the most recent West African 
outbreak showing case fatality ratios of ~60% or more (Feldmann and Geisbert 2011; 
Focosi and Maggi 2015). In comparison, human infections with Reston ebolavirus 
have never exhibited any evidence of disease symptoms (Morikawa et al. 2007), 
despite both viruses being members of the genus Ebolavirus. Applying the 
comparative approach to understand the ecology of virulent viruses could offer 
valuable synergy with studies of emergence, towards prioritisation and preparedness 
in the detection of potential new human viruses (Morse et al. 2012).  
Few comparative analyses have addressed risk of human pathogen virulence 
to date (but see Ewald 1983; Walther and Ewald 2004; Leggett et al. 2013), and none 
have done so exhaustively across the breadth of all currently recognised human 
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pathogens of a specific type. Several hypotheses regarding how pathogen ecology 
affects virulence may be derived from theoretical models of evolution. For example, 
the trade-off hypothesis was developed from ideas that transmission rate between 
individuals may increase as a function of virulence, but there will be a consequential 
increase in host mortality (or decrease in host recovery, as the inverse of mortality). 
As a result, pathogen fitness will be subject to trade-off between virulence and 
transmissibility over a longer infectious window (Anderson and May 1982; 
Bremermann and Pickering 1983). The trade-off hypothesis is highly debated, and 
contested as difficult to empirically characterise and dependent on many other 
aspects of host-pathogen coevolution (Ebert and Bull 2003; Alizon et al. 2009). 
However, comparative analysis has been suggested as a method to assess evidence for 
a virulence-transmission trade-off (Alizon et al. 2009) and based on these core 
principles, I hypothesise that limited human-to-human transmissibility may act as a 
predictive risk factor for virulence. It must be noted that evolutionary trade-offs will 
only apply to coevolved host-virus relationships and that many human viruses result 
from zoonotic cross-species transmission without onward transmission or 
adaptation. In these cases, a ‘coincidental’ non-adapted virulence may result (Levin 
and Svanborg Edén 1990; Bull 1994), and again, I hypothesise that limited human-to-
human transmissibility may predict virulence. 
Transmission route may also influence the evolution of virulence. Ewald 
(1983) suggested that vector-borne pathogens should be less constrained by costs of 
virulence, i.e. morbidity and immobilisation of the vertebrate host does not impede 
transmission if it occurs through an arthropod vector. I therefore hypothesise a 
vector-borne transmission route may predict virulence. Finally, although yet 
unexplored via theoretical models, it may be an intuitive expectation that systemic 
infections present with more severe disease than local infections. A broader tissue 
tropism could therefore also predict virulence. 
The currently known set of human RNA virus species is likely an incomplete 
inventory of the diversity of RNA viruses within humans (Woolhouse et al. 2008, 
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2012). Virus detectability and reporting is known to depend, among other factors 
(Chan et al. 2010), on distinctiveness or severity of clinical symptoms (Koopmans 
2013). Although these are factors affecting reporting of individual cases, whether 
there is ascertainment bias towards discovering human virus species with greater 
virulence has not yet been assessed. 
I aim to determine patterns of virulence across the breadth of all known 
human RNA viruses and use comparative risk factor analysis to ask whether 
ecological traits of these viruses predict virulence in humans. Specifically, I examine 
hypotheses that viruses would be more virulent if they: lacked transmissibility within 
humans; had vector-borne transmission routes; or had greater breadth of tissue 
tropisms (Table 2.1), independent of any biases in discovery. Finally, I aim to verify 
the robustness of analyses and assess use of risk factor models as a predictive tool by 
applying them to newly reported viruses as a test set. 
 
2.3. Materials and methods 
2.3.1. Data collection 
For each of the 180 recognised human-infective RNA virus species following 
standardised data compilation efforts and critical assessment protocols (Woolhouse 
et al. 2013), data on virulence and potential risk factors were collected via a 
systematic search and review of clinical and epidemiological literature. The following 
were consulted in turn: clinical virology textbooks (Knipe and Howley 2007; 
Zuckerman et al. 2009; Richman et al. 2009); references from the dataset described by 
Woolhouse et al. (2013); literature searches using Google Scholar (search terms: 1) 
[virus name] AND human, 2) [virus name] AND human AND case, 3) [virus name] 
AND human AND [fatal* OR death], 4) [virus name] AND human AND [tropi* or 
isolat*], 5) [virus name] AND human AND transmi*). Searches 3 - 5 were carried out 
only when fatality, tropism, or transmission data respectively were not already found 
from previous sources. Data collection and virus name search terms included the full 
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species name, any synonyms or subspecies (excluding vaccine strains) and the 
standard virus abbreviation as given by ICTV 9th edition (King et al. 2011). 
Although many possible measurements of virulence have been proposed (Day 
2002a; Nathanson et al. 2007), even simple metrics like case fatality ratio (CFR) have 
not been calculated for the majority of human RNA virus species. Therefore, 
virulence was rated using a simple two-category measure of severity of typical disease 
in humans. I rated viruses as ‘severe’ if they firstly had ≥5% CFR where data was 
available (134/180 viruses including those with zero CFR), otherwise, I rated viruses 
as ‘severe’ if they had frequent reports of hospitalisation, were associated with 
significant morbidity from certain conditions (haemorrhagic fever, seizures/coma, 
cirrhosis, AIDS, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, HTLV-associated myelopathy) or 
were explicitly described as “severe” or “causing severe disease” (Table A.1). I rated 
viruses as ‘nonsevere’ if none of these conditions were met. Note that this led to 
‘nonsevere’ ratings for some viruses with clinically severe, but rare syndromes, e.g. 
dengue virus causes dengue haemorrhagic fever, though this is much rarer than 
typical acute dengue fever (Knipe and Howley 2007; Zuckerman et al. 2009). To 
address this, data were also collected on whether the virus has caused fatalities in 
vulnerable individuals (defined as age 16 and below or 60 and above, 
immunosuppressed, having co-morbidities, or otherwise cited as being ‘at-risk’ by 
sources for specific viruses) and in healthy adults, and whether any ‘nonsevere’ virus 
has atypically severe strains (for example, most infections with viruses within the 
species Human enterovirus C are mild; however, poliovirus, which causes severe 
paralytic disease, is also included as a strain of this species). These were examined 
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Table 2.1. Virus trait data collected for use in classification tree analysis. Data are listed 
along with motivation for inclusion in analysis, definition of two-level categories, sources 








Risk factor Two separate measures of human 
transmissibility: 




b) Sustained (R0 ≥ 1) or 
nonsustained (R0 < 1): 
 
 
Woolhouse et al. 
(2012) model, 







Risk factor Vector-borne or nonvector-borne: 
 
 
Where “nonvector” includes direct, 















Year of publication of first human 
infection evidence 
Woolhouse et al. 
(2013) dataset 
Virus taxonomy Bias 
correction 
Genome type: +ssRNA, -ssRNA, 
dsRNA, RNA-RT) 
 
Taxonomic family: n = 18 including 
“Unassigned” 
ICTV 9th edition 
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Data were collected for three main risk factors: extent of human-to-human 
transmissibility, transmission route, and tissue tropism breadth. Transmission route 
data were collected as a multiple-category variable that was subsequently reclassified 
to a two-category variable (Table 2.1) based on supported groupings from an initial 
classification tree model (Figure A.1) and previous comparative analyses of viral 
emergence (Johnson et al. 2015a; Geoghegan et al. 2016). Based on previous 
conceptual models and a systematic compilation and review of evidence (Woolhouse 
et al. 2012; Woolhouse et al. 2016), I specified human-to-human transmissibility by 
constructing two binary variables to denote whether each virus had a) any human-to-
human transmissibility, equivalent to R0 > 0 in humans or Pathogen Pyramid level 3 
or above (see General Introduction); and b) sustained human-to-human 
transmissibility, equivalent to R0 ≥ 1 or Pathogen Pyramid level 4 (see General 
Introduction). Transmission route was defined as the primary route the virus is 
transmitted by, classified as either arthropod vector-borne (excluding mechanical 
transmission), or nonvector-borne (including direct, faecal-oral and respiratory 
transmission, which consistently clustered together in preliminary tree analyses 
(Figure A.1)). Tissue tropism breadth was specified as whether the virus typically 
infects either single or multiple organ systems. I accepted isolation of the virus, viral 
proteins or genetic material, or diagnostic symptoms of the virus (such as 
characteristic histological damage) as evidence of infection within an organ system, 
but did not accept generalised symptoms such as inflammation. 
All virulence and risk factor data pertained to natural or unintentional 
artificially-acquired human infection only and data from intentional human 
infection, animal infection, and in vitro infection were not considered. Viral 
taxonomy was corrected for in analyses by including both genome type and 
taxonomic family as covariates. Additionally, to analyse temporal trends in viral traits 
and their predictive power for virulence, year of discovery (i.e. first publication of 
human infection evidence) was obtained for each virus from the dataset described by 
Woolhouse et al. (2013).  
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2.3.2. Classification analysis 
Comparative risk factor analyses were conducted with classification trees 
using the R package ‘rpart’, v4.1-8 (Therneau et al. 2014). Classification trees aim to 
optimally classify data points into their correct category of outcome variable. 
Classification tree methods are appropriate for comparative ecological analyses as 
they easily handle missing predictor data and are capable of fitting complex non-
linear interactions. A tree was created by ‘recursive partitioning’, the repeated 
splitting of the dataset using every possible permutation of each predictor, and 
retaining the split that minimises the Gini impurity (De’ath and Fabricius 2000), a 
measure of how well-separated data points are with respect to different outcome 
variable categories. To prevent overfitting, all trees were pruned back to the optimal 
branching size, taken as most common consensus size over 1000 repeats of cross-
validation. Tree accuracy was calculated as the overall proportion of viruses correctly 
classified in outcome variable compared to literature-assigned ratings (assuming 
these to be 100% accurate as the ‘gold standard’ or ‘ground truth’). Given that my 
virulence rating only had two categories and many correct classifications may have 
occurred by chance, I compared accuracy of classification trees to that of the null 
model, i.e. a model without any predictors that simply assigned the most common 
virulence rating, ‘nonsevere’, to all viruses. All modelling was carried out in R, v3.1.1 
(R Development Core Team 2015). 
To investigate robustness of individual predictors within the classification 
tree, jack-knifing was carried out for a) the full predictor set, and b) alternative 
predictor sets, each excluding a different predictor. In all cases, jack-knifing was 
carried out by sequentially removing each data point before growing and pruning to 
the optimal tree size, giving 178 jack-knifed trees for each of the predictor sets. 
Accuracy statistics from these trees were then plotted to visualise estimates of error 
around the contribution of each predictor, in terms of loss in tree accuracy when this 
predictor was excluded. Contributions were also measured by visualising accuracy 
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for c), non-jack-knifed trees built using single predictors only. Additional statistics of 
interest (True Skill Statistic (Allouche et al. 2006), sensitivity, negative predictive 
value, and accuracy relative to null) were also obtained from jack-knifed trees (Figure 
A.4 - A.7). Risk factors were also validated in a traditional logistic regression model 
framework (Supplementary Methods A.1) 
Potential ascertainment biases due to virulence were also explored. Firstly, 
proportional discovery curves of known human virus species over time relative to 
total were constructed to compare ‘severe’ and ‘nonsevere’ viruses. Secondly, to 
confirm risk factor robustness over time and independence of any discovery biases, 
virus data was split into nested subsets of those discovered by the start of each 
decade, starting with viruses discovered by 1940. For each subset, I calculated the 
information gain associated with each risk factor variable as a measure of 
informativeness towards correct virus classification. Information gain is calculated as 
the difference between the entropy of the dataset before and after splitting via a 








for outcome variable  with  possible categories and  denoting proportion of 
data points in outcome category . Information gain was calculated for each risk 
factor using the attrEval function in the R package ‘CORElearn’, v0.9.43 (Robnik-
Sikonja and Savicky 2014) and was plotted alongside two-way discovery curves split 
by risk factor-severity rating combinations, to visualise changes in strengths of risk 
factors over time. 
Finally, to test the predictive power of the classification tree, virulence and 
risk factor data were also collected for newly reported human RNA viruses that have 
not yet been approved as species, as of ICTV 9th edition Virus Taxonomy (King et al. 
2011). These were found via literature searches using Google Scholar (search terms: 
novel OR new* AND virus, years: 2012-2014) and reference tracing from other 
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reviewed literature. Virulence and risk factor data collection followed the literature 
search step of the protocol previously outlined. The final classification tree was then 
used to generate disease severity predictions and compared in accuracy to the null 
model, assuming literature-based criteria as a ‘ground truth’. 
 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Virulence of human RNA viruses 
Of the 180 human RNA viruses described by Woolhouse et al. (2013), 48 were 
rated as causing ‘severe’ clinical disease and 130 as ‘nonsevere’ (Figure 2.1A, see also 
Table A.1). Two virus species could not be assigned a disease severity rating and were 
excluded from all analyses (Hepatitis delta virus, which is reliant on hepatitis B virus 
coinfection; and Primate T-lymphotropic virus 3, which may be associated with 
chronic disease like other T-lymphotropic viruses, but has not been known in 
humans long enough for cohort observations). Disease severity differed between the 
17 viral taxonomic families (Fisher’s exact, 1000 simulations, p < 0.001), with 
Arenaviridae, Rhabdoviridae and Retroviridae having the highest fractions of severe-
rated viruses (Figure 2.1). Fatalities were reported in healthy adults for 60 viruses and 
in vulnerable individuals only for an additional 23 viruses, whilst 8 viruses rated 
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Figure 2.1. Virulence of currently known human RNA viruses, with respect to taxonomy 
and discovery year. A) Number of human RNA viruses split by taxonomic family, B) 
curves of virus discovery within humans over time as a proportion of current known total 
(nonsevere, n = 130; severe, n = 48). Shaded bars/curves denote disease severity rating. 
 
2.4.2. Classification tree risk factor analysis 
The final pruned classification tree included all hypothesised risk factors and 
taxonomic family (Figure 2.2), and classifications matched those from literature-
based criteria for 157 of 178 viruses giving a resulting accuracy of 88.2% (95% 
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confidence interval: 82.5% - 92.6%). When compared to the null model assigning all 
viruses as nonsevere (accuracy = 73.0%), the classification tree demonstrated 
significantly greater accuracy (exact binomial one-tailed test, p < 0.001). The majority 
of virus species were classified as nonsevere in a single, large group defined by single-
organ tropism and specific taxonomic families. Three separate groups were fitted by 
the model as associated with severe disease: i) viruses with multi-organ system 
tropism in the families Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae or Filoviridae; ii) viruses with 
single-organ system tropism and nonvector-borne transmission in the family 
Rhabdoviridae; iii) viruses with single-organ system tropism, nonvector-borne 
transmission and sustained human-to-human transmissibility in the families 




Figure 2.2. Final pruned classification tree predicting disease severity for 178 human 
RNA viruses. Viruses begin at the top and are classified according to split criteria (white 
boxes) with risk factors pictorially represented following Table 2.1 until reaching 
terminal nodes with the model’s prediction of disease severity, and the fraction of viruses 
following that path correctly classified, based on literature-assigned ratings (shaded 
boxes). ‘Trans.Route’ denotes primary transmission route, and ‘S.Trans.’ denotes 
sustained human-to-human transmissibility. 
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Of the 21 misclassifications within the tree, 19 were viruses rated as severe 
through literature review that were misclassified as nonsevere, giving sensitivity of 
classifying severe disease as 0.604 and specificity as 0.985. These misclassifications 
occurred primarily in two classification groups (Figure 2.2). The final classification 
tree structure was robust to removing viruses with low-certainty data (Figure A.2, 
A.3). Although tree structure differed in some respects, specifying virulence as either 
a fatality variable alone or combined with severity and severe strains in an ordinal 
ranking system did not significantly improve accuracy (Table A.3, A.4). 
In testing robustness of individual predictors and jack-knifing, trees that 
excluded each predictor showed substantially reduced accuracy compared to the null 
model of classifying all viruses as ‘nonsevere’ (Figure 2.3), except when excluding 
sustained human transmissibility, which appeared redundant with any human 
transmissibility. When considered alone in univariate trees, taxonomic family and 
tropism breadth classified severity with accuracies of 78.1% and 81.2% respectively 
(Figure 2.3), though still less than the jack-knifed full model, suggesting that no 
single trait comprehensively explained variation in virulence. Accuracy in univariate 
trees using human transmissibility and transmission route did not improve upon the 
null model. Predictor robustness was broadly comparable when examining 
alternative model performance measures (True Skill Statistic (Allouche et al. 2006), 
accuracy relative to null, Figure A.4, A.7) and performance measures that prioritised 
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Figure 2.3. Full and jack-knifed tree accuracies across different predictor sets: ‘Null’ = 
null model (no predictors), ‘Fam’ = taxonomic family, ‘S.Trans’ = sustained human-to-
human transmissibility, ‘Route’ = transmission route, ‘Trop’ = tropism breadth, ‘Full’ = 
full model (all predictors). Solid squares denote accuracy for tree built with full dataset 
(n=178) and boxes/outlying open circles denote accuracy for 178 trees built with jack-
knifed datasets for predictor sets removing predictor given on Y axis (except ‘Null’ & 
‘Full’). Grey diamonds denote accuracy for tree built with single predictor given on Y axis 
only. Jack-knifed trees removing genome type and any human-to-human transmissibility 
are not depicted as these predictors did not appear in any trees resulting from the full 
predictor set. 
 
2.4.3. Ascertainment bias and risk factor temporality 
Ascertainment bias towards more virulent viruses did not appear present 
among the full dataset as cumulative proportional discovery curves for severe and 
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nonsevere-rated viruses showed little difference until 1960, where a relatively higher 
discovery rate of nonsevere viruses was observed (Figure 2.1B). However, differences 
in temporal trends were more visible between two-way discovery curves for each 
severity-risk factor combination (Figure 2.4D - F), for example, almost all currently 
known severe vector-borne viruses were discovered by the mid-1960s, whilst 
nonsevere vector-borne and severe nonvector-borne viruses tended to be discovered 
later (Figure 2.4E). Subsequently, the predictive power of each risk factor also varied 
over time, based on changes in information gain (Figure 2.4A - C). In earlier, smaller 
subsets, transmission route and human transmissibility were the most informative 
risk factors (Figure 2.4B-C). However, as time progressed and sample sizes increased, 
the informativeness of tissue tropism also increased (Figure 2.4A), ultimately 
becoming the most informative risk factor and the first branching criteria of the final 
classification tree (Figure 2.2).  
 
2.4.4. Predicted virulence of newly reported viruses  
I identified 30 newly recognised human RNA viruses not yet considered 
species, 15 of which were rated as causing severe disease using literature-based 
criteria and 25 of which had complete risk factor predictor data available. Although 
many were bunyaviruses or hantaviruses, 9 virus families were represented (Table 
A.2). The final classification tree was applied to these as a test set and correctly 
predicted the literature-assigned severity rating for 26/30 viruses (86.7% accuracy, 
95% confidence interval: 69.2%-96.2%) (Figure 2.5), a significantly greater 
performance than the null model (null accuracy = 50.0%; exact binomial one-tailed 
test, p < 0.001). In predicting ‘severe’ viruses, sensitivity was 0.73 and specificity 1.0; 
all four misclassifications were viruses rated severe by literature-based protocols, but 
predicted as nonsevere by the tree (Bunyaviridae: Bhanja virus, Heartland virus, 
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Figure 2.5. Application of the final classification tree to predicting disease severity for an 
independent dataset of 30 newly reported viruses not yet ratified as species. Viruses are 
classified according to criteria as in Figure 2.2. ‘Trans.Route’ denotes primary 
transmission route, and ‘S.Trans.’ denotes sustained human-to-human transmissibility. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
I present the first comparative analysis of virulence across all known human 
RNA virus species to my knowledge. I find that disease severity is non-randomly 
distributed across virus families and that severe disease is predicted by risk factors of 
tissue tropism breadth, and to a lesser extent, transmission route and human-to-
human transmissibility. Specifically, viruses were expected to cause severe disease if 
they were arenaviruses, bunyaviruses or filoviruses infecting multiple organ systems; 
or if they infected a single organ system, were nonvector-borne, and were flaviviruses 
or retroviruses with sustained transmissibility, or rhabdoviruses (regardless of 
transmissibility). These risk factors were robust to alternative modelling methods, 
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2.5.1. Ecology and evolution of risk factor traits 
Tissue tropism breadth was the most informative risk factor (Figure 2.4A) 
and the first split criteria in the classification tree (Figure 2.2). Few evolutionary 
studies have predicted how tissue tropism should influence virulence, although it has 
been noted infection of non-target tissues that do not contribute to transmission may 
result in an excessive, non-adapted virulence (Levin and Bull 1994). Relationships 
between virulence and tropism have instead largely been examined from 
experimental perspectives, which show consistency with my findings, e.g. virulent 
strains of Newcastle disease virus are detectable in more organ systems of avian 
embryos than non-virulent strains (Al-Garib et al. 2003). Tropism for multiple organ 
systems could result in virulence as a function of pathology occurring in multiple 
bodily areas, increasing intensity of clinical disease. However, the underlying 
evolutionary dynamics of generalism in tissue tropisms are unknown, and an area of 
scope for future theoretical models of virulence. In comparison, studies of pathogen 
generalism in the context of host range have predicted that generalism may increase 
virulence, though only under specific conditions (Leggett et al. 2013), e.g. within-host 
competition with specialists. The connection between generalism in tissue tropism 
and host range is not clear (Taber and Pease 1990), and further evolutionary study 
will be necessary to resolve the virulence association I observe. 
I also found that viruses primarily transmitted by routes other than arthropod 
vectors were more likely to be virulent, though only among three virus families. 
Contrastingly, Ewald (1983) previously reported a positive association between 
virulence and vector-borne transmission in comparative analyses pooling several 
microparasite types, and suggested virulence has fewer evolutionary costs if vector 
transmission is independent of host health and mobility. My findings may imply that 
even if transmission occurs independently, virulence may bring ultimate costs in 
terms of host mortality before a vector encounter can occur. This previous analysis 
was also limited to a much smaller range of viruses and may reflect ascertainment in 
discovery or data availability; I observed that most currently known severe vector-
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borne viruses were recognised much earlier than nonsevere vector-borne viruses, or 
severe viruses transmitted via other routes (Figure 2.4E). Day (2002b) found vector-
borne transmission to result in higher virulence in theoretical models only under 
certain parameter conditions and proposed that arthropod vectoring may increase 
parasite virulence if this involves a comparatively larger inoculum. However, 
experimental studies of Plasmodium chabaudi show vector-transmitted infections to 
be less virulent compared to direct inoculation, independent of inoculum size 
(Spence et al. 2013). The dynamics of virulence in vector-borne systems warrant 
further attention. 
The relationship between virulence and transmissibility appeared more 
complex. Based on hypothesised virulence-transmissibility trade-offs (Anderson and 
May 1982; Bremermann and Pickering 1983; Alizon et al. 2009) and the potential for 
coincidental non-adapted virulence in ‘dead-end’ zoonotic infections (Levin and 
Svanborg Edén 1990; Bull 1994), I expected viruses with inefficient or no human-to-
human transmission to be more virulent. For the most part I found no association 
between transmissibility and virulence, except within a small subset of nonvector-
borne flaviviruses and retroviruses, where the relationship was counter to 
expectation. Five virus species of this subset were rated to cause severe disease despite 
having efficient human-to-human transmissibility (HIV 1 and 2, Primate T-
lymphotropic virus 1 and 2, and Hepatitis C virus). These viruses are all typically 
associated with chronic conditions (specifically AIDS, HTLV-associated myelopathy, 
and cirrhosis), which may explain why this group does not support evolutionary 
theory – costs to pathogens of host mortality may be limited if disease occurs after 
the infectious window has already passed, essentially ‘decoupling’ virulence and 
transmission (Bull 1994). However, human-transmissible viruses associated with 
chronic disease were not rated ‘severe’ by literature-based criteria in all cases, e.g. 
several human enteroviruses. The lack of support for a hypothesised negative 
relationship between virulence and transmissibility may stem from the difficulty in 
accurately measuring human-to-human transmissibility. In the absence of 
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standardised metrics, both individual data (e.g. single observations) and population-
level data (e.g. R0 values) were used to categorise transmissibility despite representing 
different components of the trade-off hypothesis. Improved quantification has been 
noted as a crucial step towards fully testing this relationship (Alizon et al. 2009).  
 
2.5.2. Ascertainment biases 
Although virus detectability is known to depend on severity of cases, I did not 
observe ascertainment bias with respect to overall disease severity. However, when 
viruses were subset to only those known in decade intervals, predictive power of risk 
factors changed over time, likely as a result of shifts in viral discovery focuses. For 
example, I observed a sharp increase from the 1960s onwards in nonsevere vector-
borne viruses (Figure 2.4E), also observed elsewhere and attributed to the efforts of a 
specific arbovirus discovery program (Rosenberg et al. 2013). Whether the known set 
of human viruses and virulence risk factors among them are ultimately biased 
depends on the true picture of human virus diversity, about which it is difficult to 
speculate given how little of the human and wider global virome has been sampled 
(Anthony et al. 2013; Delwart 2013). 
I also observed some directional bias in the classification tree model – most 
misclassifications were viruses assigned as severe by literature-based criteria and 
assigned as nonsevere by the tree, a large fraction of which were vector-borne viruses. 
This may be partly due to the inflated discovery and designation of vector-borne 
virus species outlined above, leading the tree to typify taxonomic families dominated 
by vector-borne viruses (e.g. Bunyaviridae, Togaviridae) and vector-borne 
flaviviruses and rhabdoviruses as broadly nonsevere in the first two prediction 
groups, respectively (Figure 2.2). Misclassified viruses tended to be rare exceptions 
among groups of viruses with similar ecology, for example, the equine encephalitis 
viruses (Eastern, Western) are unusually severe compared to other mosquito-borne 
alphaviruses. Many of these viruses, including the equine encephalitis viruses, were 
associated with neural syndromes. This may suggest that beyond broad tissue 
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tropism, a more specialist neurological tropism could be an alternative evolutionary 
route to virulence, assuming neural pathology is a true reflection of neural tropism. 
No other traits considered distinguished between these nonsevere and severe vector-
borne viruses, and the acquisition of further ecological traits such as biogeography, or 
molecular and genetic traits may improve separation of neurological vector-borne 
viruses.  
 
2.5.3. Predictive power for newly reported viruses 
Predictive studies can provide valuable input to risk assessments of novel 
emerging diseases (Morse et al. 2012). In testing as a predictive tool for virulence risk, 
the classification tree model correctly predicted the literature-assigned disease 
severity of 26 of 30 newly reported human viruses not yet ratified as species. 
However, the predictive potential of this model is subject to the accuracy of both 
virulence and risk factor data. It must be acknowledged that the literature-based 
criteria used to calculate accuracy (in the absence of any standardised ‘ground truth’ 
for virulence) remains prone to error. Three newly-reported viruses, Bhanja virus, 
Heartland virus and Sosuga virus, were predicted by the classification tree to be 
nonsevere, but were assigned a ‘severe’ rating from the literature protocol as the few 
known cases resulted in hospitalisation. However, there remains genuine uncertainty 
as to the true level of virulence for these viruses and the literature-assigned rating 
may reflect biased detection towards highly symptomatic cases (Koopmans 2013). 
I also acknowledge that data on virulence itself may be more accessible 
information during viral emergence than several predictors used as inputs in my 
model, particularly tissue tropism, which is not likely to be known with confidence 
before the first estimate of clinical pathology. To illustrate, MERS coronavirus is a 
respiratory virus, though its syndrome often exhibits kidney involvement. However, 
there is currently no diagnostic evidence the virus infects the renal system, and I 
therefore assigned MERS coronavirus as infecting a single organ system only, which 
may have led to the discrepancy between tree prediction and literature-based rating. 
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One way to circumvent this and develop timely virulence predictions may be to 
substitute tissue tropism information using data regarding nonhuman animal 
infections. For MERS coronavirus, primate and other animal models collectively 
demonstrate multi-organ tropism with involvement of respiratory, neuronal, 
gastrointestinal, and several other tissues (van Doremalen and Munster 2015). 
However, comprehensive laboratory experiments are also unlikely to be accessible in 
the early stages of emergence. Wild surveillance studies could be consulted, although 
tissue origins of positive samples may often be left unreported (Young and Olival 
2016). The most immediate method of substituting predictor data would be 
imputation from the nearest phylogenetically related virus, particularly given tissue 
tropism appears to be a highly conserved trait (Taber and Pease 1990). The above 
concerns highlight the challenge presented by paucity of data during viral emergence. 
As genomic methods improve and viral sequence information becomes increasingly 
easy to obtain, an ultimate target will be the advancement of knowledge such that 
tissue tropism and receptor usage may be directly inferred via genetic markers from 
sequences alone. 
 
2.5.4. Analytical limitations 
I acknowledge several limitations to the quality of data used, as with any 
broad comparative analysis. Risk factor data was problematic or missing for certain 
viruses, e.g. natural transmission route for viruses only known to infect humans by 
accidental occupational exposure, and breadth of tissue tropism for viruses only 
known from serological evidence. However, the consistency of findings between 
alternative, stricter definitions of virulence and data subsets removing viruses with 
suspected data quality issues suggests scarcity of data does not bias these analyses. I 
also acknowledge that the chosen model methodology of classification trees can be 
fragile, with specific tree structures often not being robust to small changes to 
datasets. Trees are presented here in a predictive context that provides valuable direct 
interpretability rather than the context of statistical inference. However, the 
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consistent losses in accuracy across jack-knifed trees when risk factors featuring in 
the final tree are removed and the finding that single risk factors alone cannot explain 
full accuracy observed within the final tree (Figure 2.3) provide rudimentary 
statistical support for the tree model. Virulence predictors were also validated using a 
logistic regression model, which supported the risk factors and directionalities 
observed within the classification tree (Table A.5). 
There is also potential for confounding within the virulence risk factors I 
report, as virulence varies with many traits not included in this analysis. For example, 
although severity of Lassa virus disease superficially varies between infection routes, 
these differences correspond to variation in geography, which may be due to spatial 
variation in genotype (Howard 2009). As well as correcting for any broad 
phylogenetic signal of virulence, the contribution of taxonomic family to the 
classification tree is likely to have also acted as a proxy for some unmodelled viral 
traits, particularly molecular characteristics. Many potential confounders explain 
finer variation of virulence and were not testable at this ecological scale. Virulence 
can vary substantially between strains of the same virus species, and inference at this 
resolution would benefit from sequence-based phylogenetic analyses, with the 
potential to additionally base predictions on genetic markers of virulence. Within 
individual hosts, clinical symptoms often depend on host traits such as 
immunocompetence, age, or microbiome (Franco et al. 2003; Mackinnon et al. 2008). 
My risk factor analysis brings a novel, top-down perspective on virulence at the 
broadest level, though caution must be exerted in extrapolating the risk factors I find 
to dynamics of individual infections.  
 
2.5.5. Implications for public health 
Care should be also taken in interpreting my predictive model as a measure of 
population risk. I defined virulence for typical individual infections, independent of 
prevalence, incidence and population context. For example, I defined case fatality 
ratios (CFR) of ≥5% as ‘severe’, though for influenza the most severe category is 
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defined in recent pandemic severity indices as having CFR >1-2% (Reed et al. 2013). 
It is therefore important to distinguish clinical virulence from impact; 1-2% CFR 
would still cause at least 0.9-1.8 million deaths within the USA based on influenza 
incidence rates (CDC 2007) and would be more of a public health priority than a 
‘severe’ virus with CFR ≥5% that infects many fewer people each year. However, this 
does not necessarily detract from the value of my model as a predictive tool for newly 
reported viruses, where ultimate incidence rates are difficult to predict in early 
emergence. 
This work suggests directions for future public health initiatives. Firstly, I 
have demonstrated how a comparative approach could be used to predict virulence 
of newly emerging pathogens. This work brings a novel focus that complements 
comparative models surrounding other aspects of the emergence process, such as 
those predicting zoonotic transmission from certain hosts (Cleaveland et al. 2001; 
Pedersen and Davies 2009) or within certain geographic hotspots (Jones et al. 2008). 
The value of empirical modelling as an inexpensive and rapid tool during early 
emergence is increasingly being recognised, and similar functional models have been 
constructed to identify causative pathogens from early outbreak data (Bogich et al. 
2013). Secondly, there are growing calls for predictive ecological studies to shape 
surveillance or intervention strategy of candidate emerging zoonoses (Pulliam 2008; 
Daszak 2009; Morse et al. 2012). Current surveillance initiatives have just begun to 
target specific non-human hosts and locations based on empirical studies (Morse et 
al. 2012). Virulence has already been suggested as a factor that could direct 
surveillance strategies for viruses, though this has only been explored with respect to 
virulence in non-human hosts (Levinson et al. 2013). The virulence risk factors I find 
may suggest that preferentially targeting the nonvector-borne viruses of ecological 
systems and/or tailoring detection assays towards certain virus families (e.g. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
This work joins a series of comparative and predictive modelling surrounding 
emerging infectious diseases. Here, I contribute a novel focus in ecological predictors 
of virulence of human RNA viruses, which can be combined in holistic frameworks 
with other models such as those predicting emergence dynamics. As a predictive 
model, the featured classification tree can offer valuable inference into virulence of 
newly emerging infections. I propose that future predictive studies and preparedness 
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Chapter 3. Evolutionary routes of RNA virus 




The majority of human RNA viruses are zoonotic in origin, although the 
mechanisms of adaptation involved in the emergence of zoonotic pathogens are not 
well understood. Conceptual models often assume a ‘stepwise’ route where infectivity 
and transmissibility develop in distinct stages. However, empirical observations 
suggest some viruses are capable of ‘off-the-shelf’ jumps, being sufficiently adapted 
for epidemic transmissibility immediately after zoonotic transmission. Here, I aim to 
further understand and characterise these viral routes to human adaptation and their 
determinants. Firstly, I use state-switching models to assess support for both stepwise 
and off-the-shelf routes to human adaptation, measured using the Pathogen Pyramid 
level schema. State-switching models were fitted to existing RNA virus phylogenies 
where available, and additionally, a cladogram based on taxonomic structure. 
Secondly, I use phylogenetic comparative analyses to identify whether transmission 
route and genomic guanine-cytosine content can predict human adaptation. State-
switching models variously supported the stepwise or off-the-shelf routes for 
different RNA virus phylogenies, though for several taxa, neither route was well-
supported exclusively, instead resembling a mixture of both stepwise and off-the-
shelf movements. When analysed across a broad taxonomic cladogram, mixed 
dynamics were also observed. Correcting for phylogenetic signal, respiratory and 
vector-transmitted viruses were more likely to reach greater levels of human 
adaptation. This suggests that viruses follow a variety of adaptive trajectories, though 
future public health threats may be broadly predictable regarding certain groups, e.g. 
nonhuman paramyxoviruses, transmissible human alphaviruses or flaviviruses. 
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Improved sequence data and higher-resolution phylogenetic inference will be able to 
build on this approach and further elucidate patterns of viral adaptation. 
 
3.2. Introduction 
RNA viruses are consistently overrepresented among emerging human 
pathogens (Taylor et al. 2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005). As a result of 
their high rates of replication and lack of proofreading mechanisms, RNA viruses are 
generally established to have high rates of mutation (Belshaw et al. 2008; Parrish et al. 
2008), implying potential for both wide genetic diversity within existing hosts and 
rapid adaptation to novel hosts. It follows that the majority of human RNA viruses 
originate from zoonotic spillover or host shifts (Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 
2005). Although many well-studied examples of host shifts have occurred 
comparatively recently, potential ancient host shifts have been identified through 
comparative evolutionary methods (Kitchen et al. 2011; Drexler et al. 2012; Longdon 
et al. 2015b). However, precisely how viral adaptation to novel hosts occurs during 
host shifts remains poorly characterised, as does whether viruses with different traits 
follow different adaptive trajectories. 
Host shifts have been conceptually modelled as following distinct stages from 
original host to novel host in a variety of schemata (Childs et al. 2007; Wolfe et al. 
2007; Lloyd-Smith et al. 2009). Here, I focus on one such schema, the Pathogen 
Pyramid model (Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007), and use its criteria to represent RNA 
virus adaptation within humans. The Pathogen Pyramid is based on transmissibility, 
and I follow previous suggestions that “human-adapted” might describe a virus 
capable of sufficient human-to-human transmission to persist in human populations 
in the absence of any potential nonhuman hosts (Woolhouse et al. 2013). 
Viruses present only in animal hosts and not infecting humans are considered 
“level 1” (Figure 3.1A), whilst those infecting humans from a zoonotic source that 
have no onward human-to-human transmissibility are considered “level 2”. Viruses 
with human-to-human transmissibility are considered “level 3” if transmission is 
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self-limiting, usually observed as single events or short chains, or “level 4” if 
transmission is self-sustaining, which includes fluctuating epidemics or constant 
endemic transmission. Levels 2, 3, and 4 can be considered as equivalent to values of 
R0 = 0, 0 < R0 < 1, and R0 ≥ 1 respectively, where R0 denotes the basic reproductive 
number, i.e. the number of secondary cases expected to result from a single primary 
case among an entirely susceptible population. However, in practice R0 can be 
difficult to estimate and is not precisely calculated for the majority of human RNA 
viruses (Hay et al. 2013, Woolhouse et al. 2016). The pyramid shape reflects the 
presence of biological “barriers” that viruses with insufficient levels of adaptation 
may not be able to surpass, for example, host immune response, cell receptor 
availability, or potential to exit the host (Kuiken et al. 2006). Therefore, a fraction of 
viruses is prevented from moving upwards at each level, resulting in decreasing 
numbers of viruses between successive stages of adaptation; only 47 of the 180 
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Figure 3.1. Potential models of RNA virus emergence and adaptation in humans. A) The 
‘Pathogen Pyramid’ model, adapted from (Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007), where viruses 
transition between levels of adaptation (1 – animal only, no human infection; 2 – human 
infection, no human-to-human transmission; 3 – self-limited human-to-human 
transmission; 4 – sustained human-to-human transmission) with barriers (blocked 
arrows) meaning increasingly fewer viruses transition to increasingly higher levels. B) 
and C) Using Pathogen Pyramid level definitions, hypothesised models of adaptation 
based on evolutionary routes suggested by theoretical/empirical literature, where B) is 
the “stepwise” model, and C) is the “off-the-shelf” model. D) Complete RJ-MCMC model 
space with all possible transitions, including backward transitions (dashed lines). 
 
A key question for disease ecology research as well as for public health is how 
viruses traverse adaptive landscapes to adapt to novel hosts and become established 
(i.e. ascend the levels of the Pathogen Pyramid). Several routes to adaptation have 
been proposed. Generally, schemata of disease emergence assume that adaptation 
occurs in a stepwise fashion (Figure 3.1B), with selection pressures acting on viruses 
to induce genetic change successively at each level within humans as the novel host 
(Pepin et al. 2010). Although the distance between steps is often represented as 
equivalent, the magnitude of genetic change required for each level of adaptation 
may vary greatly. 
Empirically, a different pattern is often observed among emerging diseases 
(Woolhouse et al. 2016), where viruses seemingly “jump” straight from the animal 
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host at level 1 to higher levels of human adaptation (Figure 3.1C), with many high 
profile examples including SARS coronavirus (Holmes 2005), MERS coronavirus 
(Breban et al. 2013) and 2009 A-H1N1 influenza virus (Garten et al. 2009). This 
movement has been previously referred to as an “off-the-shelf” dynamic (Woolhouse 
and Antia 2007). These off-the-shelf jumps suggest that genetic variation within an 
animal host can generate a virus that transmits to humans already having sufficient 
genetic capability for human-to-human transmission (Pepin et al. 2010). Genetic 
evidence for such pre-adapted genotypes has been identified in sequences of rabies 
virus during host shifts from bats to carnivores (Kuzmin et al. 2012), though no 
broad-scale comparative studies have addressed off-the-shelf adaptation to my 
knowledge (but see Pepin et al. 2010 for a critical assessment for several viruses). 
Phylogenetic state-switching models have been used in pathogen evolution 
studies to demonstrate switching from one host to another over viral phylogenies 
(Kitchen et al. 2011), but can also be used to test hypotheses regarding routes of 
movement between states in conceptual multi-state models (Pagel et al. 2004). To my 
knowledge, these methods have not yet been applied to phenotypes describing 
human adaptation, and here I aim to use this approach to determine relative support 
for stepwise or off-the-shelf models, or find the otherwise most likely route of 
adaptation. 
I focus on evidence for these routes of adaptation among RNA viruses at a 
macroevolutionary resolution spanning taxonomic families and genera, with 
Pathogen Pyramid levels assigned to individual virus species. Although many viral 
host shifts involve adaptation at the finer resolution of genetic lineages or strains, 
traits such as human infectivity, primary host type and vector specificity show 
detectable phylogenetic signal between virus species (Grard et al. 2010; Kitchen et al. 
2011; Longdon et al. 2015). This suggests that despite being prone to changes at the 
microevolutionary scale, the genetic capability for such traits remains heritable at the 
macroevolutionary scale. The specific macroevolutionary dynamics surrounding 
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development of human-to-human transmissibility have not been addressed in depth, 
although several empirical observations may be used to illustrate.  
The alternative hypothesised routes of adaptation described would lead to 
different macroevolutionary patterns of Pathogen Pyramid level across viral 
phylogenies, subject to evolutionary rate. Specifically, the stepwise model would 
imply a highly-structured phylogenetic pattern, whereby common ancestors between 
viral species gradually progress through Pathogen Pyramid levels, resulting in a 
detectable gradient of levels along the phylogeny (Figure 3.2A). Although there are 
no fully-documented observations of a stepwise emergence owing to a rarity of 
visible level 2 to 3 movements (Woolhouse et al. in review), an appropriate case study 
might be HIV-1 and 2. These viruses diverged from zoonotic primate SIVs, which are 
a subset of a larger radiation of primate SIVs that have not been observed to infect 
humans to date (Hahn et al. 2000; Woolhouse et al. 2016). In contrast, the off-the-
shelf model would imply a much more erratic phylogenetic distribution, where virus 
species with higher Pathogen Pyramid levels arise amidst clusters of level 1 viruses 
(Figure 3.2B). A typical example is SARS coronavirus, which rapidly adapted to 
humans following exposure to intermediate hosts (Holmes 2005; Song et al. 2005), 
yet its closest phylogenetic relatives are numerous ostensibly bat-specific level 1 
coronaviruses (Tang et al. 2006). 
Aside from the route taken, the ultimate extent of human adaptation that 
viruses can reach is thought to depend on several types of viral traits (Woolhouse et 
al.; Pulliam 2008). These include ecological traits, such as host range and 
transmission route (Woolhouse 2002; Woolhouse and Adair 2013) and molecular or 
genetic factors, such as cellular replication site, genome segmentation, and nucleotide 
biases (Pulliam 2008; Pulliam and Dushoff 2009). In this chapter, I focus on one 
example of each (transmission route, and nucleotide biases, respectively).  
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Figure 3.2. Hypothesised models of RNA virus adaptation in humans with corresponding 
example phylogenies underneath. Phylogenies illustrate potential evolutionary patterns 
of phenotypic Pathogen Pyramid level between virus species conforming to routes 
described by A) the stepwise model, B) the off-the-shelf model. 
 
For transmission route, transmission via direct contact has been hypothesised 
to present the greatest risks of host shifts, involving transmission potential via a 
range of bodily tissues or fluids with little need for external survivability (Pulliam 
2008). However, vector-borne viruses have been shown to be more likely to be 
zoonotic and/or emerging (Taylor et al. 2001; Woolhouse 2002; Loh et al. 2015). 
Specifically considering human-to-human transmissibility (levels 3 and 4), 
preliminary studies suggest vector-borne RNA viruses to be less likely to develop 
human-to-human transmissibility than those using other routes (Woolhouse and 
Adair 2013; Woolhouse et al. 2013; Geoghegan et al. 2016). Other comparative work 
has shown no conclusive single transmission route to act as a risk factor among 
disease emergence events (Loh et al. 2015), however to my knowledge, no such 
analyses have corrected for phylogenetic signal in how transmission route might 
contribute to different phenotypic stages of human adaptation. 
Viral nucleotide biases may also play a role in host adaptation. In comparative 
studies, RNA viruses appear to have similarity in frequency of guanine-cytosine (GC) 
content to that of their specific host genomes (Bahir et al. 2009). Furthermore, 
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viruses may adapt to “match” host GC content during host shifts, e.g. human 
influenza viruses appear to exhibit directional evolution to reduce GC content and 
frequency of CpG motifs compared to ancestral avian influenza viruses, resembling a 
level closer to that of the human genome and potentially evading innate immune 
recognition by mimicry (Rabadan et al. 2006; Greenbaum et al. 2008). This suggests 
greater risk of human adaptation for viruses with similar GC content to humans, 
which is notably lower than that of many other mammals (Romiguier et al. 2010). 
Based on the above, I hypothesise that viruses transmitted via direct contact 
and viruses having lower GC content will have increased risk of human adaptation. I 
also hypothesise that viruses transmitted via vectors will specifically exhibit increased 
risk of human infection, but decreased risk of human transmissibility. 
I aim to test hypotheses surrounding evolutionary routes of RNA virus 
adaptation to humans across different viral taxa, taking Pathogen Pyramid level as a 
measure of adaptation. To do this, I source existing phylogenies of virus families or 
genera where available. I then estimate rates and find consensus models of switching 
between Pathogen Pyramid levels by adopting a phylogenetic comparative approach. 
I also apply state-switching models to a wider, taxonomically-structured cladogram 
as a basic first estimate of routes of adaptation across a complete mammalian and 
avian RNA virus phylogeny. Finally, I use phylogenetic regression techniques based 
on this cladogram to understand whether ecological or genetic traits of virus species 
may predict the extent of their human adaptation, correcting for signal from 
taxonomic relatedness.  
 
3.3. Materials and methods 
3.3.1. Pathogen Pyramid level data 
For each of the 180 human-infective RNA virus species identified from 
previous standardised literature search efforts (Woolhouse et al. 2013), I critically 
assessed evidence for human transmissibility. I assigned Pathogen Pyramid levels 
through extensive review of literature, including structured searches and reference 
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tracing, as described in Woolhouse et al. (2016). Sources were identified through 
search terms: [virus name term, including all synonyms sourced from ICTV 9th 
Edition (King et al. 2011)] AND [“human to human” OR “person to person” OR 
interhuman OR communicab* OR transmi* OR outbreak OR cluster OR household 
OR iatrogenic OR urban cycle]; indexes used: Google Scholar, ProMED-mail (Yu and 
Madoff 2004); as well as original references from Woolhouse et al. (2013). R0 
estimates compiled by Hay et al. (2013) were also consulted. In assigning Pathogen 
Pyramid levels 3 and 4, evidence was accepted as sufficient where literature sources 
suggested that human-to-human transmissibility is suspected, though not confirmed 
(e.g. spatial or contact-based clusters of cases without diagnostic confirmation); or 
possible, though not directly observed (e.g. very large outbreaks in urban 
communities with few potential animal hosts). 
I also identified those level 1 viruses that are known to infect mammals or 
birds for inclusion in analyses as the most likely sources of zoonotic viruses 
(Woolhouse and Adair 2013). To represent these viruses, data was supplemented 
with a list of mammal-infective RNA viruses supplied by the EcoHealth Alliance 
(Olival et al. in review), collected via structured literature searches (search terms: 
[virus name including synonyms]; sources used: Web of Knowledge, Google Scholar, 
Wildlife Disease Association meeting abstracts, Global Mammal Parasite Database 
(Nunn and Altizer 2005); protocol further described in Levinson et al. 2013). I then 
supplemented data with level 1 bird-infective viruses obtained via structured 
literature searches (search terms: [virus name including synonyms] AND [“bird” OR 
“avian” OR “host range” OR “animal” OR “reservoir”]); sources used: Web of 
Knowledge, Google Scholar, Scopus). All viruses were standardised to species using 
ICTV 9th Edition Virus Taxonomy (King et al. 2011), resulting in 374 viruses across 
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3.3.2. Virus phylogenies and cladogram 
To investigate how Pathogen Pyramid level switching and routes of 
adaptation differ between virus taxa, I sourced existing phylogenies for several 
families and genera where available, and selected those including species representing 
at least three different Pathogen Pyramid levels: families Picornaviridae (Lu 
unpublished), Rhabdoviridae (Longdon et al. 2015b), and Paramyxoviridae (Kitchen 
et al. 2011), and genera Flavivirus and Alphavirus (Kitchen et al. 2011), which 
represent the vast majority of taxonomic richness in their respective families. 
Sequence tips in these phylogenies were matched to ICTV 9th Edition virus species 
present in the mammal and bird virus dataset and dropped from the tree if no match 
could be made. If more than one sequence matched to the same species, a single 
sequence was randomly chosen to represent that species and all other sequences were 
dropped. All phylogenies were rooted as per the methods in their respective sources. 
Although possible for other types of pathogen (McNally et al. 2014), 
construction of a complete RNA virus phylogeny is precluded by difficulty in 
accurately assigning deeper evolutionary branches, as a result of the extreme genetic 
divergence between families (Holmes 2003b). Following Kümmerli et al. (2014), I 
therefore constructed a viral cladogram as a basic proxy in lieu of a full mammalian 
and avian RNA virus phylogeny. The cladogram was assembled based on consecutive 
divisions of: genome type, taxonomic family, taxonomic genus and taxonomic 
species, where all sister clades were left as unresolved polytomies (Figure 3.3). I 
assumed each RNA virus genome type is monophyletic. Although viral monophyly is 
notoriously hard to determine given the difficulties in estimating ancient viral 
divergence (Holmes 2003b, 2011), conservation of gene homologues and replication 
strategies implies monophyly within certain viral genome types (e.g. single-stranded 
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Figure 3.3. Taxonomically-structured cladogram of RNA virus species infecting 
mammals or birds, using basic branch length assumption set (a), where branch lengths 
are arbitrarily specified such that deep taxonomic branches (root to genome type, 
genome type to family) are ten times the length of shallow taxonomic branches (family to 
genus, genus to species). Colour of species tips represent Pathogen Pyramid level. 
 
Branches were assigned arbitrary lengths where deeper taxonomic branches 
(those from root to genome type and genome type to family) were ten-fold the length 
of shallower taxonomic branches (those from family to genus and genus to species) 
(Figure 3.3). These orders of magnitude between lineage diversification times are 
consistent with estimates for several RNA virus taxa (Fargette et al. 2008; Li et al. 
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2015). However, estimation of virus divergence times is often contentious, and there 
are recent suggestions that within-family diversification (i.e. my shallow taxonomic 
branches) may be much more ancient among some vertebrate RNA virus families 
(Taylor et al. 2014). Therefore, in addition to this basic cladogram (a), I tested 
robustness of state-switching models to branch length assumptions by applying 
further cladograms with alternative branch length assumption sets where: b) deep 
taxonomic branches were equal lengths to shallow taxonomic branches; c) deep 
taxonomic branches were a hundred-fold the length of shallow taxonomic branches; 
d) all branch lengths were scaled using Grafen’s (1989) method for unknown 
phylogenetic distances, where ages of branching times were proportional to the 
number of ultimate descendent nodes. All cladograms were rooted at the ancestral 
node between genome types All phylogenetic construction and manipulation was 
carried out using package ‘ape’, v3.2 (Paradis et al. 2004) in R, v3.1.3 (R Development 
Core Team 2015).  
 
3.3.3. State-switching modelling analysis 
State-switching models were implemented using the Multistate function of 
BayesTraits, v2.0 (Pagel et al. 2004). BayesTraits uses Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods to estimate parameters describing rates of transitions between 
discrete states (in this case, Pathogen Pyramid level) over a phylogenetic tree. As a 
basic comparison between hypothesised models, posterior likelihoods in the form of 
estimated harmonic mean were compared between the stepwise and off-the-shelf 
models (Figure 3.1B, 3.1C), which were specified by restricting the relevant transition 
parameters to zero (stepwise model: levels 1 to 3, 1 to 4, 2 to 4; off-the-shelf model: 
levels 2 to 3, 2 to 4, 3 to 4). 
To find the most parsimonious model from the entire potential model space 
(Figure 3.1D), I then used the reversible jump MCMC method (RJ-MCMC) (Pagel 
and Meade 2006). RJ-MCMC methods flexibly move around the entire model space 
between iterations by jumping between different model dimensionalities according 
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to a Markov chain process. Subsequently, RJ-MCMC methods collapse model 
dimensionality by reducing number of parameters used to an optimum, through 
fixing multiple transition rates as having the same parameter, or to be zero. For all 
RJ-MCMC analyses, parameter configurations with at least 5% frequency among all 
iterations in the RJ-MCMC chain were examined and from these, the consensus 
model was accepted as the most common parameter configuration. No consensus 
was thus identified among models over the Alphavirus and Flavivirus phylogenies 
(highest model frequency 2.13% and 1.87%, respectively). Although a 5% frequency 
across all RJ-MCMC iterations may appear low, this still represents substantial 
support as the potential model space is very large; the number of potential models 
featuring up to thirteen unique rate parameters (considering fixation at zero as a 
possible rate parameter) can be considered a Bell number, which describes the 
number of possible partitions of a set (Wilf 1990) and is calculable recursively as: 
 
13 =  12 	
12
=0
 = 27644437 3. 1 
 
Assuming all possible models are equally likely and sampled iterations are 
independent, the probability of observing a specific parameter configuration at a 
given iteration is therefore   =   =  3.62 x 10, and the probability of observing 
any parameter configuration at a frequency of at least 5% among  sampled RJ-
MCMC iterations follows a cumulative binomial distribution: 
 
 ≥ 0.05 =   

=0.05
1 − − 3. 2 
 
As 9950 iterations were sampled in all RJ-MCMC analyses,  ≪ #, and the 
expected number of times any specific parameter configuration would be seen is 
zero. The probability of observing a model at 5% frequency or higher under this null 
distribution becomes infinitesimally small for such a small p and large n. 
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Unless fixed at zero, rate parameters in all state-switching models were 
assigned an exponential prior with parameter sourced from a uniform hyperprior 
between 0 and 2. All RJ-MCMC chains were run for 107 iterations, discarding the 
first 5 x 104 as burn-in and sampling every 1000th iteration. Parameter traces were 
visually inspected to confirm convergence. In all cases, five separate RJ-MCMC runs 
were conducted to confirm replicability and the run with highest marginal likelihood 
(as measured by estimated harmonic mean) was retained for further analysis.  
Finally, to further assess support for hypotheses regarding routes of human 
adaptation (Figure 3.1), I used Bayes Factors, which were calculated as the ratio of 
posterior odds to the prior odds. In this context, the prior odds are the odds of 
observing the specific hypothesised model out of all possible models, which I 
calculated as a binomial process, considering each of the twelve model rates as being 
either zero or nonzero. The stepwise model (Figure 3.1B) was defined as transition 
rates from Pathogen Pyramid levels 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 4 being nonzero and 1 to 3, 
1 to 4, and 2 to 4 being zero. Inversely, the off-the-shelf model (Figure 3.1C) was 
defined as rates from level 1 to 2, 1 to 3, and 1 to 4 being nonzero, and rates from 2 to 
3, 2 to 4, and 3 to 4 being zero. In preliminary runs, loss of function was commonly 
seen in state-switching models featured in RJ-MCMC chains. Therefore, I made no 
assumptions on loss of function in assessing support for hypothesised models and 
calculate Bayes Factors based on these forward transition parameters only. The 
probability of these six rate parameters following either exact hypothesised model are 
 $12%
6
, giving prior odds of  $12%
6
1 - $12%
6 . Prior odds calculations were adjusted accordingly  
in cases where virus phylogenies used did not contain all four Pathogen Pyramid 
levels. The posterior odds are the odds of observing the exact hypothesised model 
within the posterior models featured throughout the sampled RJ-MCMC iterations. 
Strength of support provided by Bayes Factors is generally accepted as negligible for 
values <1, minor for values from 1 - 3, moderate for values from 3 - 10, strong for 
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3.3.4. Phylogenetic comparative analysis 
To determine whether ecological or genetic traits may be associated with 
Pathogen Pyramid levels, data were sourced on transmission route and GC content 
for each virus species. These traits were selected based on data availability and 
demonstration of substantial within-taxonomic family variation, as traits that are 
heavily nested within a phylogenetic structure are difficult to estimate during 
phylogenetic comparative analysis. Transmission route was defined as the route that 
viral transmission primarily occurs by, regardless of host type, and was classified as 
either ‘direct contact’ (including aerosol material that is directly inoculated), 
‘respiratory’, ‘faecal-oral’, or ‘vector-borne’ (excluding mechanical transmission). 
Transmission route data was collected via consultation of clinical virology sources 
(Knipe and Howley 2007; Richman et al. 2009; Zuckerman et al. 2009) and structured 
literature searches (search terms: [virus name including synonyms] AND [transmi* 
OR *borne OR vector]; source used: Google Scholar). Viral GC content was 
calculated using sequences obtained from GenBank (Benson et al. 2005) for the type 
isolates of each virus species, as designated in the ICTV 9th Edition (King et al. 2011). 
Virus species with missing transmission route or GC content data were excluded 
from phylogenetic regression analyses, leaving n = 221. 
To correct for potential phylogenetic signal in testing for associations 
between virus traits and Pathogen Pyramid level, I constructed Bayesian phylogenetic 
mixed regression models with MCMC implementation using the ‘MCMCglmm’ R 
package, v2.21 (Hadfield 2010). Phylogenetic regression models were specified with a 
multinomial error structure, separately comparing likelihood of reaching Pathogen 
Pyramid levels 2, 3, and 4 compared to a baseline of level 1. Phylogenetic covariance 
in Pathogen Pyramid level and virus trait predictors was corrected for by specifying 
the mammalian and avian RNA virus cladogram with assumption set (a) as a random 
effect in lieu of a complete phylogeny. Viruses excluded due to missing data were 
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dropped from the cladogram. GC content (%) was modelled under a log-
transformation. 
Phylogenetic regressions were run with inverse Wishart priors with V = 1 on 
the random term (RNA virus cladogram) and flattened Gelman priors on the fixed 
terms (multinomial intercepts, transmission route, log(% GC content)) with a scale 
of 2 +  (), using the ‘gelman.prior’ function in package ‘MCMCglmm’, following 
Gelman et al. (2008). Residual variance was fixed at 1. Phylogenetic regressions were 
run for 5 x 106 iterations, retaining every 1000th iteration, discarding the first 1.25 x 
106 as burn-in. Convergence was confirmed by inspecting trace output, and 
suitability of priors was confirmed by inspecting posterior estimates of phylogenetic 
covariance and confirming values of latent variables were consistent with logit 
function boundaries. All phylogenetic regression was carried out in R, v3.1.3 (R 
Development Core Team 2015).  
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. State-switching models of RNA virus adaptation 
I assessed whether the stepwise or off-the-shelf model (Figure 3.1B, 3.1C) best 
described evolutionary routes of human adaptation over phylogenies of different 
RNA virus families and genera. The stepwise and off-the-shelf models were both 
moderately supported for Rhabdoviridae adaptation, whereas the stepwise model was 
much more highly supported for Alphavirus and Flavivirus adaptation (Table 3.1). 
Neither model was well-supported for Picornaviridae and Paramyxoviridae 
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Table 3.1. Likelihoods and posterior support for hypothesised models of virus adaptation 
over existing family or genus-level phylogenies. Runs presented are those with the highest 
marginal likelihood. ‘lnHM’ = log(harmonic mean), ‘BF’ = Bayes Factor calculated as 
odds of observing given model in RJ-MCMC chain compared to naive odds of observing 
given model from all possible models. 
 
 State-switching model 
Virus phylogeny Stepwise Off-the-shelf RJ-MCMC 
Picornaviridae 
lnHM = -20.099 
BF = 0.33 
lnHM = -19.554 
BF = 0.75 
lnHM = -14.058 
Rhabdoviridae 
lnHM = -35.734 
BF = 5.04 
lnHM = -36.917 
BF = 5.25 
lnHM = -24.499 
Paramyxoviridae 
lnHM = -85.655 
BF = 0 
lnHM = -77.829 
BF = 0 
lnHM = -38.372 
Alphavirus genus 
lnHM = -36.402 
BF = 12.32 
lnHM = -48.182 
BF = 0.48 
lnHM = -30.238 
Flavivirus genus 
lnHM = -46.471 
BF = 10.93 
lnHM = -58.052 
BF = 2.23 
lnHM = -37.775 
 
Examination of the models fitted in RJ-MCMC analyses revealed greater 
detail in routes of adaptation between virus taxa. The most frequent models accepted 
as consensus for the Picornaviridae and Paramyxoviridae families featured off-the-
shelf transitions from Pathogen Pyramid level 1 to 4, as well as 2 to 4 (Figure 3.4, 
Table 3.2), as did all models with at least 5% frequency within RJ-MCMC iterations 
(Table B.1, B.3). Consistent stepwise gains of function in levels 1 through 4 were 
generally not seen in examined RJ-MCMC models, although models with least 5% 
frequency for the Rhabdoviridae family often featured a stepwise path from 1 to 3 
(Figure 3.4, Table B.2). Although no single model had at least 5% frequency for the 
Alphavirus and Flavivirus genera, consistent stepwise progression from level 1 to 4 
was much better supported than off-the-shelf movements when summarising over all 
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model iterations (Figure B.1). Notably, losses of function (i.e. backward transitions) 
were commonly fitted throughout all RJ-MCMC models. All models featured with at 
least 5% frequency were fitted with a single rate parameter (Table B.1 – B.3), though 
posterior mean values of this parameter showed substantial heterogeneity between 
viral families (Table 3.2). This may suggest different evolutionary rates of host 
adaptation between different viral taxa, though posterior credible intervals were wide 




Figure 3.4. Consensus RJ-MCMC state-switching models of Pathogen Pyramid levels 
across those viral phylogenies having accepted consensus models with ≥5% frequency: A) 
family Picornaviridae, B) family Rhabdoviridae, C) family Paramyxoviridae. 
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3.4.2. State-switching models across an RNA virus cladogram 
In testing which model best described adaptation across a preliminary, 
taxonomically-structured mammalian and avian RNA virus cladogram, both 
performed poorly with very little or no support (Table 3.3). Instead, the most 
frequent model accepted as consensus from the RJ-MCMC analysis suggested a 
mixture of dynamics, with stepwise-like transitions between Pathogen Pyramid levels 
1 through 3, and off-the-shelf-like jumping from level 1 to 4 (Figure 3.5). This model 
was fitted with two parameters, the higher of which was assigned to transitions 
involving complete loss of human infectivity (levels 2 to 1, 3 to 1) (Table 3.4). Other 
models with at least 5% frequency were broadly comparable, differing only in a level 
3 to 2 parameterisation (Table B.4), and the same mixture of stepwise and off-the-
shelf movements was observed when summarising over all iterations (Figure B.2). 
Repeated analyses specifying alternative sets generally supported the 
robustness of the RJ-MCMC analysis to assumptions surrounding cladogram branch 
lengths. Compared to the basic branch length assumption set (a), the same most 
frequent consensus model was obtained when using assumption sets (b), where deep 
taxonomic branches were equal lengths to shallow taxonomic branches, and (c), 
where deep taxonomic branches were a hundred-fold the lengths of shallow 
taxonomic branches (Table 3.4), with near-identical rate parameters. For these 
assumption sets, all models above with at least 5% frequency were also closely 
comparable (Table B.5, B.6). However, branch length assumption set (d) following 
Grafen’s method gave slightly different models (Table 3.4, B.7), fitting an additional 
off-the-shelf transition (level 1 to 3) and an additional stepwise transition (level 3 to 
4), suggesting higher variability in adaptive routes under this assumption set. The 
consensus model for this assumption set also featured substantially higher rate 
parameters (Table 3.4), reflecting the much shorter absolute lengths of shallow 
taxonomic branches.   
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Table 3.3. Likelihoods and posterior support for hypothesised models of virus adaptation 
over taxonomically-structured cladogram under branch length assumption set (a). Runs 
presented are those with the highest marginal likelihood. ‘lnHM’ = log(harmonic mean), 
‘BF’ = Bayes Factor calculated as odds of observing given model in RJ-MCMC chain 
compared to naïve odds of observing given model from all possible models. 
 
State-switching model lnHM Bayes Factor 
Stepwise model -528.645 0.013 
Off-the-shelf model -541.742 0 
RJ-MCMC model -393.399 NA 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Consensus RJ-MCMC state-switching model of Pathogen Pyramid levels 
across taxonomically-structured cladogram, under branch length assumption set (a). 
 
3.4.3. Viral trait associations with adaptation 
Preliminarily correcting for phylogenetic covariance using the mammalian 
and avian RNA virus cladogram with assumption set (a), phylogenetic mixed 
regression suggested that Pathogen Pyramid level is strongly associated with 
transmission route. Specifically, respiratory and vector-transmitted viruses were 
more likely to reach levels 2 and 3 than directly transmitted viruses (Table 3.5, Figure 
B.3), although this effect did not extend to level 4. Additionally, there was limited 
evidence that viruses with greater GC content were more likely to reach levels 2 and 
3, where 95% credible intervals marginally included zero (Table 3.5, Figure B.3). 
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Table 3.5. Posterior mean coefficients from multinomial phylogenetic MCMC regression 
for viruses with complete data (n = 221), with 95% credible intervals in brackets. 
‘(intercept)’ denotes log odds ratio of a virus having the specified Pathogen Pyramid level 
compared to level 1 (no human infection), ‘TR:’ denotes additional log odds of a virus 
having the specified Pathogen Pyramid level given the specified transmission route 
compared to a baseline of direct-contact transmission. 95% credible intervals around 
virus trait predictors that exclude zero are highlighted in bold. 
 
 Pathogen Pyramid level 






































Using existing viral phylogenies, state-switching models show that host 
switching and emergence in humans variously follows a stepwise or off-the-shelf 
model for different RNA virus families and genera, although several virus taxa were 
not well-described by either model exclusively. The most prominent model fits as 
determined by Bayes Factors were the stepwise model to the genera Alphavirus and 
Flavivirus. This is consistent with the emergence dynamics of those human-adapted 
viruses in these genera such as dengue virus, yellow fever virus, and more recently, 
chikungyuna virus and Zika virus. Human infections with these viruses have been 
historically restricted to localised, sylvatic cycles before their progression to large-
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scale epidemics and range expansion (Gubler 2004; Powers and Logue 2007; Weaver 
et al. 2016). 
Using a taxonomic cladogram as a tentative substitution for phylogenetic 
relationships between all RNA viruses of mammals and birds, adaptation did not 
strictly follow a stepwise or off-the-shelf model and instead resembled a mixture 
between the two. This pattern was broadly robust to assumptions surrounding 
relative orders of magnitude between cladogram branch lengths (Table 3.4). The 
observed intermediate pattern between the stepwise and off-the-shelf models may 
have resulted from heterogeneity in routes across all virus families. It must be noted 
that many families featured in the cladogram were not included in the analyses of 
existing virus phylogenies, as they only contained species limited to specific Pathogen 
Pyramid levels. For example, the Astroviridae, Caliciviridae, Coronaviridae, 
Hepeviridae and Picobirnaviridae families were all limited to levels 1 and 4, with the 
latter two only containing two mammalian or avian-infective species (King et al. 
2011). 
The consistency in parameters between accepted consensus models under 
different branch length assumption sets (Table 3.4) implies that my state-switching 
models were independent of divergence time between genome types and taxonomic 
families, and that the majority of transitions between Pathogen Pyramid levels were 
fitted to occur within virus families. Parameters only varied under branch length 
assumptions using Grafen’s (1989) method, where absolute lengths of within-family 
and within-genus branches were much shorter.  
Correcting for phylogenetic signal, I found that viruses primarily having 
respiratory and vector-borne transmission to be more likely to infect and exhibit self-
limited transmissibility between humans (Pathogen Pyramid levels 2, 3) compared to 
being restricted to non-human hosts (Pathogen Pyramid level 1). Vector-borne 
pathogens have been shown elsewhere to be more likely to be zoonotic (Woolhouse 
2002; Loh et al. 2015) and additionally, to have a more generalist range of non-
human hosts (Johnson et al. 2015a). This may imply vector mobility creates 
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transmission interfaces between individuals or populations that would not otherwise 
exist due to behavioural or geographic barriers (Rosenberg and Beard 2011). Any 
selection pressure upon a virus (or its vector) to maintain broad host exposure may 
preclude adaptation towards host specificity, which may explain the lack of 
association with reaching level 4 (see also Chapter 4). Respiratory viruses may also 
have a broad host exposure as they do not rely on close contact, and aerosolised 
material can persist outside of the host environment. However, it must be noted that 
the majority of viruses transmitted to humans by a true respiratory route (i.e. inhaled 
aerosol material) are arenaviruses and hantaviruses, though reservoir rodent hosts, 
transmission occurs via a different route - direct contact (Mills 2005), creating 
complexity in understanding routes to adaptation for these viruses. Although I 
addressed broad-level patterns, I also note that the influence of transmission route 
upon adaptation is likely to be highly contextual, depending on frequency of 
exposures and other viral traits such as environmental survivability (Pulliam 2008). 
I also observed tentative evidence suggesting viruses with increasing GC 
content may be more likely to be human-infective and human-transmissible to a 
limited extent (Pathogen Pyramid levels 2, 3). This seems to contrast with previous 
observations that human viruses have decreased GC content and suppressed CpG 
motifs (Greenbaum et al. 2008; Bahir et al. 2009). However, GC content has also been 
associated with codon optimisation during viral replication in human cells 
(Auewarakul 2005), suggesting a more sophisticated structure of genetic biases are 
involved in human adaptation than simple nucleotide frequency. The evidence for an 
association between human adaptation and GC content may have been weak as 
differences in nucleotide biases are much less pronounced within vertebrate viruses 
than between vertebrate and invertebrate or plant viruses (Greenbaum et al. 2008; 
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3.5.1. Sources of human-adapted viruses 
A priority for current public health initiatives is the ability to predict and 
prepare for emerging viruses based on knowledge of which types of candidate virus 
are most likely to reach Pathogen Pyramid level 4, i.e. develop sustained or pandemic 
human-to-human transmissibility (Daszak 2009; Morse et al. 2012; Woolhouse et al. 
2015). My analyses suggest that, generally, level 4 viruses may be sourced either via 
stepwise adaptation from existing human-infective viruses or directly off-the-shelf 
from zoonotic sources, and appear capable of following a wide variety of adaptive 
trajectories in between. Although specific routes towards human adaptation are 
therefore seemingly difficult to predict, it may be possible to predict likely adaptive 
movements by considering different virus taxa in detail.  
Several families were observed to contain only level 1 and level 4 viruses, 
which may be indicative of off-the-shelf jumps, although the precise adaptive route 
taken in such cases cannot be inferred. However, evidence for the off-the-shelf route 
may be supported by wider genetic and epidemiological studies. Within the 
Coronaviridae, both SARS and MERS coronaviruses exhibited human-to-human 
transmission rapidly during emergence, and civet and human SARS coronavirus 
sequences appear to have only very few differences, concentrated in receptor-binding 
sites (Song et al. 2005). This implies that for SARS coronavirus, only a short adaptive 
distance needed to be traversed to enable emergence in humans. 
Level 4 viruses were also consistently sourced by off-the-shelf jumps in 
models supported with at least 5% frequency for the Picornaviridae and 
Paramyxoviridae families (Figure 3.1, Table B.1, B.3). This observation may reflect 
the presence of highly host-specific, closely related human and nonhuman viruses 
within these families (e.g. human versus simian enteroviruses, human versus bovine 
parainfluenzaviruses). However, the family Paramyxoviridae also contains Nipah 
virus, which demonstrated human-to-human transmission immediately following 
emergence in Bangladesh (Epstein et al. 2006). Therefore, level 1 henipaviruses may 
represent strong candidates for off-the-shelf adaptation and are also a particular 
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concern for public health given their severe virulence. Contrastingly, for the 
Alphavirus and Flavivirus genera, visualisations over all RJ-MCMC iterations 
suggested level 4 can be reached by a continuously stepwise route of adaptation 
(Figure B.1). This suggests current level 3 alphaviruses or flaviviruses are also likely 
candidates for human adaptation, and it may be most pertinent to focus on those 
reported to have caused larger outbreaks, e.g. O’nyong-nyong virus (Lanciotti et al. 
1998), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (Weaver et al. 1996). 
When specifying a preliminary mammalian and avian RNA virus cladogram, 
off-the-shelf jumps were featured as the sole route to reaching level 4 among all 
models with a supporting frequency of at least 5% under all branch length 
assumption sets (Table B.4 – B.7), except a single model under assumption set (c) 
and all models under assumption set (d). In these cases, level 4 was attainable via 
both off-the-shelf jumps from level 1 and stepwise movements from level 3 (Table 
B.6, B.7). Over all examined models and branch length assumptions sets, movement 
from level 2 to 4 was never fitted (Figure B.2, Table B.4 – B.7), which supports 
observations that level 2 viruses rarely develop sustained human-to-human 
transmissibility without a considerable extent of adaptation (Woolhouse et al. 2016). 
Instead, sporadic human-to-human transmissibility via iatrogenic or otherwise 
anthropogenic means may be a more salient risk for level 2 viruses. To illustrate, the 
only observed human-to-human transmission of West Nile virus and rabies virus has 
been through blood products or organ transplants (CDC 2002; Srinivasan et al. 
2005), which need not involve substantial genetic adaptation. However, RJ-MCMC 
models over several virus phylogenies did prominently feature level 2 to 4 transitions 
(Figure B.1, Table 3.2), further highlighting the importance of heterogeneity between 
taxa. 
No viral traits investigated acted as risk factors for reaching level 4 in human 
adaptation, although vector-borne and respiratory transmission routes represented 
risk factors for reaching levels 2 and 3. Combined with the stronger support for the 
stepwise model in those vector-borne genera of Alphavirus and Flavivirus (Table 3.1), 
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this may suggest vector-borne viruses are more likely to adapt to humans in a 
stepwise manner, particularly if their vectors are anthropophilic (Woolhouse et al. 
2016). This is also consistent with comparative genetic studies, which have 
demonstrated that surface proteins of vector-borne RNA viruses undergo adaptive 
evolution at a slower rate than those of nonvector-borne viruses (Woelk and Holmes 
2002).  
 
3.5.2. Evolutionary scope of analysis 
As the methods I used follow an evolutionary perspective, inference of state-
switching in my analyses is focused on the timescale of divergence between virus 
species, and assumes that Pathogen Pyramid level is a genetically-determined trait 
that does not vary within species. However, Pathogen Pyramid levels were classified 
based on ecological data (Woolhouse et al. 2016), as current knowledge of genetic 
markers of adaptation is limited. For many viruses, it is likely that the assigned levels 
do not reflect their genetic capability for human infectivity or transmissibility, but 
rather, limitations of their current ecological context. For example, changes to host or 
vector population dynamics can have major implications upon viral epidemiology, 
and may cause increases in phenotypic Pathogen Pyramid level without any genetic 
change (Pepin et al. 2010). Levels 3 and 4 are particularly difficult to distinguish, as 
viruses having an R0 > 1 can exhibit varying sizes of transmission chains, subject to 
stochasticity and population heterogeneity (Woolhouse et al. 2016). As these 
contextual limits are not addressed by the scale of my analysis, this may have 
introduced error in fitted transition likelihoods.  
A further challenge in inference of evolutionary dynamics from ecological 
data is that losses of function are particularly difficult to validate. Backward 
transitions frequently featured in consensus models, predicting that losses or 
switches of function should be relatively common (Figure 3.4, 3.5), i.e. some 
previously human-adapted viruses should have diverged into nonhuman viruses. 
These losses of function are difficult to confirm without sufficient understanding of 
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the genetic determinants of human infectivity, or reliable experimental models. To 
illustrate, SARS coronavirus is classified as Pathogen Pyramid level 4 though no 
human cases have been observed since 2004 (WHO 2004), and human-infective 
strains represented a very limited subset of the genetic diversity of SARS-like 
coronaviruses in wild hosts (Ren et al. 2006; Lau et al. 2005). The capability for 
human infectivity and transmissibility among those extant SARS-like coronavirus 
lineages in animal hosts remains unknown. 
My analyses were focused at a macroevolutionary scale, though it must be 
acknowledged that many viral phenotypes can exhibit rapid changes at the 
microevolutionary scale, including human infectivity and transmissibility. Although 
the relationship between different scales of evolutionary dynamics of RNA viruses is 
largely unclear (but see Antonovics et al. 2015), the adaptive movements identified 
herein still contribute valuable understanding. These analyses may offer inference 
towards likely pyramid level transitions at other phylogenetic resolutions and 
predictions of observable viral emergence events for several reasons.  
Firstly, although my scope of analysis covered RNA virus-wide cladograms 
and family-level phylogenies, the methodology used included some 
microevolutionary coverage. BayesTraits applies continuous rates of state switching 
along all branches of inputted trees, in this case, including those branches from genus 
nodes to species tips. Resulting state-switching models should therefore have at least 
in part reflected transition likelihoods of pyramid level switches within species. 
Secondly, what may be considered ‘macroevolutionary’ for RNA viruses may still 
have immediate public health relevance. RNA virus evolution is rapid, owing to high 
mutation rates and lack of proofreading mechanisms (Belshaw et al. 2008; Parrish et 
al. 2008), and it follows that divergence between viral species or even genera may 
potentially occur over relatively short timescales (Holmes 2003b). Finally, although 
dominated by host-virus codivergence, previous phylogenetic analyses have 
suggested that host shifts, particularly zoonotic host shifts, can be associated with 
macroevolutionary divergence and viral speciation (Kitchen et al. 2011). Even though 
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viral species are a somewhat artificial concept, this implies that macroevolutionary 
patterns have direct implications for the prediction of viral emergence in humans. 
A critical next step will be to investigate routes of adaptation at a 
microevolutionary scale. Pathogen Pyramid level is already known to vary between 
intraspecific strains of some viral species (e.g. Betacoronavirus 1 contains strains with 
host specificity for dogs, cats and swine, as well as humans), and for some viruses, 
very few genetic changes appear necessary to increase adaptation to humans (Holmes 
2005; Li et al. 2005). This would require identification of infective and transmissible 
phenotypes of specific genetic lineages, which may only be possible through 
systematic sampling and sequencing efforts to strengthen quality of genetic evidence 
and markers of adaptation (Pepin et al. 2010). Such sequence-level analyses will be 
necessary to formally assess support for the routes of adaptation I prospectively 
identify and ultimately determine how macroevolutionary patterns relate to the 
likelihood of microevolutionary changes.  
 
3.5.3. Analytical limitations 
The analyses presented are intended as a first estimate of the comparative 
viral dynamics of human adaptation, and several limitations must be acknowledged. 
Firstly, the scope of available viral phylogenies and assumptions made to construct 
the wider virus cladogram restricted the phylogenetic accuracy of my analyses. The 
recent construction of a resolved phylogeny for all RNA viruses with single-stranded 
negative-sense genomes (Li et al. 2015) suggests that inference at a broader resolution 
will be feasible for future phylogenetic studies. Furthermore, I examined routes of 
adaptation within mammalian and avian RNA viruses only, as viral host shifts are 
overwhelmingly predicted from these host groups over other vertebrates or 
invertebrates (Woolhouse and Adair 2013; Woolhouse et al. 2013). However, 
mammalian and avian RNA viruses ultimately diverge from viruses infecting other 
host types, often more recently than divergence from other mammalian and avian 
viruses – of the 19 families containing mammalian or avian viruses, 12 also contain 
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virus species or strains capable of infecting other hosts, excluding arthropod vectors 
as hosts (King et al. 2011). 
Secondly, methodological inaccuracies may have arisen from the use of 
cladograms featuring unresolved polytomies. Without the bifurcating structure and 
intermediary nodes of the true phylogeny, many more alternative patterns of 
transitions could have explained the distribution of Pathogen Pyramid levels at 
cladogram tips, which would have reduced precision around the fitted transitions. 
Furthermore, the use of polytomies is likely to have biased methods against detecting 
the stepwise route of adaptation. To illustrate, a phylogeny conforming to the off-the-
shelf model would feature many transitions from level 1 to all other levels (Figure 
3.2B). The ability of state-switching analyses to detect such transitions would not be 
impeded by collapsing this phylogeny to a polytomy, assuming the appropriate 
ancestral nodes were still assigned as level 1. However, a phylogeny conforming to 
the stepwise model would feature highly-structured transitions from level 1 through 
to level 4 (Figure 3.2A). Such structure would be lost when collapsing to a polytomy, 
resulting in reduced ability to detect all true transitions. Analyses conducted using 
the RNA virus cladograms therefore represented a more conservative test of the 
stepwise route of adaptation. Several stepwise movements were consistently observed 
in cladogram consensus models (Table 3.4), although a level 3 to 4 transition was 
typically absent and subsequently, little evidence was observed for this exact 
hypothesised route (Table 3.3). 
As with any comparative dataset, there may also be inevitable biases or errors 
resulting from the data I use. For example, these analyses are based on known virus 
species, which are subject to ascertainment biases. Specifically, it is likely that many 
Pathogen Pyramid level 1 viruses are missing from the phylogenies and cladograms 
used, as very little of the viral diversity in wild mammal and bird hosts is currently 
known (Anthony et al. 2013; Cooper and Nunn 2013). Undersampling of level 1 
viruses would result in fewer lineages with level 1 tips being present, and in terms of 
transition rate parameters, inflation in the estimated rates of transitions from level 1 
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to higher levels. Likewise, the estimated rates of backward transitions from higher 
levels to level 1 would also be inflated, which may explain the comparatively large 
rate parameters assigned to backward transitions in analyses over viral cladograms 
(Table 3.4). However, the above mechanism of bias assumes the ancestral states 
assigned by state-switching models to be fixed. In actuality, completeness of data 
regarding level 1 lineages is likely to also intricately affect estimation of ancestral 
states and subsequent transition likelihoods. Therefore, the effects of ascertainment 
bias are difficult to quantify, and the potential resulting biases either towards or away 
from the stepwise or the off-the-shelf models are not intuitive. The routes of 
adaptation I identify should therefore be continuously validated as knowledge of 
both the human and nonhuman virome improves. 
 
3.5.4. Wider implications 
My analyses describe adaptive routes in terms of phenotypes and can 
synergise with studies aiming to identify the specific underlying genetic changes 
associated with adaptation. However, current understanding of genetic changes 
involved in adaptation and at which loci is often limited, making stepwise and off-
the-shelf routes difficult to distinguish in practice (Pepin et al. 2010). Additionally, 
genetic changes associated with adaptation can be highly variable, with many 
different potential protein or sequence alterations resulting in similar shifts in 
function (Streicker et al. 2012a). Even if changes can be identified, it is often difficult 
to determine whether these are essential components of adaptation or whether they 
adjust an existing phenotype (Pepin et al. 2010). In addition to informing genomic 
surveillance and further phylogenetic study as previously outlined, the results 
presented may also set up hypotheses to be tested in experimental studies - if human-
adapted viral genotypes replicate sufficiently and persist in suspected reservoir hosts, 
this would suggest off-the-shelf jumps are feasible, whereas a lack of replication 
would suggest stepwise adaptation within human hosts and a consequent loss of 
fitness in other hosts.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
Evolutionarily, RNA viruses may have the genetic capability to transmit from 
zoonotic sources to humans already having or rapidly developing epidemic potential, 
although the specific routes towards human adaptation are highly variable. However, 
dynamics of human adaptation are predictable in a broad, comparative perspective, 
considering virus taxonomy and transmission route. Future work will develop 
understanding of adaptive dynamics at higher phylogenetic resolution and further 
isolate the genetic changes involved in viral adaptation. 
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Chapter 4. Breadth and specificity of mammal 
host range predict dynamics of RNA virus 




RNA viruses show substantial variation in their host range, where closely 
related viruses may infect different host taxa. It is well-established that RNA viruses 
with a broad host range are more likely to infect humans, though less empirical work 
has addressed other aspects of viral emergence in relation to host range. Following 
suggestions from preliminary studies, I investigate whether specific RNA virus traits 
of human infectivity, transmissibility and virulence are associated with the 
taxonomic or phylogenetic breadth of their nonhuman mammalian host ranges, as 
well as infection of specific host taxonomic orders. I source data from externally 
compiled literature searches on known mammal host-virus relationships. I then use 
logistic mixed regressions to test whether several host range metrics correlate with 
viral traits whilst correcting for study effort and virus taxonomy. I find that viruses 
with a broad host range are less likely to exhibit human-to-human transmissibility, 
but more likely to be highly virulent. I also find that the ability to infect humans 
correlates with having mammal hosts that are phylogenetically close to humans, 
rather than host breadth outright. Specific host taxonomic orders also predicted virus 
traits, e.g. viruses with nonhuman primate hosts were more likely to be human-
transmissible, and viruses with artiodactyl hosts were less likely to be highly virulent. 
These analyses shed further light on the complex relationships between host range 
and the evolution of emerging viruses. The influence of host range upon viral traits 
suggests that understanding viruses within the ecological contexts of their nonhuman 
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4.2. Introduction 
The majority of pathogens are known to infect multiple hosts (Cleaveland et 
al. 2001; Haydon et al. 2002; Fenton and Pedersen 2005). RNA viruses are no 
exception and are often cited to be the most likely pathogen type to infect multiple 
hosts, as a result of their affinity for host shifts through high mutation rates and/or 
lack of replication proofreading (Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005; Parrish et 
al. 2008). However, host ranges of pathogens exhibit substantial variation in their 
taxonomic diversity, specificity, and breadth, such that the observed host range of 
even superficially similar pathogens can be very different. Therefore, the study of 
pathogens within the context of their host ranges is critical to understanding 
dynamics of disease, including emergence in novel hosts (Karesh et al. 2012). 
Host range is not simply just a product of pathogen characteristics, but 
instead, a dynamic trait thought to influence the evolutionary trajectories of 
pathogens. Selection pressures acting on pathogens will be differ between different 
host environments and may often be antagonistic (Elena et al. 2009). For example, a 
pathogen selected to efficiently bind to the cell receptors of one host may be less 
efficient at binding to more divergent receptors among other hosts (Crill et al. 2000). 
Host range has been observed to correlate with pathogen traits at varying scales, e.g. 
within hosts, molecular characteristics such as genome size (McNally et al. 2014); and 
between hosts, transmission rates and persistence dynamics (Dobson 2004). Here, I 
focus on whether host range correlates with traits of RNA virus species, using 
comparative analyses. 
As the majority of human RNA viruses emerge from a mammal origin 
(Woolhouse and Adair 2013), I specifically focus on nonhuman mammalian host 
ranges of RNA viruses, and how they relate to traits of emergence. Previous empirical 
catalogues of human pathogens have shown viruses with a broad host range to be 
more likely to be emerging, or to infect humans via zoonotic transmission 
(Cleaveland et al. 2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005). However, 
emergence in a novel host species is a multi-step process, involving several 
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mechanisms and viral traits (Wolfe et al. 2007; Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007; Lloyd-
Smith et al. 2009). In addition to human infectivity (the ability to establish an 
infection within an individual), I use these multi-step schemata to identify human-
to-human transmissibility and virulence as key features that both determine the 
success of RNA virus emergence and represent exceptional importance to public 
health. Zoonotic viruses show substantial variation in their ability to transmit 
between humans and cause human disease, and here I ask whether mammalian host 
range could explain this variation. 
Although a broad host range is known to correlate with human infectivity, 
other measurable aspects of host range may also predispose RNA viruses to infect 
humans. Viral host shifts are likely to be increasingly successful with decreasing 
phylogenetic distance (and therefore, increasing biological similarity) between hosts 
(Wolfe et al. 2000), which has been demonstrated between nonhuman primates and 
humans (Pedersen and Davies 2009). Human infectivity may also correlate with 
infection of certain taxa noted to have high richness of zoonotic viruses (Luis et al. 
2013). Therefore, I hypothesise that a nonhuman host range with broader taxonomic 
span, closer phylogenetic distance to humans, and infection of key host types will 
positively correlate with human infectivity. 
To my knowledge, fewer studies have attempted to address how host range 
influences human transmissibility. However, a recent comparative analysis of 95 
zoonotic RNA and DNA viruses reported that viruses infecting a broader range of 
host groups (combining taxonomic orders and ecology-based groups) were more 
likely to exhibit human-to-human transmissibility, and it was suggested that 
evolutionary potential to infect many different hosts also coincides with potential to 
develop transmissibility between them (Johnson et al. 2015a). Here, I aim to further 
investigate this finding within an exhaustive dataset comprising all known mammal-
RNA virus relationships, by testing multiple standardised metrics of host range. I also 
distinguish self-limiting from sustained human-to-human transmissibility, as these 
have very different implications upon emergence. Following this reported finding, I 
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hypothesise that a broader nonhuman host range will positively correlate with both 
human-to-human transmissibility measures. 
Several evolutionary theories have related host range to virulence. Assuming 
that an evolutionary trade-off exists coupling virulence and transmission rate 
(although this idea is heavily debated, see Alizon et al. 2009), higher virulence may be 
exhibited by pathogens with narrower host ranges as a consequence of efficient 
selection to increase transmission rate within the specialist host(s) (Leggett et al. 
2013). Virulence can also be exhibited as a non-adapted coincident phenotype within 
‘dead-end’ hosts that can be infected, but do not contribute to transmission (and 
therefore, present no opportunity for host-virus coevolution) (Levin and Svanborg 
Edén 1990; Bull 1994). Non-adapted virulence would be more likely for infections 
with generalist viruses, as a broad host range is more likely to include dead-end hosts 
(Leggett et al. 2013). However, no comparative analyses to my knowledge have 
investigated how host range correlates with virulence across virus species. In addition 
to host breadth, the relationship between phylogenetic distance between hosts and 
virulence has also not been fully addressed. Viruses may more easily exploit and 
cause disease within novel hosts that are more similar to those they have coevolved 
with, following the same logic as for infectivity outlined earlier. Alternatively, novel 
hosts may clear viruses that originate from related hosts more easily if immune 
strategies are phylogenetically conserved (Holmes and Drummond 2007). These 
uncertainties make precise hypotheses about nonhuman host range and virulence 
difficult to specify. 
I aim to further understand the relationship between breadth and specificity 
of nonhuman mammalian host ranges of RNA viruses and their traits surrounding 
emergence in humans, specifically infectivity, transmissibility, and virulence. To 
quantify nonhuman mammalian host ranges and RNA virus traits, I use literature-
sourced data on all known viral infections of mammal species and viral dynamics in 
human hosts. Firstly, I use permutation tests and matrix visualisations to investigate 
how these RNA virus traits are distributed across both virus and mammalian host 
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taxonomies. Secondly, I use mixed regression models to test whether RNA virus 
traits can be explained by taxonomic breadth of hosts, phylogenetic breadth of hosts, 
and infection of specific key host types. These comparative models can contribute to 
better understanding the biological process of emergence and predicting novel RNA 
virus dynamics.  
 
4.3. Materials and methods 
4.3.1. RNA virus trait and mammal host data 
Data on mammal-infective RNA viruses and their known nonhuman host 
species were sourced from the EcoHealth Alliance (Olival et al. in review), and 
collected via structured literature searches (search terms: [virus name including 
synonyms]; sources used: Web of Knowledge, Google Scholar, Wildlife Disease 
Association meeting abstracts, Global Mammal Parasite Database (Nunn and Altizer 
2005); protocol further described in Levinson et al. 2013). After standardising virus 
names to species level using ICTV 9th Edition Virus Taxonomy (King et al. 2011), 
these data spanned 281 viruses. 
To classify which viruses are human-infective, I used a previous systematic 
literature review describing a catalogue of 180 known human RNA virus species 
(Woolhouse et al. 2013), which provided 50 additional viruses not present in the 
mammal-infective virus data. These 50 were therefore only known to infect humans 
among mammals and hereafter referred to as ‘human-specialist’, though the 
possibility these have nonhuman hosts yet to be discovered must be noted. These 
combined data spanned 331 virus species within 718 nonhuman mammal host 
species, across 1991 unique virus species-host species pairings. To classify human 
transmissibility, data was sourced from a comprehensive systematic review of RNA 
virus transmissibility potential (Woolhouse et al. 2016), and I assigned binary 
variables as to whether each virus has a) any human-to-human transmissibility 
(equivalent to an R0 value of > 0), and b) self-sustained human-to-human 
transmissibility (equivalent to an R0 value of ≥ 1). To classify human virulence, I 
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assigned a binary variable as to whether each virus typically causes ‘severe’ or 
‘nonsevere’ disease in humans, where ‘severe’ met at least one of the following 
criteria: ≥5% case fatality ratio, frequent reports of hospitalisation, association with 
significant morbidity from a pre-specified list of conditions (haemorrhagic fever, 
seizures/coma, cirrhosis, AIDS, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, HTLV-associated 
myelopathy) or were explicitly described as “severe” or “causing severe disease” in 
literature sources (see Chapter 2). Virulence in nonhuman hosts was not considered 
due to poor coverage of data on viral pathology in mammal hosts (Levinson et al. 
2013). 
I focused on virus host range dynamics among nonhuman mammals as no 
comparably thorough data currently exists describing bird-RNA virus relationships. 
Therefore, I excluded those RNA viruses exclusively using birds as reservoirs (or 
otherwise originating in birds) that simply 'spill over' into humans or nonhuman 
mammals without onward transmission. Viruses with bird reservoirs were assessed 
via structured literature searches (search terms: [virus name including synonyms] 
AND [“bird” OR “avian” OR “host range” OR “animal” OR “reservoir”]); sources 
used: Web of Knowledge, Google Scholar, Scopus) and consultation of previous 
efforts to assign RNA virus reservoirs (Kitchen et al. 2011). Viruses identified as 
having exclusive bird reservoirs (n = 21) or entirely unknown reservoirs (n = 6) were 
excluded from analyses. 
To standardise data, virus families with less than 5 species present in the 
combined data were also excluded from analyses (Arteriviridae, Bornaviridae, 
Hepeviridae, Picobirnaviridae, and additionally, viruses unassigned to a family). 
Mammal host orders with less than 5 species present in the combined data were also 
excluded from analyses and host breadth calculations (Cingulata, Erinaceomorpha, 
Peramelemorphia, Proboscidea, Scandentia, Soricomorpha). Phylogenetic host range 
measures were not calculable for viruses that were only known to infect nonhuman 
mammal species which did not correspond to any Latin binomial name present in 
the mammal phylogeny used (Bininda-Emonds et al. 2007). To standardise 
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comparison between taxonomic and phylogenetic host range measures, these viruses 
(n = 15) were also excluded. These exclusions left 280 viruses within 683 nonhuman 
mammal hosts as the primary dataset, across 1702 unique virus species-host species 
pairings.  
 
4.3.2. Host range calculations 
I aimed to investigate whether viral traits of emergence could be explained by 
different aspects of mammalian host diversity by calculating the following metrics of 
host range per virus: a) total number of known nonhuman mammal host species, b) 
total number of known nonhuman mammal host orders, c) phylogenetic breadth of 
known nonhuman mammal host species, and d) minimum phylogenetic distance to 
humans among known nonhuman mammal host species. As the viral traits 
investigated referred to phenotypes in humans, I did not consider humans equivalent 
to other mammalian host species and therefore did not include humans in 
calculations of any host range metric. For host phylogenetic measures (c) and (d), I 
used the mammal supertree phylogeny of Bininda-Emonds et al. (2008). 
Phylogenetic breadth was calculated as the sum of branch lengths required to 
connect all nonhuman host species tips, i.e. how far viral infection is known to span 
across the mammal phylogeny. Phylogenetic breadth was defined as zero for human-
specialist viruses. Minimum phylogenetic distance to humans was calculated as the 
minimum value among all pairwise patristic distances from nonhuman mammal host 
species to humans. As this measure was not intuitively definable for those human-
specialist viruses, minimum phylogenetic distance to humans was analysed separately 
with a data subset excluding human specialists (n = 239). All phylogenetic 
manipulation and calculation was carried out using package ‘ape’, v3.2 (Paradis et al. 
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4.3.3. Statistical analysis 
To investigate the distribution of viruses and viral traits across host-virus 
relationships, I constructed a matrix with rows denoting the 11 mammal host 
taxonomic orders and columns denoting the 14 virus taxonomic families within the 
primary dataset. Matrix values were assigned as the number of unique viruses in each 
family known to infect each mammal order. To test whether the observed host-virus 
relationships were non-random with respect to taxonomy, I created 999 matrix 
permutations using the function permatfull() in package ‘vegan’, v2.3-2 (Oksanen et 
al. 2015) in R, v3.1.3. Permutations were restricted to maintain fixed row totals to 
account for column-wise exclusivity, i.e. individual viruses can infect multiple host 
orders but cannot belong to multiple virus families. The Chi-squared statistic was 
calculated for the observed matrix and compared to the distribution of Chi-squared 
values across permutations to create a permutation test with p value calculated as 
 =  *+,-. / *.0.12 /  where 345467  denotes total number of permutations and 389:4  
denotes number of permutations producing a Chi-squared statistic greater than or 
equal to the value for the observed matrix. Additionally, this matrix was used to 
calculate further matrices of proportions of viruses exhibiting each viral trait of 
interest to visualise where human-infective, human-transmissible and viruses causing 
severe disease clustered within host-virus relationships. 
To test whether viral traits were associated with nonhuman mammalian host 
ranges, I constructed logistic mixed regression models with binomial error structures 
using function glmmadmb() in package ‘glmmADMB’ v0.8.3.2 (Skaug et al. 2015) in 
R, v3.1.3. All viral traits were modelled using four independent model building paths, 
each containing one of host range metrics (a) – (d). Models predicting 
transmissibility and sustained transmissibility used the complete primary dataset for 
host range metrics (a) – (c) (n = 280), and the secondary subset excluding human-
specialist viruses for host range metric (d), minimum phylogenetic distance to 
humans (n = 239). Although the primary dataset included human-specialist viruses 
that did not infect nonhuman mammals, it did not include analogous viruses neither 
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infecting humans nor nonhuman mammals (i.e. it was not known how many viruses 
with a mammal host range of zero have failed to infect humans). To avoid bias from 
this, models predicting human infectivity used the secondary subset excluding 
human-specialist viruses for all host range metrics (a) – (d) (n = 239). As virulence 
was rated in humans only, models predicting virulence were limited to further data 
subsets featuring only human-infective viruses with complete virulence information 
(n = 148 for host range metrics (a) – (c); n = 107 for host range metric (d)). 
In addition to host range, I also investigated whether specific types of 
mammal host could predict viral traits by including binary variables in model 
building paths representing whether viral infection was known in each of the five 
most common mammal host taxonomic orders in the dataset (Artiodactyla, 
Carnivora, Chiroptera, Primates, Rodentia). All models were fixed to include two 
corrective terms: number of literature citations in PubMed search results for virus 
species names, to correct for ascertainment biases in mammal sampling; and virus 
taxonomic family as a random effect, to correct for taxonomic signal in viral traits as 
well as potential unmeasured traits that may covary with taxonomy (for example, 
substitution rate). 
Host range metric (c), phylogenetic breadth, exhibited zero inflation as a 
result of large numbers of viruses only having a single known host species, or being 
human specialists. Therefore, phylogenetic breadth was specified in regression 
models as two simultaneous predictor terms: a binary variable denoting whether 
phylogenetic breadth was zero or nonzero, and a continuous variable denoting 
phylogenetic breadth value. All continuous predictors were modelled under a 
log(covariate + 1) transformation to normalise, except minimum phylogenetic 
distance to humans, which showed appreciable normality. 
Model building paths were constructed using each host range metric (a) – (d), 
for each of the four viral traits (16 paths in total). Starting with the minimal model of 
corrective terms only, predictors were sequentially added using a stepwise algorithm, 
retaining predictors that improved the model fit based on likelihood ratio tests 
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(LRTs) until no further predictors were retained. Predictors were then confirmed by 
dropping each term and comparing model fit using LRTs. This process resulted in 
four models for each trait, each built using a different host range metric path (a) – 
(d), hereafter referred to as the “best” models. For each best model that featured a 
host range metric, I tested whether adding random slopes on the host range term 
with respect to viral family improved model fits via LRTs. For host range metric (c), 
random slopes were only applied to the continuous component of phylogenetic 
breadth. Between the best models predicting each trait, the model with the lowest 
AIC score (Akaike 1974) was accepted and presented as the “final” model. As models 
testing host range metric (d), minimum phylogenetic distance to humans, used the 
secondary data subset excluding human specialists, these models were excluded from 
AIC comparisons with metrics (a) – (c), except for models predicting human 
infectivity where the secondary data subset was used for all metrics (a) – (d) as 
previously described. 
As some degree of correlation was expected between regression model 
predictors (e.g. greater known host breadth may result from greater virus sampling 
effort), I calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for each predictor in final 
regression models to determine whether collinearity had inflated variance estimates 
around fitted coefficients. VIFs were calculated using the function vif() in package 
‘car’, v2.1-0 (Fox and Weisberg 2011) in R, v3.1.3. Regression assumptions were 
verified by inspecting independence of final model residuals against fitted values. 
Final models were also validated against viruses suspected to be influential by 
removing these and reconstructing the selected model building path. For example, 
anthroponotic viruses might skew observed patterns in that their human origin 
implies these are more likely to have certain traits (e.g. human-to-human 
transmissibility) and also may be more likely to infect specific nonhuman taxa that 
are closely related to humans (i.e. primates) or domesticated (i.e. some artiodactyls 
and carnivores). Anthroponotic viruses (n = 4) were identified using a recently 
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published list of anthroponoses derived from structured literature review (Messenger 
et al. 2014).  
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Matrices of host-virus relationships  
Among the complete primary dataset of 280 virus species and 683 nonhuman 
mammal host species, host-virus relationships showed highly skewed distributions; 
most viruses were only known to infect zero or a few mammal hosts, and most 
nonhuman mammal species were only known to host a single virus (Figure C.1). 
Visualising the taxonomic patterns behind these relationships showed clear 
associations between host and virus type, with high clustering in certain areas of the 
host order-virus family matrix, which was otherwise sparse (Figure 4.1). For example, 
arenaviruses and bunyaviruses were most strongly associated with rodent hosts, 
whilst paramyxoviruses and retroviruses were most strongly associated with 
nonhuman primate hosts. This observed clustering pattern showed significant 
nonindependence between host and virus taxonomy (restricted permutation test, 
excluding human row, p = 0.013). When viral traits of interest were mapped onto the 
host order-virus family matrix, heterogeneity was again visible (Figure C.2 - C.5). 
Increasing sparsity was observed with increasing degrees of human-to-human 
transmissibility (Figure C.2 - C.4), with primate-infective viruses appearing the most 
consistently human-transmissible. Bat- and rodent-infective viruses appeared the 
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4.4.2. Mixed regression analyses of host range 
Correcting for sampling biases and virus taxonomy, different aspects of 
nonhuman mammalian host range were associated with viral traits of emergence in 
mixed logistic regression models. For human infectivity, the model building path 
featuring host range metric (d), minimum phylogenetic distance to humans among 
mammal hosts, was selected as the final model (ΔAIC to next best model = 4.09). 
Viruses were more likely to be human-infective with a closer minimum phylogenetic 
distance to humans among mammal hosts (Table 4.1, Figure 4.2A). Bat- and rodent-
infective viruses were also more likely to be human-infective (Table 4.1). No other 
host range metrics predicted human infectivity as these did not appear in the 
respective best models for each model building path (Table C.1). Three reoviruses 
that were not human-infective and were only known to infect marsupials among 
nonhuman mammals were observed as outliers (Orbivirus: Eubenanagee virus, 
Wallal virus, Warrego virus), their hosts having the largest phylogenetic distances to 
humans (Figure 4.2A). When these viruses were removed, the same final model and 
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Table 4.1. Outputs from final logistic mixed regression model predicting human 
infectivity among mammalian RNA viruses, excluding human-specialist viruses (n = 
239). Model building path selected based on AIC was model featuring host range metric 
d) minimum phylogenetic distance to humans (best models from each model building 












15.05 < 0.001 
Min. phylogenetic distance to 
humans among hosts 
0.984 
(0.976, 0.992) 










Table 4.2. Outputs from final logistic mixed regression model predicting human-to-
human transmissibility among mammalian RNA viruses (n = 280). Model building path 
selected based on AIC was model featuring host range metric b) number of nonhuman 
mammal host orders (best models from each model building path are presented in Table 












35.99 < 0.001 
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For human-to-human transmissibility, the final model selected featured host 
range metric (b), number of nonhuman mammal host orders (ΔAIC to next best 
model = 13.00). Viruses with a narrower range of host orders were more likely to be 
human-transmissible (Table 4.2, Figure 4.2B). Bat-, carnivore- and primate-infective 
viruses were also more likely to be human-transmissible (Table 4.2). When 
considering only sustained human-to-human transmissibility, the final model 
selected again featured host range metric (b), number of nonhuman mammal host 
orders (ΔAIC to next best model = 23.15), with a similar resulting model (Table 4.3). 
However, a sharper decrease in risk of sustained transmissibility with increasing 
number of host orders was observed (Figure 4.2C). Furthermore, carnivore infection 
did not feature in this model, and nonhuman primate infection showed a much 
stronger association with sustained transmissibility (Table 4.3). For both 
transmissibility and sustained transmissibility, the same final models and effect of 
nonhuman primate infection were retained when anthroponoses were removed (LRT 
= 8.98, p = 0.003, odds ratio = 5.115; and LRT = 17.33, p < 0.001, odds ratio = 17.379 
respectively). A closer minimum phylogenetic distance to humans among mammal 
hosts also positively predicted both measures of human-to-human transmissibility 
(Table C.2, C.3), though model building path (d) used a secondary data subset and 
was not directly comparable to the final models selected (Table 4.2, 4.3). 
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Table 4.3. Outputs from final logistic mixed regression model predicting sustained 
human-to-human transmissibility among mammalian RNA viruses (n = 280). Model 
building path selected based on AIC was model featuring host range metric b) number of 
nonhuman mammal host orders (best models from each model building path are 












20.29 < 0.001 












20.82 < 0.001 
 
Table 4.4. Outputs from final logistic mixed regression model predicting severe disease 
among human RNA viruses (n = 148). Model building path selected based on AIC was 
model featuring host range metric a) number of nonhuman mammal host species (best 













< 0.01 0.972 
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For virulence in humans, the final model selected featured host range metric 
(a), number of nonhuman mammal host species (ΔAIC to next best model = 3.66), 
although the model featuring (c) phylogenetic breadth was closely comparable (Table 
C.4). Viruses with a broader range of mammal host species were more likely to cause 
severe disease (Table 4.4, Figure 4.2D). Artiodactyl- and primate-infective viruses 
were less likely to cause severe disease (Table 4.4). In contrast to the other viral traits 
examined, number of virus citations was not a significant predictor of virulence 
(Table 4.4), consistent with discovery curves suggesting viruses causing severe disease 
do not have preferential study effort (see Chapter 2). Rabies virus was observed as an 
outlier, causing severe disease and having a much larger range of host species than 
other viruses (Figure 4.2D). When removed, the same final model and effect of 
nonhuman host species breadth were retained (LRT = 14.45, p < 0.001, odds ratio = 
2.244). Similarly, the association with artiodactyl infection was robust to removal of 
anthroponoses (LRT = 7.73, p = 0.005, odds ratio = 0.146), though the association 
with nonhuman primate infection was noticeably weaker and was not retained in the 
final model when removing anthroponoses (LRT = 3.45, p = 0.063). 
 
Between each final mixed regression model predicting viral traits, virus 
taxonomic families showed substantial variation in their fitted random intercepts 
(Table 4.5). Those viral families in the top quartiles for risk of human infectivity or 
transmissibility generally did not overlap with those in the top quartiles for risk of 
severe human disease and instead were often in the bottom quartile for the opposing 
trait. The sole exception to this was the Arenaviridae, being in the top quartile for 
both transmissibility and severe disease (but the lowest quartile for sustained 
transmissibility) (Table 4.5). Under no circumstances did the addition of random 
slopes upon host range metrics improve the fits of best models (Table C.5), except for 
the best model predicting sustained transmissibility featuring (d) minimum 
phylogenetic distance to humans. Adding random slopes with respect to virus family 
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gave a marginally improved fit for this model (LRT = 4.48, p = 0.034), though based 
on AIC values this was not selected as a final model for further analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.5. Fitted random intercepts (odds ratios) associated with each RNA virus family 
from final logistic mixed regression models predicting viral traits. Families within the 
first quartile (viruses least likely to have the focal trait) are highlighted with italics, whilst 
families within the last quartile (viruses most likely to have the focal trait) are highlighted 
in bold. 
 
 Modelled viral trait 





Arenaviridae 0.90 2.29 0.26 6.43 
Astroviridae 0.66 0.99 1.71 0.75 
Bunyaviridae 1.37 0.66 0.18 1.16 
Caliciviridae 0.51 1.24 4.75 0.63 
Coronaviridae 0.95 2.75 10.03 0.94 
Filoviridae 1.52 1.98 0.84 24.92 
Flaviviridae 0.79 0.33 0.39 1.54 
Orthomyxoviridae 2.83 1.85 6.39 0.39 
Paramyxoviridae 0.26 0.51 0.76 1.07 
Picornaviridae 1.92 1.84 4.25 0.38 
Reoviridae 1.65 2.12 4.25 0.17 
Retroviridae 0.18 0.24 0.37 7.23 
Rhabdoviridae 1.99 0.23 0.20 2.22 
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4.5. Discussion 
Using comparative analytical methods, I found the nonhuman mammalian 
host range of RNA viruses to be associated with viral traits integral to human 
emergence. It is already established that certain taxa of viruses are more likely to 
emerge in humans (Pulliam 2008) and further to this, I observed areas in host-virus 
matrices with comparatively higher risk of emergence-associated viral traits, 
suggesting that combining data on host range and virus taxonomy might improve 
predictions of emergence. These visualisations also raise biological questions about 
combinations with noticeably low risks. For example, sustained human-to-human 
transmissibility was known for four of the nine nonhuman primate-infective 
paramyxoviruses, but none of the seven artiodactyl-infective paramyxoviruses. This 
lack of transmissibility is unlikely to be due to limited opportunity for adaptation, as 
humans will have had exposure to many of these viruses via contact with domestic 
artiodactyls, suggesting the presence of an adaptive barrier that primate 
paramyxoviruses may be more likely to overcome. 
Considering mixed regression model analyses, I did not replicate findings 
that a broad host range of mammals predisposes viruses to infect humans, as no host 
range breadth metrics featured in best models. Instead, I found risk of human 
infectivity to increase if viruses also infected hosts with phylogenetic similarity to 
humans, supporting the concept of a phylogenetic constraint on successful cross-
species transmission (Wolfe et al. 2007). Parallel to this, alternative model building 
paths showed nonhuman primate infection to be a predictor of human infectivity in 
lieu of phylogenetic distance (Table C.1). This supports observations of increasing 
risk of pathogen sharing between closely related nonhuman primates and humans 
(Pedersen and Davies 2009; Cooper et al. 2012), but also across host phylogenies 
among other host-virus relationships (Streicker et al. 2010; Longdon et al. 2011). 
Fitted mathematical models of viruses within several mammal orders have suggested 
a sigmoidal shape to this relationship; infectivity decreased relatively little over short 
phylogenetic distances, and markedly over longer distances (Cuthill and Charleston 
 
 
4. Breadth and specificity of mammal host range predict dynamics of RNA virus emergence in humans 92 
2013), which may explain why the simple measure of nonhuman primate infectivity 
also strongly predicted human infectivity. The lack of correlation between human 
infectivity and host range breadth may suggest that infectivity does not depend on 
virus generalism or specialism outright (Roche et al. 2015), but rather the underlying 
differences in ecological exposure and evolutionary opportunity that these strategies 
create. 
Bats and rodents were additional host orders that significantly predicted 
human infectivity, both of which have been demonstrated elsewhere to host a 
relatively high diversity of zoonotic viruses (Luis et al. 2013). Both these orders 
contain many species that use peridomestic environments, which may result in 
relatively high human exposure to their viruses. However, both may also have been 
preferentially sampled for viruses already known to be human-infective following 
high-profile emergence events, i.e. hantaviruses for rodents and 
henipaviruses/coronaviruses for bats. A distinctly sharp increase in bat virus study 
effort since 2004 has been noted (Olival et al. 2012).  
I found that viruses with a broad nonhuman host range were less likely to be 
human-transmissible. This could be explained in terms of competing evolutionary 
trajectories – genetic adaptation required for transmissibility among humans (or any 
specific host species) may antagonistically reduce infectivity and/or transmissibility 
among alternative hosts. Although inference from the regression models presented is 
limited to ecological correlation and does not address the underlying evolutionary 
mechanisms, similar ideas have been supported for pathogen infectivity (Elena et al. 
2009). Meta-analyses of experimental infections also suggest that the majority of 
observed failures to infect non-hosts are driven by pathogen specialisation for 
existing hosts (as opposed to evolution of defences among non-hosts) (Antonovics et 
al. 2013). As transmissibility follows on from infectivity in conceptual models of host 
adaptation and specialism (Wolfe et al. 2007; Lloyd-Smith et al. 2009), 
transmissibility may feasibly be subject to similar constraints.  
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The observed negative correlation between breadth of nonhuman host range 
and transmissibility contradicts recent comparative analyses suggesting that zoonotic 
viruses with a broader host range are more likely to be human-transmissible 
(Johnson et al. 2015a). Critically, the scope of analyses presented here was wider, 
including those human-specialist viruses that are sufficiently adapted to transmit 
between humans without apparent dependency upon on other mammal hosts, 
further implying patterns of specialisation drive the relationship observed here. It 
must be noted that many human-specialist viruses such as HIV-1 and 2 have an 
ultimate zoonotic origin, and that zoonotic hosts are still important to consider when 
assessing potential human-to-human transmissibility of emerging viruses, 
particularly if the zoonotic hosts are those in which human-specialist viruses tend to 
originate.  
Post-thesis submission, a reanalysis of models predicting human-to-human 
transmissibility whilst removing human-specialist viruses was conducted 
(Supplementary Methods C.1). Within this reanalysis excluding human specialists, no 
host range metrics acted as predictors of human transmissibility (Table C.6, C.7). This 
suggests that the observed model slopes and strengths of association between breadth of 
host range and human transmissibility (Figure 4.2) were primarily driven by an 
inflated count of human-specialist viruses; human-specialist viruses would be expected 
to have both human transmissibility and zero nonhuman hosts by definition (assuming 
host range data was accurate and complete, though see below). Therefore, given the 
currently available data, I conclude that specialism outright explains phenotypic 
patterns in human-to-human transmissibility of RNA viruses rather than relative 
degree of generalism in host range. 
Interestingly, even after removing human-specialist viruses, my analyses still do 
not replicate previous findings of a positive host breadth-human transmissibility 
relationship (Johnson et al. 2015). This disparity therefore may arise from the 
alternative data definitions of transmissibility used by Johnson et al. (2015), where 
vector-borne transmission was excluded from human transmissibility estimates and 
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groups of species with shared ecology were considered equivalent to taxonomic orders. I 
also defined human specialists as those viruses infecting humans with no other known 
nonhuman mammal host species, though it is likely many of these have alternative 
hosts not yet identified (or not recorded to species level) as a result of sampling 
inadequacies, and certainly so for the few “specialists” that were not human-
transmissible (n = 14). 
Although the reanalysis implies human transmissibility of RNA viruses is 
independent of mammalian host range, this does not necessarily act as evidence against 
antagonistic pleiotropy in intraspecific transmissibility between different hosts. Rather, 
evidence for this is unclear at this analytical resolution, and genomic studies will be 
necessary for further investigation of adaptation and viral fitness between hosts at the 
molecular resolution (Pepin et al. 2010). Furthermore, nonhuman host range is still 
important to consider when assessing potential human-to-human transmissibility of 
emerging viruses. Many human-specialist viruses have an ancestral zoonotic origin, for 
example, HIV-1 and 2 and it follows that phenotypic capability of human-to-human 
transmission must arise before or at least concurrently with human specialisation. 
Although not addressed by this analysis, it is likely that the risk of development of 
human specialism will be greater for viruses that have an existing specialist or narrow 
host range, particularly if those hosts are closely related to humans. 
In terms of host orders predicting human-to-human transmissibility, 
nonhuman primate infection was a strong predictor, particularly for sustained 
transmissibility, and this was not attributable to human-transmissible viruses being 
known to infect primates as anthroponoses. This may again reflect the short 
phylogenetic distance between humans and nonhuman primates, and a shorter 
phylogenetic distance to humans was also featured as a positive predictor of 
transmissibility in best models resulting from model building path (d) (Table C.2, 
C.3). Additionally, bat infection also predicted human-to-human transmissibility, 
which may suggest influence from other aspects of viral ecology. Previous studies 
have reported viruses to have greater risk of human-to-human transmissibility if 
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humans are infected through contact during hunting or associated practices 
(Johnson et al. 2015a), a common route for viral zoonoses from primates and bats as 
taxonomic groups widely hunted for bushmeat (Mickleburgh et al. 2009). However, 
bushmeat hunting also occurs for many other mammal taxa (Taylor et al. 2015), 
though relative global bushmeat pressures are too poorly-quantified for a direct 
comparison. 
Finally, I observed that viruses with a broad nonhuman host range were more 
likely to exhibit higher virulence in humans. Combined with the previous result that 
viruses with a broad nonhuman host range were also less likely to be human-
transmissible, if humans are ‘dead-end’ hosts that represent no potential for onward 
transmission and viral evolution, this would represent evidence of coincident, non-
adaptive virulence (Levin and Svanborg Edén 1990; Bull 1994). However, my 
previous analysis finds little evidence for a direct association between transmissibility 
and virulence (see Chapter 2). There may instead be a population biology basis to this 
observation. In cases where multiple host species jointly contribute to viral 
maintenance (Haydon et al. 2002; Fenton et al. 2015), there may be lower pathogen 
costs of host mortality within any particular host species, as alternative hosts may still 
be sufficient for viral persistence (or vice-versa; Leggett et al. (2013) suggest that if 
virulence reduces host availability this could reciprocally select for a generalist host 
range). Any resulting selection for virulence could then indirectly increase virulence 
in novel hosts, including humans. Although this specific idea has not been directly 
addressed, mathematical models have shown the evolution of virulence to be highly 
dynamic in multi-host systems, being subject to heterogeneities in host competency, 
abundance, and interspecific transmission rates (Woolhouse et al. 2001; Gandon 
2004; Rigaud et al. 2010). 
The observed relationship between nonhuman host range and virulence 
could additionally be driven by those human-specialist viruses typically associated 
with mild disease (for example, rhinoviruses or parainfluenzaviruses). This may 
suggest that a longer coevolutionary history between humans and these viruses has 
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led to attenuation of virulence, although it must be noted that several human-
specialist viruses still cause severe, chronic disease (e.g. HIV, hepatitis C virus; see 
also Chapter 2). Primate-infective viruses also exhibited lower virulence in humans, 
though this was not robust to the removal of anthroponoses, reflecting the potential 
anthroponotic transmission to nonhuman primates of nonsevere, human-specialist 
viruses. In contrast, the observed lower virulence among artiodactyl-infective viruses 
was not dependent on anthroponoses and warrants further empirical study. 
I did not observe any association between virulence and phylogenetic distance 
to humans among mammal hosts. In experimental infections of Drosophila sigma 
viruses, virulence also did not follow a predictable linear relationship with 
phylogenetic distance between host species, and instead showed nonlinear clusters of 
high and low virulence across the Drosophila host phylogeny (Longdon et al. 2015a). 
If virulence is a phylogenetically conserved trait of hosts as a general rule, this would 
suggest the level of virulence in nonhuman primates may be an informative predictor 
of virulence in humans. Although this approach has been traditionally applied in 
experimental inoculations of nonhuman primate models (Patterson and Carrion 
2005), this will be a significant challenge for comparative study as virulence data for 
wild nonhuman hosts, including primates, is scarce and often hard to quantify 
(Levinson et al. 2013).  
 
4.5.1. Analytical limitations 
The taxonomic host range data and phylogenetic breadth calculations I use 
here likely do not represent the full nonhuman host range of each virus, which may 
have introduced inaccuracies to my analyses. The majority of hosts were identified as 
only having a few virus species (Figure C.1), although calculations extrapolating from 
intensive sampling efforts of a single bat species would suggest this is a very small 
fraction of the true viral diversity within mammals (Anthony et al. 2013). Although 
sampling effort for viruses was directly controlled for, there may be remaining biases 
as a result of the unequal sampling effort across host taxa, e.g. host orders containing 
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several common domestic species (Artiodactyla, Carnivora) may be more thoroughly 
sampled than those with exclusively wild species (e.g. Chiroptera). It is difficult to 
precisely identify how this would bias analyses. Sampling inequalities could have 
several influences, e.g. oversampling of domestic taxa may lead to biased inclusion of 
mammal-exclusive viruses that do not infect humans in the dataset and negatively 
bias risks of infectivity. However, preferential sampling of otherwise undersampled 
wild taxa for viruses associated with human outbreaks may lead to biased inclusion of 
human-infective viruses and positively bias risks of infectivity. Furthermore, host 
sampling inequalities are known to be present within orders, subject to factors such 
as biogeography and life history (Cooper and Nunn 2013). 
Uncertainty in the classifications of viral traits used are discussed in previous 
chapters for both data on virulence (see Chapter 2) and transmissibility (see Chapter 
3), and the same potential errors also apply to analyses presented here.  
 
4.5.2. Wider implications 
My analyses may set up hypotheses for studies of underlying genetic 
mechanisms behind the associations between nonhuman host range and viral traits. 
Host specialism within the orthopoxviruses (a genus of DNA viruses) is associated 
with genome shortening, with extant specialists thought to descend from a generalist 
virus with a much longer genome (Hendrickson et al. 2010). The relationship 
between host range, viral traits and genome length warrants further comparative 
study. Additionally, future studies could identify specific genetic loci associated with 
host range breadth or specificity, or deeper phylogenetic patterns among viral traits. 
These analyses also have implications for public health. The correlations I 
find between host range and traits of emergence highlight that nonhuman hosts and 
the wider ecological context should be considered in public health decisions, in line 
with the One Health perspective. Those key host types my models identify as being 
associated with human infectivity, transmissibility and virulence could also 
contribute towards targeted surveillance and interventions (Daszak 2009). However, 
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if the observed correlations from the models presented reflect a sensitive underlying 
evolutionary balance, then removal of nonhuman hosts during certain interventions 
may alter selection pressures and have unpredictable and/or unintended 
consequences (Bolzoni and De Leo 2013). Resources should first be invested in 
understanding how host range affects emergence dynamics at a more local, 
community-based scale.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Traits of RNA viruses are intrinsically linked to their host range, not only in 
simple taxonomic breadth but also in the specific types of hosts infected and their 
phylogenetic relationship with humans. These patterns suggest that nonhuman hosts 
are a key factor underpinning the emergence of novel viruses. Ultimately, this work 
represents a strong admonition that human diseases do not operate in a closed 
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Chapter 5. Allometry of mammal species 





The majority of human RNA viruses have a mammalian origin. Comparative 
studies have begun to identify life history traits among mammal species associated 
with greater virus diversity and ability to host zoonotic viruses. However, it remains 
poorly understood whether life history traits predispose certain mammals to hosting 
viruses with high risks of virulence or transmissibility. Using body mass or 
‘allometry’ as a proxy for overall pace of life, I aim to determine whether life history 
of mammal species can predict hosting zoonotic RNA viruses capable of a) causing 
severe disease in humans, and b) human-to-human transmission. I obtain data on 
mammal body mass, virus traits, and reported mammal-virus relationships by 
conducting or externally sourcing systematic literature searches. Correcting for 
taxonomy and study effort, I use mixed logistic regressions to investigate whether 
proportions of virulent and human-transmissible viruses are predicted by body mass 
among 524 mammal species. I observed that mammal species with a smaller body 
mass (and therefore, a faster pace of life history) were more likely to host viruses 
causing severe human disease. The relationship between human-to-human 
transmissibility and mammalian host body mass was sensitive to data definitions of 
transmissibility and subgroup analyses, and largely remains unclear. My analyses 
suggest that host life history may play a significant role in the evolution of virus 
traits, and further studies of virulence should consider the context of host ecology. 
Efficiency of global health strategies may be improved by preferentially targeting 
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5.2. Introduction 
Newly recognised viral infections are continuing to emerge at a persistent rate 
(Woolhouse et al. 2012). Although several definitions of ‘emergence’ are based solely 
upon infectivity (Morse 1995), emerging viruses vary greatly in their ultimate public 
health impact. This is partly determined by virus traits such as virulence and human-
to-human transmissibility, with several key virulent and/or human-transmissible 
viruses having recently been designated a priority for global health (WHO 2015). The 
majority of emerging and re-emerging RNA viruses are zoonotic (Taylor et al. 2001; 
Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005), and among those, the majority are shared 
with nonhuman mammals. Certain risk factors are known to predispose mammals to 
hosting zoonotic viruses, e.g. phylogenetic relatedness to humans, primarily within 
hominid apes and wider primates (Pedersen and Davies 2009), and degree of human 
contact, primarily within domestic mammals (Cleaveland et al. 2001). 
Several comparative analyses have shown the diversity and zoonotic potential 
of viruses hosted by mammals to additionally depend on their ecology and life 
history. Mammals exhibit a very broad range of ecological strategies and show 
substantial variation in their patterns of maturity, activity, reproduction, etc. 
(Lindstedt and Calder 1981; Ricklefs and Wikelski 2002). Greater virus richness has 
been observed among mammals with greater body mass, longer lifespan, earlier and 
more frequent reproduction, specific diets, greater range use intensity and greater 
population genetic structure (Nunn and Dokey 2006; Lindenfors et al. 2007; 
Turmelle and Olival 2009; Luis et al. 2015). Fewer studies have directly addressed 
zoonotic transmission in the context of mammal life history, though both ability to 
host zoonotic viruses and richness of zoonotic viruses hosted appear to follow similar 
principles, being greater in species with greater lifespan and reproductive potential 
(Luis et al. 2013; Han et al. 2015b). 
However, mammal life history influences more than simply the diversity of 
viruses hosted. Mammals with differing life history strategies are likely to represent 
very different host environments and subsequently, selection pressures for viruses. 
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Consequently, host ecology and life history may shape the trajectory of viral 
evolution (Streicker et al. 2012b). Therefore, a key question that remains is how life 
history influences the traits of viruses hosted by mammal species. Correspondingly, 
there is also a pressing public health need to identify likely host species of future 
high-impact emerging zoonoses (Daszak 2009), beyond simply predicting virus 
sharing. Here, I ask whether life history can predict ability to host priority RNA 
viruses, in terms of virulence and transmissibility within humans. 
Although the term ‘life history’ covers a broad spectrum of traits such as 
activity, maturity and reproduction, variation in life history is often described using a 
single axis of “pace of life”, with fast-paced species having comparatively shorter 
lifespans, but faster metabolism and higher fecundity, and vice versa for slow-paced 
species (Promislow and Harvey 1990; Ricklefs and Wikelski 2002). Additionally, 
many of the traits following such a gradient strongly correlate with overall body mass 
or ‘allometry’, such that body mass is a well-established proxy for pace of life 
(Lindstedt and Calder 1981; West and Brown 2005), and here I focus on allometry to 
represent pace of life in the context of hosting virulent and human-transmissible 
viruses. 
Evolutionary pressure to increase virulence and transmissibility may be 
anticipated in mammals with certain life histories for several reasons. Firstly, 
mammal species with a faster-paced life history might exhibit narrower, more 
opportunistic windows of viral transmission potential as a result of shorter lifespans 
and intensive reproduction. This may introduce selection pressure for viruses to 
increase their intensity of replication and subsequently, virulence and transmissibility 
(Nidelet et al. 2009).  
Secondly, higher investment in processes such as reproduction and 
metabolism among faster-paced mammal species may restrict investment in immune 
function via resource trade-offs (Lochmiller and Deerenberg 2000; Tella et al. 2002). 
Differences are also predicted with life history in where immune investment is 
allocated – faster-paced species may preferentially invest in innate immunity versus 
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costlier adaptive immunity (Lee 2006; Previtali et al. 2012). One might expect this to 
extend to greater potential for host exploitation and evolution of increased virulence 
and transmissibility. 
Using body mass as an allometric proxy, I aim to test whether pace of life 
history in mammal species predicts their ability to host zoonotic RNA viruses with 
specific traits of virulence and transmissibility within humans. Based on the above, I 
hypothesise that mammal species with smaller body mass (and therefore, faster-
paced life history) will be more likely to host viruses with greater virulence, and 
viruses capable of human-to-human transmission.  
Previous studies that identified potential mammalian hosts of zoonotic 
viruses have largely done so on the basis of zoonotic virus richness (Luis et al. 2013, 
2015), though this does not account for baseline viral diversity within each mammal 
species. Instead of richness, I focus on the relative proportions of virulent and 
human-transmissible viruses out of all hosted zoonotic viruses. I source known 
mammal host-virus relationships, mammal body mass data, and virus trait data using 
datasets constructed from systematic literature searches. Correcting for mammal 
taxonomy and study effort, I used mixed logistic regression models to investigate 
whether body mass of mammal species predicts their proportions of virulent and 
human-transmissible viruses. I then conduct subgroup analyses to test whether 
specific transmission routes or viral families are driving observed relationships. 
 
5.3. Materials and methods 
5.3.1. RNA virus and mammal host data 
Zoonotic RNA viruses were defined as those known to infect both humans 
and non-human mammals. Human-infective RNA viruses were defined using a 
published empirical review of human RNA virus species (Woolhouse et al. 2013). 
Mammal RNA viruses and their known host species were sourced from the 
EcoHealth Alliance (Olival et al. in review) and were originally compiled via 
structured literature searches (search terms: [virus name including synonyms]; 
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sources used: Web of Knowledge, Google Scholar, Wildlife Disease Association 
meeting abstracts, Global Mammal Parasite Database (Nunn and Altizer 2005); 
protocol further described in Levinson et al. (2013). Virus detection via molecular 
methods (e.g. virus isolation, PCR-based methods) and serological methods (e.g. 
serum neutralisation, antigen detection assays) were both accepted as sufficient 
evidence of host infection. Data from experimental inoculations, studies of captive 
individuals (e.g. zoological parks and breeding facilities), or cell culture detections 
were excluded. Host species were accepted based solely on evidence of infection, via 
either molecular (e.g. virus isolation, PCR-based methods) or serological (e.g. serum 
neutralisation, antigen detection assays) diagnostic methods. Diagnostic evidence 
from experimental infections, captive individuals (zoological parks and breeding 
facilities), and cell cultures were not considered. Virus names were standardised to 
species using ICTV 9th Edition Virus Taxonomy (King et al. 2011). 
For each zoonotic RNA virus species represented, virulence and 
transmissibility within humans were classified using previous analyses/sources. 
Firstly, I defined virulence as a binary classification based on whether viruses 
typically cause either ‘severe’ or ‘nonsevere’ disease in humans, where ‘severe’ met at 
least one of the following criteria: ≥5% case fatality ratio, frequent reports of 
hospitalisation, association with significant morbidity from a prespecified list of 
conditions (haemorrhagic fever, seizures/coma, cirrhosis, AIDS, hantavirus 
pulmonary syndrome, HTLV-associated myelopathy) or were explicitly described as 
“severe” or “causing severe disease” in literature sources (see Chapter 2). Secondly, I 
defined viruses capable of human-to-human transmission as described in a 
comprehensive empirical review (Woolhouse et al. 2016), and accepted any observed 
route of human-to-human transmissibility, including vertical or iatrogenic routes. 
Following Woolhouse et al. (2016), I accepted viruses as human-transmissible where 
transmissibility is suspected but unconfirmed (e.g. spatial or contact-based clusters of 
cases without diagnostic confirmation) or possible but not yet directly observed (e.g. 
very large outbreaks in urban communities with few potential animal hosts). One 
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virus was removed due to difficulty in estimating virulence (Retroviridae: Primate T-
lymphotropic virus 3). To understand whether wider viral traits were driving any 
observed patterns, I also compiled the primary transmission route of each virus 
where known using the same literature sources outlined above (see Chapter 2), 
classified as either ‘vector-borne’ (excluding mechanical transmission) or ‘nonvector-
borne’ (including direct contact, respiratory and faecal-oral transmission). This 
grouping was chosen as transmission routes occasionally vary between different 
hosts, but do not usually cross this dichotomy. 
For each mammal host species with at least one zoonotic virus, I calculated 
the proportions of viruses causing severe human disease and being capable of 
human-to-human transmission out of their total number of known zoonotic viruses. 
Body mass data for mammal species was sourced from PanTHERIA (Jones et al. 
2009), an open-access database of mammal life history traits, and was defined therein 
as adult body mass in grams, averaged over all data sources consulted. Zoonotic virus 
richness in mammal species has been consistently demonstrated to correlate with 
sampling effort (Nunn et al. 2003; Lindenfors et al. 2007; Luis et al. 2013). To correct 
for any additional bias from preferentially sampling mammal hosts for virulent and 
human-transmissible viruses, I obtained a count of virus research citations for the 
Latin binomial name of each mammal species via PubMed, while attempting to 
minimise inclusion of experimental studies (search terms: [Genus] + [species] + virus 
NOT experiment* NOT "cell line"). To standardise the mammal taxonomic orders 
represented, orders with less than 10 species were excluded. When removing 
mammal species with missing body mass data, erroneous citation counts (one 
species, Axis axis), or belonging to an order with less than 10 species, data was 
filtered from 627 to 524 mammal species, within six taxonomic orders (Artiodactyla, 
Carnivora, Chiroptera, Lagomorpha, Primates, Rodentia). Mammal species within 
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5.3.2. Statistical analysis 
To investigate whether mammal body mass correlated with ability to host 
virulent and human-transmissible viruses, I constructed logistic mixed regression 
models where outcomes were specified as proportion of zoonotic viruses causing 
severe human disease and being capable of human-to-human transmission, 
respectively. Mammal species were weighted within models by their total zoonotic 
virus richness to account for their baseline virus diversity. Model covariates were 
specified as body mass and citation counts, both of which were modelled under a 
log(covariate+1) transformation. Model covariates were assessed via likelihood ratio 
tests (LRTs) between the full model and a reduced model removing the covariate. As 
a basic correction for unmeasured mammal traits and phylogenetic structure in host-
virus relationships, mammal taxonomic order was specified as a random effect. 
Separate models were created featuring a) random intercepts, and b) random 
intercepts plus random slopes upon the body mass covariate. Models (a) and (b) were 
compared using LRTs, retaining the best fitting model. All mixed regression models 
were conducted using function glmer() in package ‘lme4’, v1.1-11 (Bates et al. 2015) 
within R, v3.2.2 (R Development Core Team 2015). Confidence intervals were 
calculated for fitted model plots using 1000 simulations over both fixed and random 
terms using function predictInterval() in package ‘merTools’, v0.2.0 (Knowles and 
Frederick 2011). 
As body mass has been demonstrated to correlate with study effort in certain 
mammal orders (Cooper and Nunn 2013; Brooke et al. 2014; Han et al. 2015a), I used 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) to assess collinearity between body mass and 
citation counts within retained models. VIFs were calculated using a function 
adapted for mixed regression models (Frank 2011) based on the function vif() in 
package ‘rms’, v3.2-0 (Harrell 2011). 
To understand whether any observed associations were being driven by 
specific types of viruses, data compilation and analyses were repeated for four data 
subgroups, limiting those viruses considered to: a) vector-borne viruses (resulting in 
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n = 258 mammal species analysed), b) nonvector-borne viruses (n = 388 mammal 
species), and two viral families producing adequate sample sizes, c) Bunyaviridae (n 
= 126 mammal species) and d) Flaviviridae (n = 157 mammal species). Model 
sensitivity was also assessed by repeating analyses removing those virus species 
suspected to be influential due to their exceptionally broad mammalian host range 
(Rhabdoviridae: Rabies virus, Picornaviridae: Foot-and-mouth disease virus).  
 
5.4. Results 
Of the 125 zoonotic RNA viruses represented within compiled data, 42 were 
classified as ‘severe’ in their human virulence, and 46 exhibited evidence of human-
to-human transmissibility. Among the 524 mammal host species represented, there 
was strong overdispersion in the number of known zoonotic viruses hosted, as well as 
the number of severe and human-transmissible viruses (Figure D.1). The majority of 
mammal species were only known to host a single zoonotic virus, leading to many 
values of zero or one in proportions of severe and human-transmissible viruses. 
Three of the five mammal species hosting the highest number of severe viruses (n = 7 
viruses), were fruit bats (Artibeus lituratus, Artibeus jamaicensis, Rousettus 
leschenaultii), with the remainder being common rodents (Mus musculus, 
Peromyscus leucopus). The mammal with the highest number of human-
transmissible viruses was again a fruit bat, Rousettus leschenaultii (n = 11 viruses), 
followed by species that include domestic variants: house mice (Mus musculus; n = 
9), cattle (Bos taurus; n = 9) and swine (Sus scrofa; n = 8). 
Considering human virulence, mammals with a smaller body mass hosted a 
greater proportion of viruses causing severe disease (Table 5.1, Figure 5.1). No 
relationship was observed with sampling effort (Table 5.1), and no influence of 
collinearity upon fitted model variances was detected (VIF = 1.007). Fitted model 
intercepts under a common regression slope suggested carnivores, rabbits and hares 
(order Lagomorpha), and bats (order Chiroptera) hosted the greatest proportion of 
viruses causing severe disease, and primate and artiodactyl species hosted the least 
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(Figure 5.1), though there was general overlap in 95% confidence intervals of fitted 
model lines between mammal orders (Figure D.2). Introducing random slopes with 
respect to mammal order did not improve model fit (LRT = 2.83, p = 0.243). 
 
Table 5.1. Outputs from logistic mixed regression model predicting proportion of 
zoonotic RNA viruses causing ‘severe’ human disease within 524 mammal host species. 
Variance in random intercept term of mammal taxonomic order = 0.289. LRT = 










log(Adult body mass (g)) 
0.822 
(0.757, 0.894) 
19.91 < 0.001 






Rabies virus and Foot-and-mouth disease virus were suspected to be 
influential in analyses due to their broad host ranges. When mammal species hosting 
either of these viruses were examined, a large number (n = 100) appeared to host one 
of these as their only recognised zoonotic virus (particularly artiodactyls, carnivore, 
and bat species), which could have introduced potential bias to regression slope 
estimates. However, the negative relationship between proportion of viruses causing 
severe disease and body mass was robust to their removal (removing Rabies virus, 
odds ratio = 0.739, LRT = 23.06, p < 0.001; removing Foot-and-mouth disease virus, 
odds ratio = 0.823, LRT = 21.33, p < 0.001, Figure D.3). This relationship was also 
consistently retained when data were limited to subgroups considering viruses with 
specific transmission routes or taxonomic families (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2. Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals describing effect of mammal adult 
body mass from logistic mixed regression models predicting proportion of zoonotic RNA 
viruses causing ‘severe’ human disease and capable of human-to-human transmission, 
respectively. Colours denote effects from fitted models for data subgroups, limiting 
viruses considered to those with specific transmission routes (vector-borne, nonvector-
borne) or from specific taxonomic families (Bunyaviridae, Flaviviridae). Odds ratios 
from models with full data are presented in red for comparison. Dashed line denotes the 
null expectation of an odds ratio value of 1. 
 
Considering human-to-human transmissibility, no relationship with mammal 
body mass was observed, nor with sampling effort (Table 5.2A), and no collinearity 
was detected (VIF = 1.003). Therefore, to visualise potential differences between 
mammal taxonomic orders, a subsidiary model was created specifying order as a 
random intercept and no other terms. As for virulence, carnivore and bat species 
appeared to host the greatest proportion of viruses capable of human-to-human 
transmission, though confidence intervals suggested limited distinction between 
orders (Figure 5.3). 
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Table 5.2. Outputs from logistic mixed regression models predicting proportion of 
zoonotic RNA viruses capable of human-to-human transmission within 524 mammal 
host species. Models presented use different datasets where transmissibility is defined as 
A) any observed transmissibility following Woolhouse et al. (2016), and B) excluding 
iatrogenic transmission, which reclassifies six viruses as non-transmissible. Variance in 
random intercept term of mammal taxonomic order for A) = 0.499, B) = 0.312. LRT = 





LRT statistic p(LRT) 
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Figure 5.3. Relationship between mammal taxonomic order and proportion of zoonotic 
RNA viruses capable of human-to-human transmission among 524 mammal species. 
Filled circles denote individual host species where circle size denotes number of zoonotic 
viruses (i.e. denominator in calculated proportion on the y axis) and model weighting in 
logistic mixed regression. Filled circles are jittered along both axes for visibility. Boxes 
denote predictions and 95% confidence interval from 1000 simulations derived from a 
subsidiary model containing only random intercepts for each taxonomic order, as neither 
body mass nor citation counts were significantly associated with proportion 
transmissible. 
 
As for the full dataset, no relationship was visible between proportion of 
viruses capable of human-to-human transmission and mammal body mass when 
limiting data to subgroups considering nonvector-borne viruses or flaviviruses 
(Figure 5.2). However, a positive relationship was observed when considering 
bunyaviruses and vector-borne viruses, though this was much more tentative for the 
latter subgroup. To further explore this model sensitivity, human-to-human 
transmissibility was redefined to exclude transmission through iatrogenic routes, 
reclassifying six viruses as non-transmissible (Arenaviridae: Lymphocytic 
choriomeningitis virus; Flaviviridae: Japanese encephalitis virus, Usutu virus, West 
Nile virus; Reoviridae: Colorado tick fever virus; Rhabdoviridae: Rabies virus). A 
positive relationship was also visible within the full dataset under this reclassification 
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(Table 5.2B), where mammals with a larger body mass hosted a greater proportion of 
viruses capable of human-to-human transmission (Figure D.4). 
Analogous results were obtained when the data structure was reversed to 
conduct analyses at the level of virus species rather than host species (Supplementary 
Methods D.1). Specifically, viruses with a smaller average body mass among their 
hosts were more likely to cause severe disease, but were not more likely to be human-
transmissible (Table D.1A, D.2A, Figure D.5A). Similar conclusions were also 
confirmed when restricting data to host-virus pairs with stringent diagnostic 
evidence of within-host replication (Table D.1B, D.2B, Figure D.5B). 
 
5.5. Discussion 
Using a comparative trait-based approach, I found evidence for a relationship 
between host body mass and traits of emergence among zoonotic mammalian RNA 
viruses. Specifically, smaller mammals were more likely to host viruses causing severe 
disease in humans. This is consistent with my initial hypothesis that, following an 
allometric proxy, mammal hosts with faster-paced life history may have increased 
suitability to host virulent viruses. Assuming allometry is an accurate proxy for 
overall pace of life history, two key elements need to be confirmed to better 
understand any underlying causality between host life history and virulence in 
humans. 
Firstly, pace of life must influence selection for virulence within the mammal 
host itself, either directly or indirectly through trade-offs, which may occur via 
several potential mechanisms. For example, hosts with faster pace of life may have 
differential investment in immunity. Generalised immune function has been 
reported to be lower in species with lower body mass and shorter lifespan across 50 
bird species (Tella et al. 2002). However, the multitude of pathways within the 
vertebrate immune system means this is likely not a simple relationship, and instead 
pace of life may determine where immune investment is allocated. For example, 
species with faster-paced life history exhibited higher metrics of innate immunity and 
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lower metrics of adaptive or antibody-mediated immunity in assays of wild rodents 
(Previtali et al. 2012). Hosts with a faster pace of life may also present limited 
windows for viral transmission, creating a selection pressure to increase replication 
or viral load. Fewer studies have addressed this idea, though viral replication rates 
appear to be higher in cell types with higher turnover (Hicks and Duffy 2014). It 
remains to be tested whether viral replication mirrors host turnover at the wider scale 
of host species longevity and life history. Although any evolutionary mechanisms are 
difficult to precisely identify, there is empirical evidence that the level of virulence 
observed in animal hosts reflects their life history. Mammals and birds with smaller 
body mass experienced faster onset of symptoms and mortality in a meta-analysis of 
microparasites, including two RNA viruses (Cable et al. 2007). Virulence has also 
been reported to vary with pace of life in other host-parasite systems (Nidelet et al. 
2009; Johnson et al. 2012). 
Secondly, any evolved level of virulence must then persist over zoonotic 
cross-species transmission, independent of the equivalent pace of life of humans. 
This would imply a detectable correlation between virulence within animal and 
human hosts, though the extent to which animal hosts show pathology varies 
(Levinson et al. 2013) with several highly virulent human viruses not being known to 
cause disease in their suspected natural host range (Halpin et al. 2007). Although the 
level of virulence can be a non-adapted, coincidental phenotype following cross-
species transmission to a novel host (Levin and Svanborg Edén 1990; Bull 1994), 
some predictability of virulence is evident from experimental studies, based on host 
phylogenies (Longdon et al. 2015a). Evolutionary study of the relative influences of 
both original and novel host species pace of life history upon virulence during cross-
species transmission will be a crucial next step towards understanding risks 
surrounding emerging viruses. 
Mammals with larger body mass appeared more likely to host viruses capable 
of human-to-human transmission only under select conditions, and the wider 
relationship between pace of life history and transmissibility remains unclear. An 
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interaction between pace of life and microparasite transmissibility within nonhuman 
hosts has been proposed in several mathematical models (De Leo and Dobson 1996; 
Han et al. 2015a). However, evolutionary potential for human-to-human 
transmissibility to develop following zoonotic transmission is likely determined by a 
wider range of factors (see Chapter 3, also Pepin et al. 2010). 
Among mammal orders, bats, lagomorphs and carnivores were observed to 
have the highest proportions of viruses causing severe disease (corrected for body 
mass), and artiodactyls the lowest. However, species within these orders often hosted 
viruses suspected as influential in regression modelling (Figure D.3). Sensitivity 
analyses suggested that although regression slopes over body mass remained 
consistent, Rabies virus visibly inflated the fitted intercept for carnivores (Figure 
D.3). However, fitted intercepts for artiodactyls and bats were comparable after 
removing these viruses. My analyses may tentatively suggest support towards bats as 
reportedly “special” hosts of viruses causing severe disease and mortality in humans 
(Dobson 2005), and requiring focused study.  
 
5.5.1. Analytical limitations 
As with any comparative trait-based modelling, my analyses are prone to 
error from gaps in data availability. Mammal host-virus data and life history data 
were sourced from standardised datasets compiled using systematic literature 
searches. I implicitly assumed this data to be representative across all mammals. 
However, most mammal species were only known to host a single virus as data 
coverage of the complete mammal virome remains poor (Anthony et al. 2013; 
Cooper and Nunn 2013). I adjusted models to place greater confidence upon well-
studied species by weighting with respect to the number of known zoonotic viruses 
and explicitly correcting for citation counts, though ongoing study will be needed to 
confirm my findings as coverage of mammal-virus data improves. Although life 
history data is often incomplete, contingent on species rarity and difficulty of 
sampling (Penone et al. 2014), body mass data coverage among mammal species 
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included here was satisfactory (93.4%). There are also potential biases within the data 
collection protocol and classification systems I use for virulence and human-to-
human transmissibility, discussed in detail in previous chapters (see Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3). 
Additionally, analysis of data aggregated at the species level for mammal hosts 
brings several limits to inference. I detected differences in ability to host viruses 
causing severe human disease between mammal species, though it is possible for 
greater unmeasured variation to occur within species. Viral communities can vary 
highly even among geographically close intraspecific populations or individuals 
(Anthony et al. 2015). Other host traits that might indirectly govern relationships 
observed here may also vary within species, e.g. individual or seasonal differences in 
immunity (Lee 2006). Although the large amount of unexplained variation in hosting 
viruses causing severe disease (Figure 5.1) likely reflects these processes, comparative 
study between host species remains essential. To my knowledge, the analyses herein 
represent the first empirical tests of hypotheses relating nonhuman host life history 
to traits of emerging human viruses. There is also an urgent need among global 
health programmes to understand the broad-scale trends of viral emergence. To 
improve inference and precision of risk assessments, my analyses can be followed by 
trait-based study of mammal-virus relationships at more precise ecological scales 
(Johnson et al. 2015b). 
Finally, my analyses are built on mammal host-virus data collected via 
literature searches, including studies of cross-sectional sampling. With this scope of 
data, it is currently not possible to distinguish between mammal species that are true 
maintenance hosts or ‘reservoirs’ (and therefore, have significant coevolutionary 
relationships with their respective viruses) from dead-end host species that do not 
contribute to onward transmission. This introduces uncertainty regarding any 
underlying explanations for the associations I observe, as host pace of life cannot 
shape viral selection without coevolution. To strengthen causality, analyses could be 
repeated considering only known reservoir species. However, reservoir status is 
 
 
5. Allometry of mammal species predicts ability to host virulent human RNA viruses 116 
challenging to establish without in-depth study (Viana et al. 2014), and no reservoir 
has yet been identified for many zoonotic viruses.  
 
5.5.2. Wider implications  
Study of mammalian life history in relation to pathogen traits has significant 
implications for public health. As the importance of the wider ecology of infectious 
diseases is increasingly recognised under ‘One Health’ perspectives, there are calls to 
target surveillance and control programmes for zoonoses based on insights from 
empirical models (Daszak 2009). In previous studies of virus richness, correlations 
with life history have varied between different mammal groups or analytical 
methods, though generally, larger mammal species with slower-paced life history 
have been associated with a greater diversity of zoonotic viruses (Lindenfors et al. 
2007; Luis et al. 2013, 2015). Based on this, species with a slower pace of life would 
appear to be priority targets for surveillance and intervention. However, my results 
suggest that, independent of diversity, those mammals hosting viruses with the 
greatest potential public health impact are actually smaller species with a faster pace 
of life. This disparity highlights the wide phenotypic variation among emerging 
viruses and the essential need for studies of parasite richness to be complemented by 
trait-based analyses. The most efficient public health strategies concerning mammal 
hosts may therefore involve a compromise between sampling virus-rich species and 
species suited to hosting virulent viruses. There is a clear need for further research of 




Analogous to aspects of traditional ecology, virulence and potentially other 
traits of RNA viruses hosted follows a gradient of life history pace within mammals. 
Further work is urgently needed to identify the underlying evolutionary pressures 
that govern these host-virus relationships. The influence of mammal life history 
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upon zoonotic virus traits supports the growing recognition of nonhuman hosts as a 
key component of global human health. Risks of future virulent zoonoses may be 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion  
6.1. Outline 
This thesis aimed to identify and quantify the influence of ecological virus 
traits and host traits upon the virulence and human-to-human transmissibility of 
RNA viruses, with a view to better understanding viral emergence. I have presented, 
to my knowledge, the first dataset for virulence and transmissibility based on a 
structured review of literature that covers all known taxonomically-standardised 
human pathogens of a single type. By compiling such data, I was able to conduct 
comparative analyses of these characteristics using a comprehensively broad scope. I 
have demonstrated that while often non-linear and highly holistic, ecological traits of 
both viruses and hosts have discernible associations with virulence and 
transmissibility and are likely to play key roles in the ultimate dynamics of emerging 
RNA viruses.  
Specifically, I found that the traits with the highest predictive power for 
virulence in classification models were tissue tropism breadth and transmission 
route, where broad tissue tropisms and nonvector-borne transmission predicted 
severe disease. Transmissibility itself was a weaker predictor of virulence, except 
within a small subset featuring viruses causing chronic infections, where sustained 
transmissibility predicted severe disease. Increased risk of virulence was also 
observed for viruses infecting a broader diversity of mammal host species. 
Furthermore, mammal host species with a smaller body mass (and by extension, a 
faster pace of overall life history) were more likely to host a higher proportion of 
zoonotic viruses associated with human virulence. 
Increased risk of human-to-human transmissibility (though not self-
sustained transmissibility) was observed for viruses with vector-borne or respiratory 
transmission routes. Increased risk of all forms of human-to-human transmissibility 
was observed for viruses infecting a narrower diversity of mammal taxonomic orders, 
as well as mammals with close phylogenetic similarity to humans. Additionally, 
adaptation towards transmissibility appeared to follow a variety of potential 
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evolutionary routes in state switching models, rather than hypothesised routes of 
stepwise or off-the-shelf movements exclusively. Finally, host and virus taxonomy 
were additional important influences upon both virulence and transmissibility 
throughout analyses. These findings are summarised in Figure 6.1. 
 
6.2. Insights into virus ecology and evolution 
The various predictive virus traits and host traits I find to be associated with 
virulence and transmissibility are diverse and vary widely in their scale (ranging from 
within-host tissue tropism, to known global diversity of host taxa). The connections 
between emerging virus dynamics and this highly varied range of predictors further 
confirms disease emergence as a complex, multifactorial phenomenon, and supports 
the use of frameworks applying a holistic approach to emerging pathogens (Wilcox 
and Colwell 2005; Wood et al. 2012). 
The potential mechanisms, influences, and recommended avenues to aid 
understanding of each of these specific relationships in Figure 6.1 are discussed in 
detail in their respective chapters. However, several overarching trends and 
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6.2.1. Virulence and niche diversity  
Higher risk of virulence in humans was associated with broad niche diversity 
of RNA viruses at different ecological levels: both within-host (breadth of tissue 
tropism) and in host macroecology (breadth of mammal host species). This provides 
a phenomenological link between these two scales of disease ecology (Johnson et al. 
2015b). An understanding of the mechanisms connecting these scales is needed to 
truly characterise the relationship between niche generalism and virulence, though it 
is currently unclear whether breadths of tissue tropism and host range are related. 
Although a broad tissue tropism and host range coincides for certain virus taxa (e.g. 
henipaviruses (Zeltina et al. 2016) and among DNA viruses, dependoparvoviruses 
(Hueffer and Parrish 2003)), there are suggestions these traits may not be strongly 
coupled, with tissue tropism likely to be more evolutionarily conserved than host 
range (Taber and Pease 1990). It also remains to be tested whether the association 
between risk of human virulence and niche diversity holds at intermediate scales, i.e. 
breadth of genotypes within host species, or breadth of host species within 
communities. 
In a review of evolutionary processes, generalism in host range was predicted 
to lead to lower virulence than specialism in the majority of scenarios (Leggett et al. 
2013), contradicting these findings. To further investigate the underlying causes 
behind this association, it will be essential to understand how niche diversity arises 
among emerging viruses. For example, my observations may hint towards a 
molecular mechanism of niche diversity as a critical contributor to viral virulence, 
such as usage of multiple receptors, or a single, highly-conserved receptor. As an 
illustration, henipaviruses cause severe human disease and enter cells via the ephrin-
B2 surface protein, which is both expressed in a wide range of tissues and conserved 
across a wide range of mammals (Zeltina et al. 2016), allowing a diverse range of both 
tropisms and hosts. Several viruses analysed likely have broad niche generalism as a 
viral species because they comprise large numbers of strains or subspecies, each of 
which may individually have specialism for a single host or small group of related 
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hosts. This pattern has been recognised in the phylodynamics of Rabies virus 
(Streicker et al. 2010), with potential implications for the evolution of rabies 
virulence (Mollentze et al. 2014). It is not possible to distinguish which of these 
mechanisms explain niche diversity, and for which viral taxa, at the scale of my 
analyses. However, further hypotheses regarding generalism and virulence may be 
tested in future via study beyond the species resolution.  
 
6.2.2. Antagonistic pleiotropy and constraints of human 
adaptation 
I observed that human-to-human transmissibility, particularly sustained 
transmissibility, which may be thought of as an important phenotypic marker of 
human adaptation, became less likely with increasing breadth of host range of 
nonhuman mammals. This may be indicative of antagonistic pleiotropy, whereby 
genetic adaptation to one host consequently reduces suitability for other hosts. This 
phenomenon is well-documented in numerous experimental studies that show a 
negative trade-off between viral fitness within different host types (Crill et al. 2000; 
Turner and Elena 2000; Elena et al. 2009). Although antagonistic pleiotropy has 
primarily been explored with respect to intracellular infectivity and replication, my 
findings may imply identifiable patterns or strategies in host adaptation specifically 
regarding transmissibility, i.e. generalism, where viruses may exhibit some limited 
transmissibility in each of a number of hosts; and specialism, where viruses are 
adapted to efficient transmission within a single or few host(s).  
Patterns of host specialisation in infectivity have generally been observed to 
be driven by viral adaptation rather than host defence (Antonovics et al. 2013), 
though may follow constraints of host phylogenies (Longdon et al. 2011; Cooper et 
al. 2012). Similar constraints to transmissibility are suggested by the relationships I 
observe between human-to-human transmissibility and phylogenetic similarity of 
nonhuman hosts to humans, as well as infection of nonhuman primates (Chapter 4). 
These host scenarios likely involve a shorter adaptive distance to be traversed to 
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develop transmissibility (Davies and Pedersen 2008; Parrish et al. 2008). Although 
not closely related to humans, bat-infective viruses also appeared more likely to 
develop sustained human-to-human transmissibility. Suggestions that bats are 
special or unique amongst zoonotic virus sources are still under close scrutiny 
(Dobson 2005; Olival et al. 2012). 
Assuming distinctive strategies of generalism and specialism, regarding 
transmissibility, the important exceptions for both scientific study and public health 
priorities would be viruses that are capable of sustained transmission within a large 
number of distantly-related hosts. One potential determinant of these dynamics that 
warrants further exploration is viral genome size, as a larger genome may offer 
plasticity and scope for sufficient adaptation to multiple hosts (Holmes 2003a), a 
pattern observed within a genus of DNA viruses, the orthopoxviruses (Hendrickson 
et al. 2010). 
Finally, adaptation may be particularly subject to pleiotropic or other genetic 
constraints for viruses with vector-borne transmission, as replication must occur in 
very different host environments of arthropods and vertebrates (Woelk and Holmes 
2002; Holmes 2003a). Vector-borne viruses also showed little evidence of off-the-
shelf jumps in adaptation (Chapter 3). In addition to evolutionary constraints, if 
arthropod vectors facilitate wide host exposure then infection of multiple hosts is 
likely (Woolhouse et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2015a), but if this exposure is 
nonselective, vector transmission may simultaneously reduce opportunity for 
adaptation towards specialism. This is supported by my observations that vector-
borne viruses were more likely to infect and transmit between humans in self-limited 
chains, but were not more likely to transmit between humans in self-sustained chains 
without need for other hosts (Chapter 3). It has been noted that there are very few 
human-adapted vector-borne viruses (Woolhouse and Adair 2013; Woolhouse et al. 
2016), the only examples being dengue virus, yellow fever virus, chikungunya virus, 
and additionally reconsidered since these citations, Zika virus. A crucial determinant 
of host adaptation for vector-borne viruses is the ecological feeding preference of the 
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arthropod vectors, and each of the human-adapted vector-borne viruses has at least 
one vector species recognised to be anthropophilic (Gratz 2004; Chouin-Carneiro et 
al. 2016). It is evident that generally, vector-borne viruses follow different dynamics 
in their epidemiology and ecology to those of other viruses.  
 
6.2.3. Evolutionary trade-offs in virulence and transmissibility 
The trade-off hypothesis of virulence posits that transmission rate between 
individuals will increase as a function of virulence, by means of pathogen replication 
or development of symptoms. However, host mortality will consequently also 
increase as a function of virulence, such that resulting pathogen fitness or R0 follows a 
trade-off between virulence and transmission throughout a longer infected host 
lifespan (Anderson and May 1982; Bremermann and Pickering 1983). 
I observed that those ecological risk factors for human virulence 
predominantly did not coincide with those for human-to-human transmissibility, 
and in several cases, showed opposite directionality (Figure 6.1). For example, 
breadth of mammal host range was positively associated with virulence but 
negatively associated with transmissibility (Chapter 4), and vector-borne 
transmission generally predicted nonsevere disease (Chapter 2) but also predicted 
development of self-limited transmissibility (Chapter 3). These correlations would 
appear to support a broad scale trade-off between virulence and transmissibility 
within human hosts, at least at the resolution of viral species. 
However, inference of a trade-off from these analyses may be blurred by the 
broad data definitions applied. Use of a standardised transmissibility measure was 
precluded by the large number of human viruses that are poorly studied. To ensure 
coverage of a broad diversity of viruses, human-to-human transmissibility was 
defined using both evidence of individual-scale transmissibility (e.g. case reports of 
transmission events), which might be considered equivalent to the transmissibility 
axis within the trade-off hypothesis, and population-scale transmissibility (e.g. R0 
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calculations), which might be considered equivalent to viral fitness and the ultimate 
outcome of the trade-off hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the observed patterns are likely to at least partly reflect 
differences in coevolutionary relationships between viruses and humans as hosts – if 
humans have not coevolved with a pathogen and are infected via zoonotic 
transmission without onward human-to-human transmission, virulence in humans 
will not be shaped by adaptation and can be coincidentally severe (Levin and 
Svanborg Edén 1990; Ebert and Bull 2008). However, the a priori expectations for 
levels of non-adapted virulence are not well-established. In experimental inoculations 
of Drosophila C virus (Longdon et al. 2015a), both increases and decreases in 
virulence were observed, broadly following phylogenetic clusters of Drosophila hosts 
that experienced either high or low virulence. If the absence of coevolution were to 
consistently result in a single direction of change in virulence in humans, this would 
suggest a detectable relationship between virulence and human-to-human 
transmissibility. 
Potential for such a direct relationship was explored in Chapter 2, however, 
transmissibility appeared to be a poorer predictor of virulence than other traits. 
Human-to-human transmissibility only featured in the classification model for a 
subset of viruses associated with chronic disease, where, counter to expectation, 
human-transmissible viruses were predicted to be more highly virulent. Viruses 
associated with chronic disease may cause symptoms well after their transmission 
window, essentially decoupling the two (Bull 1994), which would again indicate a 
non-adapted virulence. Contrastingly, among pooled RNA and DNA viruses, 
human-to-human transmissibility was found to be associated with lower case fatality 
ratios (Geoghegan et al. 2016). However, this analysis also found greater risk of 
transmissibility for viruses with chronic infections, nonvector-borne transmission, 
and specific genomic structures, all of which are also likely to influence the evolution 
of virulence. Without a more holistic framework controlling for the complex 
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interplay between these traits, the precise relationship between virulence and 
transmissibility is difficult to elucidate. 
Brought together, the above considerations imply that the nature of any 
trade-offs or other form of relationship between virulence and transmissibility will be 
highly dynamic and subject to many other viral traits (Ebert and Bull 2003; Alizon et 
al. 2009), making it particularly challenging to characterise at this comparative scale 
of study. Furthermore, virulence and transmissibility are often highly contextual, 
showing heterogeneity both within viral species and between host taxa. Therefore, 
developments in testing evolutionary models of virulence may be achieved by 
comparative or experimental analyses of viral strains and alternative host species 
(Alizon et al. 2009; Bull and Lauring 2014).  
 
6.3. Key areas for further study 
6.3.1. Knowledge and data gaps 
Throughout the chapters presented, several core areas are apparent where 
current knowledge is deficient and may be improved upon with further data 
collection efforts. I investigated how risks of virulence and transmissibility vary with 
ecological viral traits, though how these risks are shaped by further traits, such as 
molecular factors, is not well-understood and may describe unexplained variation 
within my analyses. One key determinant of emergence not addressed here is 
receptor usage, as success of cross-species transmission will be influenced by 
conservation of receptors between hosts (Woolhouse et al. 2012). In addition, genetic 
traits such as substitution rates and loci associated with virulent or transmissible 
phenotypes (Pepin et al. 2010) are still largely unknown for human viruses, though 
proteomics and sequencing efforts have the potential to address this deficiency as 
they improve in coverage (Delwart 2013; Lipkin 2013). 
Regarding data on nonhuman hosts, I primarily used predictors based on 
mammal species known to be infected, though the extent of known mammal-virus 
relationships is likely to be a very small fraction of the complete mammal virome 
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(Anthony et al. 2013), as data is deficient even for well-studied taxa (Cooper and 
Nunn 2013). Systematic, wide-ranging sampling strategies of animal hosts will 
therefore be necessary to improve predictive models. Beyond mammal species 
infected, a more meaningful basis for biological predictions might be those mammal 
species that viruses originated within or those that act as reservoirs (noting that these 
may not necessarily be the same species). The value of comprehensively documenting 
the origins of every human pathogen has been emphasised (Wolfe et al. 2007; Morse 
et al. 2012) and phylogenetic studies are closing this knowledge gap by assessing 
evidence for ancestral hosts among mammalian RNA virus families (Drexler et al. 
2012; Longdon et al. 2015b). It is also important to identify reservoir hosts, i.e. those 
hosts viruses can be maintained in and transmit from, though these are difficult to 
accurately determine, e.g. reservoir potential may be synergistic and subject to 
presence of other host species (Haydon et al. 2002; Viana et al. 2014). Mathematical 
frameworks have been proposed to identify reservoirs through transmissibility 
metrics, based on epidemiological data (Fenton et al. 2015). Data on reservoir status 
and transmissibility would also allow a test of the presence of antagonistic pleiotropy 
across mammal-virus systems (see ‘Insights into virus ecology and evolution’). 
Multivariate analyses could then be constructed following Chapter 3, to understand 
whether gain of transmissibility in one host directly coincides with loss in another. 
In addition to transmissibility, I also was unable to directly compare virulence 
in humans to virulence in nonhuman hosts. Efforts to systematically compile data on 
nonhuman virulence would also allow verification of the traits I find associated with 
virulence in additional species beyond humans, whether reservoirs or incidental 
dead-end hosts. Initial attempts at structured data compilation suggest a wide 
variation in viral virulence within mammals (Levinson et al. 2013). Problematically, 
pathology and mortality are usually difficult to quantify in wild observational studies, 
creating incentives to turn to experimental studies. Experimental inoculations have 
been classically used to assess virulence, though existing data is likely to be focused 
towards specific laboratory models rather than species among natural host ranges.  
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6.3.2. Study directions and methods  
Many determinants of cross-species transmission and emergence have been 
characterised (Taylor et al. 2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria 2005; Wolfe et 
al. 2007), and this thesis adds new dimensions in characterising determinants of 
virulence and transmissibility. Assuming adequate data were readily available, 
inference of emergence risk may be improved by several directions of study that can 
build upon the analyses presented herein. 
Cross-species transmission is well-accepted to be dependent on both 
phylogenetic similarity and ecological contact (Wolfe et al. 2007), though the 
potential interdependencies of such risk factors remain ambiguous. One study 
directly comparing contributions of both phylogeny and contact for West Nile virus 
among birds concluded that neglecting either can result in wrongful conclusions 
(Roche et al. 2015). Models of zoonotic pathogen sharing combining phylogeny and 
contact have to date been mainly limited to primates (Pedersen and Davies 2009), 
representing a narrow window of the much wider vertebrate phylogeny. Better 
metrics of human contact are also required, as previous studies have often used the 
generalised measure of geographic overlap with human density (Pedersen and Davies 
2009; Han et al. 2015b). One possibility may be creation of a conceptual gradient 
based on proximity to humans in both physical habitat and interfaces created by 
human activity (e.g. domesticity, population management, resource harvesting). 
Broader analyses of virus sharing that integrate phylogeny and ecology are currently 
under development (Olival et al. in review). 
More broadly, methodologies that use highly-structured statistical 
frameworks also offer scope to investigate how determinants of disease emergence 
interact. For example, network-based modelling offers a natural way of representing 
interactions between hosts, pathogens or both (Godfrey 2013). Network models 
could allow insight into risks of viral virulence and transmissibility by quantifying the 
structure of: within-host interactions between viruses (Murall et al. 2012; Griffiths et 
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al. 2014); similarities between viruses in their ecological or clinical traits (Bogich et al. 
2013); or perhaps most significantly, similarities between hosts in their known 
virome, in order to determine likely sources of emerging zoonoses (Gómez et al. 
2013; Morand et al. 2014). Alternatively, structural equation modelling or similar 
methods could be used to investigate proposed routes of causality by integrating 
emergence predictors in a pathway-based model (Plowright et al. 2008). With these 
methods, specific hypotheses surrounding virulence and transmissibility predictors 
may be tested based on the connections and directionalities I observed throughout 
the thesis (Figure 6.1). 
The next major methodological developments in comparative studies of 
disease emergence are likely to be transitions from species-based analyses to 
sequence-based analyses, especially considering sequencing efforts are increasing in 
efficiency and reducing in cost (Lipkin 2013). Firstly, this would assist in a move 
towards models that fully account for virus phylogenies – many of these associations 
I report are likely to have strong phylogenetic determinants yet to be fully 
characterised. I specified taxonomic family as a basic correction for phylogenetic 
relatedness, and was only able to specify viral phylogenies in analyses focusing on 
single families (Chapter 3). Comparatively high substitution rates and short genome 
lengths among RNA viruses mean that extreme divergence between families has 
impeded the reconstruction of a single complete phylogeny (Holmes 2003b). 
However, phylogenies at a wider resolution than taxonomic family have recently 
begun to be reconstructed from large-scale sampling efforts (Li et al. 2015). 
Improvements to sequence data and viral phylogenetics will also synergise 
with trait-based models. Phylogenetic analyses could infer patterns in determinants 
of virulence and transmissibility at a finer resolution than viral species, assuming that 
phenotypic traits may be accurately assigned to sequences. Potential steps towards 
sequence-level trait data include closer collaboration between clinical diagnostics and 
genomic sampling efforts, experimental inoculation using animal models, or 
inference from known genetic signals, e.g. virulence-associated markers or mutations 
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(Brault et al. 2007). Phylogenetic models of infectivity based on sample host origins 
of sequences show a promising route to better understanding viral host switching 
(Streicker et al. 2010; Longdon et al. 2011, 2015a; Drexler et al. 2012). As identifying 
traits for individual sequences is likely to be resource-intensive, scope for 
phylogenetic analyses may be most efficient with a small, high-resolution focus. For 
example, The Vietnam Initiative on Zoonotic Infections (VIZIONS) focuses on 
sampling and phylogenetic analysis of viruses among a human cohort identified as 
at-risk for zoonotic transmission, and the animals they are exposed to (Rabaa et al. 
2015).  
 
6.4. Implications for global health 
RNA viruses represent a major threat to global health, with concerns 
surrounding their potential for rapid emergence, pandemic spread, and debilitating 
clinical disease. Although public health infrastructures such as surveillance networks 
and reporting systems are globally improving (Chan et al. 2010), resources remain 
limited. A strategy shaped by scientific prediction would use available resources more 
effectively, and comparative analyses have been advocated as useful tools to aid in 
public health decisions (Daszak 2009; Morse et al. 2012). More informed and 
targeted strategies are beginning to be implemented through projects like USAID’s 
Emerging Pandemic Threats programme (USAID 2009) that directly feed into to 
policy and applied risk assessments. However, there is still a clear shortage of targeted 
programmes for zoonotic transmission and disease emergence (Morse et al. 2012), 
and the analyses within this thesis have implications for the development of new 
public health strategies. 
Overall, this thesis highlights that future emerging viruses will originate from 
a diverse range of zoonotic sources and through a diverse range of routes. At first, a 
tailored public health strategy may seem impossibly broad. However, emergence 
dynamics are not entirely unpredictable. I find that human RNA viruses tend to be 
shared with phylogenetically related species, are most likely to develop human 
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transmissibility following vector-borne or respiratory routes, and are most likely to 
cause severe human disease following nonvector-borne routes or when infecting a 
wide range of hosts and tissue types. 
This information can be used to allocate resources in several ways. Firstly, 
regarding surveillance, sampling methodologies and assays can be prioritised towards 
those specific virus taxa of concern, e.g. coronaviruses and orthomyxoviruses as the 
most likely candidates for human transmissibility (Chapter 4), or arenaviruses and 
filoviruses as the most likely candidates for severe human disease (Chapters 2, 4). 
Surveillance of specific targets has also been advocated (Morse et al. 2012). 
Considering likely sources of viruses with epidemic potential (i.e. sustained human-
to-human transmissibility) within state-switching models (Chapter 3), surveillance 
could be tailored to animal hosts for paramyxoviruses, where epidemic potential was 
most likely following zoonotic transmission; and large human populations for 
alphaviruses and flaviviruses, where epidemic potential was most likely following 
existing self-limited human-to-human transmission. Furthermore, my findings 
support previously proposed human populations to target, such as those in regular 
domestic or occupational contact with arthropod vectors or key mammal host taxa of 
bats and primates, e.g. forest workers or bushmeat hunters (Wolfe et al. 2000).  
Beyond surveillance, the factors I find associated with virulence and 
transmissibility offer criteria for quantifying viruses during risk assessments 
(Mangen et al. 2010). The virulence classification model presented (Chapter 2) may 
be also applied directly or within a larger framework as an immediate, inexpensive 
risk assessment tool. Regarding ultimate control initiatives, the priority virus families 
identified by my analyses may represent key coverage areas for future vaccine 
development, and those priority transmission routes may represent important 
considerations in selecting intervention methods. 
Inclusion of wild animal populations within surveillance and control 
strategies is also integral to public health (Wendt et al. 2014; Johnson et al. 2015b), 
and supported by the associations I observe between virulence, transmissibility, and 
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mammal host traits. Several existing passive surveillance systems anticipate human 
outbreaks and issue warnings to regional public health divisions based on reports of 
infection in certain indicator hosts, e.g. birds for mosquito-borne viruses (Wendt et 
al. 2014). The same could be implemented for those key host groups I find associated 
with human-transmissible viruses (Chapter 4).  
Although the finding that virulence correlates with a broad range of mammal 
hosts (Chapter 4) may initially suggest a need for widespread control measures across 
many mammal taxa, it will first be necessary to quantify the contributions of each 
nonhuman host to zoonotic transmission (Woolhouse et al. 2001; Fenton et al. 2015). 
Overall, interventions at the zoonotic interface (such as contact barriers or reduction 
of bushmeat pressure) may be most productive when targeted to bats, primates, wild 
carnivores, or mammal species with faster-paced life history (Chapters 4, 5). 
Unfortunately, the latter may present a significant challenge in that fast-paced 
mammals are often capable of survival in highly changeable conditions, including 
peridomestic and urban environments (Mills 2006). A further method of targeted 
control may be population management or culling, though it must be stressed that 
any culling must be carried out carefully - sufficient prior understanding of local 
ecology is critical to minimise risks of unintended consequences. For example, 
removal of established reservoir hosts may result in replacement by opportunistic, 
short-lived species that may host more virulent human viruses (Chapter 5) or 
indirectly alter selection pressures for virulence and transmission (Bolzoni and De 
Leo 2013). 
In the longer-term, recommendations for public health strategies will be 
refined as knowledge expands from wider data availability and better model 
inference. Therefore, these suggested strategies should be periodically revisited and 
evaluated to avoid becoming obsolete or inflexible (Wilcox and Colwell 2005). The 
value of predictive comparative study for this purpose is clear. Although disease 
emergence and public health crises are often contingent on single chance events, such 
as the translocation of a single arthropod vector or transmission of a single rare 
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genotype, predictive models as I present in this thesis can aid in understanding and 
quantifying disease emergence by addressing the wider risk of such events with a 
universal perspective. 
 
6.5. Concluding remarks 
The emergence of novel zoonotic viruses in the near future is inevitable, 
posing an immediate threat to global health regarding risks of increasing disease 
burdens and pandemic spread. This thesis has demonstrated that the determinants of 
viral virulence and transmissibility within humans are diverse, but broadly 
predictable. The ecology and evolution of both viruses and their associated hosts play 
significant roles in shaping viral phenotypes. The work presented herein offers 
inference into the likely trait profiles of high-impact emerging viruses and can 
contribute to a more effective, pre-emptive, and adaptive public health strategy. This 
thesis highlights the fundamental connectivity between pathogens, humans, and their 
wider hosts, and amidst a frame that brings together clinicians, veterinarians, 
virologists and ecologists, fits a further piece of the ever-challenging puzzle of 
emerging infectious diseases. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary material for: 
Tropism breadth and transmission ecology 




A.1. Supplementary methods 
A.1.1. Bayesian mixed regression model analysis 
As a statistical validation of the risk factors highlighted by the final 
classification tree (Figure 2.2), I also carried out risk factor analysis by constructing a 
Bayesian mixed logistic regression model with Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation 
(MCMC), using package ‘MCMCglmm’, v2.22.1 (Hadfield 2010) in R, v3.1.1 (R 
Development Core Team 2015). Predictors were specified as in Table 2.1, except that 
human-to-human transmissibility was only specified as sustained versus 
nonsustained, and taxonomic family was specified as a random effect as a basic 
control for phylogenetic relatedness. The model was specified with residual variance 
fixed at 1, an inverse Wishart prior with V = 1 on the random term of taxonomic 
family, and flattened Gelman priors on the fixed terms using the ‘gelman.prior’ 
function in package ‘MCMCglmm’, following recommendations by Gelman et al. 
(2008). Gelman priors were scaled by a factor of 1 +  +  
	

, where  denotes 
the first posterior estimate of the residual variance of the taxonomic family random 
effect. The model was run for 5 x 106 iterations, retaining every 1000th iteration, 
discarding the first 1.25 x 106 as burn-in, and inspecting trace output and assessing 
convergence using the gelman.diag function in package ‘coda’, v0.18-1 (Plummer et 
al. 2012). As a result of missing predictor data, 17 virus species were excluded from 
the model, leaving n = 161. The Bayesian mixed regression model supported the risk 
factors from the final classification tree. Specifically, viruses with multi-organ system 
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tropism were more much more likely to cause severe disease (Table A.5). Viruses 
with vector-borne transmission and viruses with sustained human-to-human 
transmissibility were less likely to cause severe disease, though these were weaker risk 
factors (Table A.5). 
 
A.2. Supplementary figures 
 
 
Figure A.1. Pruned classification tree run with same methodology/dataset as Figure 2.2, 
with transmission route variables specified using multiple categories (direct contact, 
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Figure A.4. True Skill Statistic (TSS, calculated as sensitivity + specificity - 1) values for 
resulting trees when specifying different predictor sets and jack-knifed datasets as in 
Figure 2.3. Solid squares denote TSS for tree built with full dataset (n=178) and 
boxes/outlying open circles denote TSS for 178 trees built with jack-knifed datasets for 
predictor sets removing predictor given on Y axis (except ‘Null’ & ‘Full’). Grey diamonds 
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Figure A.5. Sensitivity values for resulting trees when specifying different predictor sets 
and jack-knifed datasets as in Figure 2.3. Solid squares denote sensitivity for tree built 
with full dataset (n=178) and boxes/outlying open circles denote sensitivity for 178 trees 
built with jack-knifed datasets for predictor sets removing predictor given on Y axis 
(except ‘Null’ & ‘Full’). Grey diamonds denote sensitivity for tree built with single 
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Figure A.6. Negative Predictive Values (NPV, calculated as correctly classified 
nonseveres/(correctly classified nonseveres + misclassified severes)) for resulting trees 
when specifying different predictor sets and jack-knifed datasets as in Figure 2.3. Solid 
squares denote NPV for tree built with full dataset (n=178) and boxes/outlying open 
circles denote NPV for 178 trees built with jack-knifed datasets for predictor sets 
removing predictor given on Y axis (except ‘Null’ & ‘Full’). Grey diamonds denote NPV 
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Figure A.7. Resulting tree accuracies relative to null model (extent of remaining variation 
explained beyond null model, calculated as (accuracy-null accuracy)/(1 – null accuracy)) 
for resulting trees when specifying different predictor sets and jack-knifed datasets as in 
Figure 2.3. Solid squares denote relative accuracy for tree built with full dataset (n=178) 
and boxes/outlying open circles denote relative accuracy for 178 trees built with jack-
knifed datasets for predictor sets removing predictor given on Y axis (except ‘Null’ & 
‘Full’). Grey diamonds denote relative accuracy for tree built with single predictor given 
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Table A.3. Six-rank system of classifying human RNA virus virulence with available data, 








Fits any of ‘severe’ criteria outlined in 
main text (≥5% case fatality ratio, 
frequent reports of hospitalisation, 
significant morbidity from certain 
symptoms, otherwise explicitly described 
as “severe” or causing “severe disease”) 
Rabies virus 48 
2 
Those not fitting ‘severe’ criteria, but are 
reported to have caused fatalities in 
healthy adults 
Dengue virus 14 
3 
Those not fitting ‘severe’ criteria, but 
have severe strains or subspecies reported 
to cause fatalities in healthy adults 
Influenza A virus 6 
4 
Those not fitting ‘severe’ criteria, but are 
reported to have caused fatalities in 
vulnerable individuals (age 16 and below 
or 60 and above, immunosuppressed, 
having co-morbidities, or otherwise ‘at-
risk’) 
Rotavirus A 17 
5 
Those not fitting ‘severe’ criteria, but 
have severe strains or subspecies reported 






Those not fitting ‘severe’ criteria that 
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Table A.4. Accuracy and 95% confidence interval, sensitivity, and specificity for final 
pruned classification trees run with same methodology/risk factors as in Materials and 
Methods, except with alternative two-category definitions of “virulent” as the predicted 
variable. Vulnerable individuals are defined as those age 16 and below, age 60 and above, 
immunosuppressed, having co-morbidities, or otherwise cited as being ‘at-risk’. Ranks 







Reported to have caused 





Reported to have caused 
fatalities in vulnerable 




Fits ‘severe’ criteria outlined in 
main text, including viruses 
having severe strains or 
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Table A.5. Posterior mean coefficients from Bayesian mixed logistic regression 
predicting disease severity with viral taxonomic family as a random effect (n = 161 after 
removing viruses with missing predictor data). Baselines for predictors were specified as 
follows: genome type: -ssRNA, human-to-human transmissibility: nonsustained, 
transmission route: nonvector-borne, tropism; single-organ system. 95% credible 
intervals that exclude zero are highlighted in bold. 
 
Model component 
Posterior mean coefficient 
(95% credible interval) 
(intercept) -0.71 (-2.06, 0.62) 
Genome type: +ssRNA 0.10 (-1.71, 1.89) 
Genome type: dsRNA -2.34 (-5.65, 0.89) 
Genome type: ssRNA-RT 1.53 (-1.27, 3.94) 
Transmissibility: sustained -1.74 (-3.30, -0.24) 
Transmission route: vector-borne -1.93 (-3.27, -0.65) 
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Appendix B. Supplementary material for: 
Evolutionary routes of RNA virus emergence 
and human adaptation 
 
B.1. Supplementary figures 
 
Figure B.1. Graphical summary of RJ-MCMC state-switching model configurations over 
existing family or genus-level phylogenies. A) family Picornaviridae, B) family 
Rhabdoviridae, C) family Paramyxoviridae, D) genus Alphavirus, E) genus Flavivirus. 
Line widths are proportional to frequency of transition parameter inclusion (i.e. not 
being fixed at zero) over RJ-MCMC chain, with transitions having zero frequency not 
presented. Graphs are density plots of transition parameter values over RJ-MCMC chain. 
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Figure B.2. Graphical summary of RJ-MCMC state-switching model configurations 
across taxonomically-structured cladogram under branch length assumption set (a). Line 
widths are proportional to frequency of transition parameter inclusion (i.e. not being 
fixed at zero) over RJ-MCMC chain, with transitions having zero frequency not 
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Figure B.3. Posterior density plots of log odds from multinomial phylogenetic mixed 
regression for viruses with complete data (n = 221). Dashed grey lines represent posterior 
medians, dotted lines represent posterior 95% credible intervals, and solid blue lines 
highlight zero for clarity. ‘(intercept)’ denotes log odds of a virus having the specified 
Pathogen Pyramid level compared to level 1 (no human infection), Transmission 
variables denote additional log odds of a virus having the specified Pathogen Pyramid 
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Appendix C. Supplementary material for: 
Breadth and specificity of mammal host range 




C.1. Supplementary methods 
C.1.1. Human specialist sensitivity reanalysis 
 
Please note that the following analysis was conducted post-thesis submission. 
 
To test independence of model conclusions regarding human-to-human 
transmissibility to the inclusion of human-specialist viruses, final models predicting 
any transmissibility (Table 4.2) and sustained transmissibility (Table 4.3) were 
applied to the secondary dataset which excluded these specialist viruses (n = 239). 
Additionally, model building paths predicting these traits and featuring host range 
metrics a) number of nonhuman mammal host species, b) number of nonhuman 
mammal host orders, and c) phylogenetic breadth of nonhuman mammal host 
species were reconstructed using the secondary dataset. Unless stated otherwise, all 
model protocols followed the methods described in Chapter 4. 
When human specialists were removed, reconstructions of the same final 
models as in Chapter 4 showed only very tentative or no evidence for an association 
between human-to-human transmissibility and breadth of mammal host orders (any 
transmissibility: LRT = 1.47, p = 0.226; sustained transmissibility: LRT = 3.55, p = 
0.059). When model building paths were reconstructed, paths for all host range 
metrics (a) – (c) converged upon the same best model, which did not contain any 
host range predictors. Instead, bat-infective viruses were more likely to exhibit any 
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human-to-human transmissibility (Table C.6), and primate-infective viruses were 
more likely to exhibit any or sustained human-to-human transmissibility (Table C.6, 
C.7), consistent with the effects of these predictors in the main analysis of Chapter 4. 
 
C.2. Supplementary figures 
 
 
Figure C.1. Histograms of number of known hosts for each virus and number of known 
viruses in each host across 280 virus species and 683 nonhuman mammal host species. 
Rabies virus is omitted for clarity, having a much larger number of known host species 
than any other virus (147 host species).  
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C.3. Supplementary tables 
 
Table C.1. Outputs from best logistic mixed regression models of each model building 
path predicting human infectivity among mammalian RNA viruses excluding human-
specialist viruses, using different host range metrics (a) – (d). The final model featured in 




LRT statistic p(LRT) 
(a) No. nonhuman mammal host species model (n = 239, AIC = 275.31) 
(intercept) 0.086 (0.031, 0.234) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.376 (1.153, 1.642) 14.70 < 0.001 
Chiroptera infection 4.169 (1.826, 9.515) 2.03 0.001 
Primate infection 7.124 (2.479, 20.469) 6.66 < 0.001 
Rodentia infection 2.801 (1.361, 5.765) 8.05 0.005 
(b) No. nonhuman mammal host orders model (n = 239, AIC = 275.31) 
(intercept) 0.086 (0.031, 0.234) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.376 (1.153, 1.642) 14.70 < 0.001 
Chiroptera infection 4.169 (1.826, 9.515) 12.03 0.001 
Primate infection 7.124 (2.479, 20.469) 16.66 < 0.001 
Rodentia infection 2.801 (1.361, 5.765) 8.05 0.005 
(c) Phylogenetic breadth model (n = 239, AIC = 275.31) 
(intercept) 0.086 (0.031, 0.234) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.376 (1.153, 1.642) 14.70 < 0.001 
Chiroptera infection 4.169 (1.826, 9.515) 12.03 0.001 
Primate infection 7.124 (2.479, 20.469) 16.66 < 0.001 
Rodentia infection 2.801 (1.361, 5.765) 8.05 0.005 
(d) Minimum phylogenetic distance to humans model (n = 239, AIC = 271.22) 
(intercept) 1.874 (0.376, 9.348) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.388 (1.161, 1.659) 15.05 < 0.001 
Min. phylogenetic distance 
to humans among hosts 
0.984 (0.976, 0.992) 20.75 < 0.001 
Chiroptera infection 4.257 (1.844, 9.829) 12.14 < 0.001 
Rodentia infection 2.630 (1.274, 5.430) 7.00 0.008 
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Table C.2. Outputs from best logistic mixed regression models of each model building 
path predicting human-to-human transmissibility among mammalian RNA viruses, 
using different host range metrics (a) – (d). The final model featured in main text and 




LRT statistic p(LRT) 
(a) No. nonhuman mammal host species model (n = 280, AIC = 255.68) 
(intercept) 0.075 (0.029, 0.194) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.671 (1.399, 1.995) 43.29 < 0.001 
Artiodactyla infection 0.265 (0.115, 0.610) 11.26 0.001 
Rodentia infection 0.400 (0.184, 0.868) 5.66 0.017 
(b) No. nonhuman mammal host orders model (n = 280, AIC = 234.49) 
(intercept) 0.156 (0.053, 0.457) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.685 (1.386, 2.048) 35.99 < 0.001 
log(No. mammal host 
orders) 
0.032 (0.009, 0.108) 38.08 < 0.001 
Carnivora infection 4.942 (1.487, 16.429) 6.71 0.010 
Chiroptera infection 9.514 (2.998, 30.194) 16.09 < 0.001 
Primate infection 5.731 (1.965, 16.709) 10.66 0.001 
(c) Phylogenetic breadth model (n = 280, AIC = 247.49) 
(intercept) 0.001 (0.000, 0.021) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.561 (1.298, 1.878) 27.69 < 0.001 
Phylogenetic breadth 
binary variable  




log(Phylogenetic breadth) 2.294 (1.276, 4.125) 9.08 0.003 
Artiodactyla infection 0.195(0.077, 0.495) 14.04 < 0.001 
Rodentia infection 0.392 (0.159, 0.969) 4.31 0.038 
(d) Minimum phylogenetic distance to humans model (n = 239, AIC not compared) 
(intercept) 0.162 (0.032, 0.828) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.430 (1.180, 1.732) 15.06 < 0.001 
Min. phylogenetic distance 
to humans among hosts 
0.989 (0.982, 0.996) 9.24 0.002 
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Table C.3. Outputs from best logistic mixed regression models of each model building 
path predicting sustained human-to-human transmissibility among mammalian RNA 
viruses, using different host range metrics (a) – (d). The final model featured in main text 




LRT statistic p(LRT) 
(a) No. nonhuman mammal host species model (n = 280, AIC = 180.47) 
(intercept) 0.053 (0.015, 0.184) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.613 (1.305, 1.993) 23.43 < 0.001 
log(No. mammal host 
species) 
0.315 (0.188, 0.528) 24.77 < 0.001 
Primate infection 5.903 (1.883, 18.502) 9.79 0.002 
(b) No. nonhuman mammal host orders model (n = 280, AIC = 157.32) 
(intercept) 0.106 (0.023, 0.490) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.631 (1.288, 2.065) 20.29 < 0.001 
log(No. mammal host 
orders) 
0.012 (0.002, 0.057) 49.74 < 0.001 
Chiroptera infection 9.101 (1.670, 49.586) 6.68 0.010 
Primate infection 21.424 (4.955, 92.634) 20.82 < 0.001 
(c) Phylogenetic breadth model (n = 280, AIC = 189.98) 
(intercept) 0.005 (0.000, 0.169) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.549 (1.259, 1.906) 19.35 < 0.001 
Phylogenetic breadth 
binary variable  
(breadth = zero) 
11.740 (0.349, 394.882) 2.07 0.150 
log(Phylogenetic breadth) 1.273 (0.669, 2.424) 0.56 0.454 
Artiodactyla infection 0.206 (0.067, 0.639) 9.00 0.003 
(d) Minimum phylogenetic distance to humans model (n = 239, AIC not compared) 
(intercept) 0.455 (0.065, 3.196) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.226 (0.969, 1.551) 2.91 0.088 
Min. phylogenetic distance 
to humans among hosts 
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Table C.4. Outputs from best logistic mixed regression models of each model building 
path predicting severe disease among human RNA viruses, using different host range 
metrics (a) – (d). The final model featured in main text and selected based on AIC is 




LRT statistic p(LRT) 
(a) No. nonhuman mammal host species model (n = 148, AIC = 153.64) 
(intercept) 0.120 (0.023, 0.620) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.004 (0.796, 1.267) < 0.01 0.972 
log(No. mammal host 
species) 
2.574 (1.584, 4.183) 17.53 < 0.001 
Artiodactyla infection 0.139 (0.030, 0.643) 7.65 0.006 
Primate infection 0.250 (0.061, 1.013) 4.33 0.037 
(b) No. nonhuman mammal host orders model (n = 148, AIC = 164.34) 
(intercept) 0.200 (0.050, 0.801) - - 
log(Virus citations) 0.993 (0.814, 1.212) < 0.01 0.946 
Chiroptera infection 3.073 (1.171, 8.065) 5.26 0.022 
(c) Phylogenetic breadth model (n = 148, AIC = 157.30) 
(intercept) 0.167 (0.005, 5.225) - - 
log(Virus citations) 1.018 (0.813, 1.274) 0.02 0.877 
Phylogenetic breadth 
binary variable  
(breadth = zero) 
0.612 (0.019, 19.870) 0.08 0.783 
log(Phylogenetic breadth) 1.285 (0.689, 2.398) 0.63 0.427 
Artiodactyla infection 0.186 (0.042, 0.817) 5.67 0.017 
(d) Minimum phylogenetic distance to humans model (n = 107, AIC not compared) 
(intercept) 0.612 (0.180, 2.084) - - 




   196 
Table C.5. Outputs from likelihood ratio tests comparing model fits when adding 
random slopes upon host range metrics with respect to viral family. Cells denote LRT 
results for best models of each modelled virus trait in humans (columns) and each host 
range metric (rows) as presented in Table C.1 – C.4. Results where LRT ≈ 0 denote a 
negligible difference in likelihoods following addition of random slopes. 
 














(host range  
not featured)  
(host range  
not featured) 
LRT = 0.09, 
p = 0.762 





(host range  
not featured) 
LRT ≈ 0 
LRT = 0.25, 






(host range  
not featured) 
LRT = 0.22, 
p = 0.638 
LRT = 0.50, 
p = 0.482 





LRT ≈ 0 
LRT = 2.42, 
p = 0.120 
LRT = 4.48, 
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Table C.6. Output from best logistic mixed regression model predicting human-to-
human transmissibility among mammalian RNA viruses, excluding human-specialist 
viruses (n = 239). Model was convergently reached within each model building path using 























Table C.7. Output from best logistic mixed regression model predicting sustained 
human-to-human transmissibility among mammalian RNA viruses, excluding human-
specialist viruses (n = 239). Model was convergently reached within each model building 
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Appendix D. Supplementary material for: 
Allometry of mammal species predicts ability 
to host virulent human RNA viruses 
 
 
D.1. Supplementary methods 
D.1.1. Virus-centric mixed regression model analysis 
To confirm conclusions were not biased by non-independencies arising from 
the data structure (i.e. the same virus may be hosted by and therefore represented 
within the virus richness of several different mammal species), analyses were 
repeated at the level of virus species. Virus-centric analyses were conducted a) using 
the same final dataset of 125 zoonotic viruses and 524 mammal host species as 
described in Chapter 5, and b) restricting data to host-virus relationships presenting 
stringent diagnostic evidence suggestive of within-host replication (defined as those 
identified via virus isolation or PCR-based methods), resulting in 95 zoonotic viruses 
and 298 mammal host species, within 494 host-virus pairs. 
For each virus species, I calculated the median log-transformed adult body 
mass among all known host species. I also obtained the number of literature citations 
in PubMed search results for the virus species name. I then constructed mixed 
logistic regression models where outcomes were specified as categorical variables as 
to whether viruses caused severe human disease and whether viruses were capable of 
human-to-human transmission, respectively. Model predictors were specified as the 
median log-transformed host body mass, and log-transformed virus citation count. 
Models were fitted with a random intercept term upon viral taxonomic family, and 
additional model fits were tested by applying random slopes to the median body 
mass predictor. Unless otherwise stated, models were constructed, assessed, verified, 
and plotted following the methods described in Chapter 5. 
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All model conclusions were concordant with the primary analysis for both a) 
the complete dataset, and b) the restricted dataset. Specifically, viruses with a smaller 
median body mass among their mammal hosts were more likely to cause severe 
disease (Table D.1, Figure D.5), and no relationship was detected between median 
host body mass and human-to-human transmissibility (Table D.2). Additionally, 
virus sampling effort did not predict disease severity (Table D.1), but positively 
predicted human-to-human transmissibility (Table D.2), in agreement with results 
elsewhere within the thesis (see Chapter 4). In no cases did introducing random 
slopes improve model fit (highest observed LRT statistic = 1.12, p = 0.570), nor was 
any influence of collinearity upon fitted model variances detected (highest observed 
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D.2. Supplementary figures 
 
 
Figure D.1. Histograms of number of known RNA viruses with zoonotic status, causing 
‘severe’ human disease, and capable of human-to-human transmission per mammal host 
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Figure D.2. Relationship between adult body mass in grams and proportion of zoonotic 
RNA viruses causing ‘severe’ human disease among 524 mammal species within six 
taxonomic orders as in Figure 5.1, within a single panel. Solid lines denote fitted effect 
from logistic mixed regression model with random intercepts for each taxonomic order, 
holding mammal species citations constant at the median value. Shaded areas denote 95% 
confidence interval from 1000 simulations accounting for variances of both the 
regression slope and random intercepts. Dashed black line denotes the overall regression 
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Figure D.3. Relationship between adult body mass in grams and proportion of zoonotic 
RNA viruses causing ‘severe’ human disease among mammal species as in Figure 5.1, for 
the three taxonomic orders primarily hosting viruses suspected as influential within 
logistic mixed regression models. Filled circles denote individual host species with sizes 
denoting number of zoonotic viruses and solid lines denote fitted effect from logistic 
mixed regression model as in Figure 5.1. Circle colours denote whether host species is a 
known host of Rabies virus, Foot-and-mouth-disease virus, or both. Hosts with the 
smallest circle size therefore are only known to host the single respective virus denoted by 
their colour. Lines denote fitted effect from logistic mixed regression models within 
sensitivity analysis, with line colours denoting virus removals (black: full dataset as in 
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Figure D.5. Relationship between viral disease severity and median adult body mass of 
mammal host species for complete dataset containing 125 zoonotic RNA viruses. Solid 
line denotes fitted effect from logistic mixed regression model, holding virus citations 
constant at the median value and marginalising over random intercepts. Shaded areas 
denote 95% confidence interval based on 1000 simulations. 
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D.3. Supplementary tables 
 
Table D.1. Outputs from logistic mixed regression models predicting severe disease 
among zoonotic RNA viruses based on A) complete dataset following Chapter 5 and B) 
restricted dataset containing only host-virus relationships with stringent evidence of 
within-host replication. Variance in random intercept term of virus taxonomic family for 





LRT statistic p(LRT) 





median log(Adult body  
mass of mammal hosts (g)) 
0.668 
(0.537, 0.795) 










median log(Adult body  
mass of mammal hosts (g)) 
0.708 
(0.547, 0.860) 
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Table D.2. Outputs from logistic mixed regression models predicting human-to-human 
transmissibility among zoonotic RNA viruses based on A) complete dataset following 
Chapter 5 and B) restricted dataset containing only host-virus relationships with 
stringent evidence of within-host replication. Variance in random intercept term of virus 





LRT statistic p(LRT) 





median log(Adult body  







17.57 < 0.001 
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Appendix E. Publication: RNA viruses: a case 




The following publication is a review addressing emerging RNA viruses that 
describes a comprehensive list of viruses recognised to infect humans and their 
characteristics, which was updated through the systematic literature reviews 
conducted by myself as part of this thesis.  
 
Citation: Woolhouse MEJ, Adair K, Brierley L. RNA viruses: a case study of 
the biology of emerging infectious diseases. Microbiol Spectrum. 2013;1(1):OH-
0001-2012. 
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RNA Viruses: A Case Study of
the Biology of Emerging
Infectious Diseases
MARK E. J. WOOLHOUSE, KYLE ADAIR, and LIAM BRIERLEY
Centre for Immunity, Infection & Evolution, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3JT, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT There are 180 currently recognized species of RNA
virus that can infect humans, and on average, 2 new species are
added every year. RNA viruses are routinely exchanged between
humans and other hosts (particularly other mammals and
sometimes birds) over both epidemiological and evolutionary
time: 89% of human-infective species are considered zoonotic
and many of the remainder have zoonotic origins. Some viruses
that have crossed the species barrier into humans have persisted
and become human-adapted viruses, as exemplified by the
emergenceofHIV-1.Most, however, have remained as zoonoses,
and a substantial number have apparently disappeared again. We
still know relatively little aboutwhat determineswhether a virus is
able to infect, transmit from, and cause disease in humans, but
there is evidence that factors such as host range, cell receptor
usage, tissue tropisms, and transmission route all play a role.
Although systematic surveillance for potential new human
viruses in nonhuman hostswould be enormously challenging, we
can reasonably aspire to much better knowledge of the diversity
of mammalian and avian RNA viruses than exists at present.
INTRODUCTION
Viruses account for only a small fraction of the 1400 or
more different species of pathogen that plague humans
—the great majority are bacteria, fungi, or helminths (1).
However, as both the continuing toll of childhood
infections such as measles and recent experience of AIDS
and influenza pandemics illustrate, viruses are rightly
high on the list of global public health concerns (2).
Moreover, the great majority of newly recognized hu-
man pathogens over the past few decades have been
viruses (3) and a large fraction of emerging infectious
disease “events” have involved viruses (4).
There are two kinds of viruses: RNA viruses and
DNA viruses. The latter largely consist, with the ex-
ception of a handful of pox- and herpesviruses, of
viruses that have probably been present in and
coevolved with humans for long periods of time. RNA
viruses are very different. The majority of RNA viruses
that infect humans are zoonotic, meaning that they can
infect vertebrate hosts other than humans. Many of
those that are not regarded as zoonotic are believed to
have had recent (in evolutionary terms) zoonotic origins.
So it is the RNA viruses that are of greatest interest in the
context of One Health.
In this chapter, we review current knowledge of how
RNA viruses in humans and other vertebrates are re-
lated, in terms of both of their evolution and their
ecology, with the intention of trying to understand
where human RNA viruses came from in the past and
where new ones might emerge in the future. Until re-
cently, research on these topics was essentially a series of
case studies. Extraordinary work has been done de-
tailing events such as the historical emergence of HIV-1
in Central Africa (5) and the more recent emergence of
Nipah virus in Southeast Asia (6). But while every
emergence event is a fascinating story in its own right,
our aim here is to look beyond the specifics and to try to
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identify any underlying generalities that tell us some-
thing useful about the emergence of RNA viruses as a
biological process.
We begin by comparing the RNA viruses reported to
infect humans with RNA virus diversity as a whole and
exploring the overlap between viruses in humans and
viruses in other kinds of hosts. Next, we refine the
analysis by distinguishing among viruses according to
their ability not just to infect humans but also to trans-
mit from one human to another, which is a prerequisite
for a virus being able to cause major epidemics and/or
become an established, endemic human pathogen. We
then consider in more detail the subset of human RNA
viruses that can persist in human populations without
the need for a nonhuman reservoir. Next, we attempt to
identify characteristics of RNA viruses that allow them
to cross the species barrier and those that predispose
them to cause severe disease, as such viruses are of
particular public health concern. We go on to discuss
how new human RNA viruses arise (sometimes to sub-
sequently disappear again). From the information as-
sembled we construct a conceptual model of the
relationship between RNA viruses in humans and other
hosts. We consider how this model might be of practical
value, concentrating on risk assessments for newly dis-
covered viruses and also the much discussed topic of the
design of surveillance programs for emerging infectious
diseases.
DIVERSITY OF HUMAN RNA VIRUSES
The diversity of human RNA viruses was recently sur-
veyed using a formal methodology (3), and we update
that information here. All RNA viruses known to infect
humans were included, with the exception of those only
known to do so as the result of deliberate laboratory
exposures.
In this chapter, we use virus species as designated by
the Ninth Report of the International Committee for the
Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) (7) (noting that this differs
from earlier ICTV reports used in previouswork and that
it will doubtless change again in the not-too-distant fu-
ture). ICTV designations may not always accurately
reflect the biological meaning of a “species,” i.e., repro-
ductive isolation. The operational criteria used for RNA
viruses may include any or all of (i) phylogenetic relat-
edness based on sequence data, (ii) serological cross-
reactivity, (iii) host range, and (iv) transmission route.
It is also important to note that any analysis at the level
of a virus species implicitly ignores a great deal of
biomedically relevant diversity. This point is best illus-
trated by the influenza A viruses: the epidemiology and
public health importance of seasonal influenza A and the
H5N1 or H7N9 “bird flu” variants are very different,
but all are included within a single species. Less variable
virus species than influenza A may still contain multiple
serotypes and other functionally distinct subtypes. De-
spite these limitations, the species remains the most use-
ful unit for studying virus diversity currently available.
Updating the earlier survey (3) with new taxonomic
information (7) reveals 180 recognized species of RNA
viruses that have been reported to infect humans. These
viruses represent 50 genera and 17 families (with one
genus,Deltavirus, currently unassigned to a family). It is
not immediately obvious what we should make of this. Is
180 a large number or a small one? Should we be sur-
prised that it is not much higher or that it is not much
lower? We consider such questions further below. We
can, at least, be sure that 180 is an underestimate. New
human RNA virus species are still being discovered or
recognized at a rate of approximately 2 per year, al-
though recent work (8) has suggested that the pool of
undiscovered species could be much smaller than pre-
viously proposed (3). Even if we still have very little idea
of the number of species “out there,” it is, as we will
consider in detail later on, possible to say something
about where “out there” is.
The possibility of large numbers of as yet unrecog-
nized viruses also raises the specter of ascertainment
bias. Certain kinds of RNA viruses may be underrepre-
sented, perhaps dramatically so, among those currently
recognized. These might be viruses from particular tax-
onomic groups, those associated with less severe disease
or certain kinds of symptoms, or simply those that are
rare and/or occur in less studied regions of the world.
While this is clearly an issue, it is worth pointing out that
both the rates and kinds of RNA viruses being discov-
ered or recognized have been remarkably consistent for
the past half century, despite massive changes in the
technologies for virus detection and identification and
considerable variability in the effort put into virus dis-
covery in different places and at different times (3).
RNA VIRUSES OF HUMANS
AND NONHUMANS
One striking observation is that 160 species of human-
infective RNA virus species (89% of the total) are
regarded as zoonotic; i.e., they can also infect other
kinds of vertebrate hosts. (The definition of “zoonotic”
ignores arthropod vectors; these are regarded as spe-
cialized transmission routes rather than alternative host
2 ASMscience.org/MicrobiolSpectrum
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species.) The nonhuman hosts usually (>90% of all
zoonotic RNA virus species) include other mammals and
less commonly (<40%) birds. Humans rarely, if ever,
share their RNA viruses with anything else. Although
the bias toward sharing viruses with other mammals is
obvious, it is less clear whether we preferentially share
viruses with particular kinds of mammals. Many human
viruses (both RNA and DNA) are shared with ungulates,
carnivores, rodents, primates, or bats (3), but our
knowledge of the host range of most viruses is too in-
complete for us to be confident about any underlying
patterns. The remaining 20 RNA viruses are not known
to naturally infect nonhuman hosts. However, most of
these have close relatives that can infect other mammals.
The only exceptions are hepatitis C, hepatitis delta, and
rubella virus.
The overlap between the ability to infect humans and
the ability to infect other mammals can be illustrated in
other ways, too. Of the 62 recognized RNA virus genera
containing species that can infect at least one kind of
mammal, 50 (81%) contain species that can infect
humans. And of the 19 recognized RNA virus families
that contain species reported to infect mammals, all but
2 include species found in humans. The exceptions are
the Nodaviridae, which are essentially insect viruses,
and the Arteriviridae, which include species infecting a
range of different mammals, notably including simian
hemorrhagic fever virus.
The fact that human-infective species are distributed
so widely among the RNA viruses of mammals strongly
suggests that, in evolutionary terms, the ability to infect
humans is very easily acquired by these viruses. It also
implies that many, perhaps most, human RNA viruses
need not have arisen by evolving from other human
RNA viruses. This idea is supported by a recent anal-
ysis of the relationship between phylogeny and host
range for three RNA virus families—Paramyxoviridae,
Caliciviridae, and Rhabdoviridae—and two genera—
Alphavirus and Flavivirus—which concluded that the
majority of speciation events were associated with host
species jumps (9). Note that this pattern contrasts
markedly with the human DNA viruses, among which
taxa such as the Papillomaviridae and the Anelloviridae
appear to have undergone extensive diversification
within humans.
THE PATHOGEN PYRAMID
The categorization of viruses based simply on their
ability to infect humans fails to distinguish between a
vast range of epidemiologies, from occasional very mild
cases of Newcastle disease virus infection to pandemics
of influenza A or HIV-1. A useful conceptual framework
for thinking about this issue is the pathogen pyramid
(10). The version of pyramid used here has four levels
(Fig. 1).
Level 1 corresponds to human exposure, whether via
ingestion, inhalation, the bite of an arthropod vector, or
any other route. As discussed in the previous section, the
most important sources of exposure are other mammals
and, to a lesser degree, birds. There are no good
estimates of the total diversity of mammal and bird
viruses, but it seems likely that the human population is
exposed to hundreds, perhaps thousands, of species on a
regular basis. The major determinants of the rate of
exposure to new viruses are the ecology and behavior of
humans, the nonhuman virus reservoir(s), and (in some
cases) arthropod vectors.
Level 2 corresponds to human infection, which we
take to mean the ability to enter and replicate in human
cells in vivo. For all (known) RNA viruses there are as-
sociated host responses, although not all infections
necessarily lead to clinical symptoms of disease. Key
determinants of the ability to infect humans include the
route of entry (e.g., needle sharing has created a new
entry route for blood-borne viruses) and the molecular
biology of the human-virus interaction (discussed in
more detail below). Of the 180 recognized species of
RNA viruses that can infect humans, almost 60% (107
species) are restricted to level 2 (Fig. 2).
Level 3 corresponds to the ability both to infect
humans and to transmit from one human to another.
The ability to transmit refers to all kinds of transmission
routes, including vectors. Less than half of human-
infective RNA viruses (73 species in all) are able to
transmit between humans. A minority of these (26 spe-
cies) are restricted to level 3 (Fig. 2).
Level 4 corresponds to the ability to transmit suffi-
ciently well that the virus can invade human pop-
ulations, causing epidemics and/or establishing itself as
an endemic human pathogen. In epidemiological par-
lance, this corresponds to the condition that R0 is >1
within the human population, where R0 is the basic re-
production number, defined as the number of secondary
cases generated by a single primary case introduced into
a large population of naïve hosts. In contrast, level 3
viruses have an R0 of <1 in humans, which implies that
although self-limiting outbreaks are possible, the infec-
tion cannot “take off” and cause a major epidemic. Al-
though R0 is partly determined by the transmissibility of
the virus, it is also a function of the behavior and de-
mography of the human host population; for example,
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changes in living conditions, travel patterns, and sexual
behavior (for sexually transmitted viruses) can all
greatly influence R0. More generally, the term “crowd
diseases” implies that certain human viruses (and other
pathogens) can only become established once critical
host population densities have been reached (10). Our
best estimate is that there are 47 level 4 RNA virus
species in humans (Fig. 2).
A useful exercise is to consider what kinds of viruses
are found at levels 2, 3, and 4 in the pyramid. There
appear to be three major determinants of this: (i) tax-
onomy (at the level of both family and genus), (ii)
transmission route (especially the distinction between
vector-borne transmission and other routes), and (iii)
host range (expressed here as the ability to infect dif-
ferent mammalian orders). These three factors are not
independent (1); in particular, there are very few vector-
borne viruses with narrow host ranges (11).
Nonetheless, several patterns can be identified. First,
only two vector-borne viruses are found at the top of the
pyramid (level 4): yellow fever and dengue (Fig. 2). It is
not immediately apparent why this should be so; we will
consider this point further later on. Second, viruses with
a host range that is, as far as we know, restricted to
primates are rarely found lower down on the pyramid
(levels 2 and 3), with a few exceptions such as the simian
foamy viruses. The obvious implication is that if a virus
is capable of infecting and transmitting from our closest
relatives, then it is very likely to have the same capabil-
ities in us. Patterns are also apparent in the taxonomy of
human-infective viruses: for example, the Bunyaviridae,
Rhabdoviridae, Arenaviridae, and Togaviridae (with the
exception of rubella, which is atypical of that group) are
not represented at level 4 at all. This reflects the fact that
these four families are made up of viruses that are vector









FIGURE 1 A representation of the pathogen pyramid. Each level of the pyramid represents
a different degree of interaction between a virus and a human host. Level 1 corresponds to
exposure of humans, level 2 to the ability to infect humans, level 3 to the ability to transmit
from one human to another, and level 4 to the ability to cause epidemics or persist as an
endemic infection. Arrows indicate pathways that viruses may take to reach each level. For
example, a level 4 virus may arrive at that state directly, simply by exposure to the virus
from a nonhuman reservoir. This is known as an “off-the-shelf” virus. Alternatively, it may
initially enter the population as a level 2 or 3 virus—not capable of sustained transmission—
but evolve the ability to transmit between humans at a sufficiently high rate to persist
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Finally, it is worth noting that the “shape” of the
pathogen pyramid for RNA viruses differs from that for
nonviral human pathogens. Most strikingly, much
smaller fractions of recognized species of bacteria, fungi,
protozoa, or helminths are capable of extensive spread
in human populations (i.e., are found at level 4). On the
other hand, human DNA viruses are even more con-
centrated at the top of the pyramid, with almost 90% of
species at level 4. These patterns could simply be an
artifact of our incomplete knowledge of virus diversity at
lower levels of the pyramid, but they could also reflect
real biological differences between viruses and other
kinds of pathogens: viruses (especially DNA viruses)
may be more likely to speciate within humans, or viruses
(especially RNA viruses) that jump the species barrier
into humans may be more capable of spreading in hu-
man populations or of rapidly evolving that capability
(see below).
HUMAN-ADAPTED RNA VIRUSES
There is a semantic argument that only those viruses that
are capable of persisting in human populations in the
absence of a nonhuman reservoir should be described as
LEVEL 4
Aichi      Betacoronavirus 1        Dengue Hepatitis A       Hepatitis C Hepatitis E Hepatitis delta      Human astrovirus
Human coronavirus 229E, HKU1, NL63          Human enterovirus A-D          HIV-1 and -2           Human metapneumovirus
Human parainfluenza 1-4             Human parechovirus          Human picobirnavirus           Human respiratory syncytial virus
Human rhinovirus A-C          Human torovirus       Influenza A-C        Mammalian orthoreovirus        Measles       Mumps
Norwalk       PTLV 1-3       Rotavirus A-C      Rubella       Sapporo     SARS-related coronavirus      Theilovirus        Yellow fever
LEVEL 2
African green monkey simian foamy          Aroa          Australian bat lyssavirus           Avian metapneumovirus          Bagaza
Banna         Banzi Bayou          Black Creek Canal         Borna disease          Bovine enterovirus Bovine viral diarrhea 1
Bunyamwera          Californian encephalitis          Candiru          Caraparu          Catu Chandipura          Changuinola
Chapare Dhori          Dobrava-Belgrade          Dugbe          Duvenhage          Eastern equine encephalitis          Edge Hill 
Encephalomyocarditis Equine rhinitis A-B         European bat lyssavirus 1-2 Everglades         Foot-and-mouth disease
Gadgets Gully          Getah         Great Island          Guama          Guaroa       Hantaan          Hendra          Highlands J          Ilheus
Irkut Isfahan            Japanese encephalitis          Kairi          Kokobera            Kyasanur Forest disease          Laguna Negra
Langat          Lebombo Ljungan Louping ill         Macaque simian foamy         Maraba Marituba          Madrid
Mayaro        Mokola        Mucambo       Murray Valley encephalitis       New York        Newcastle disease       Ntaya          Nyando
Omsk hemorrhagic fever          Oriboca          Orungo        Parainfluenza 5      Pichinde          Piry          Pixuna Powassan
Punta Toro        Puumala         Rift Valley fever        Rio Bravo         Rio Negro Saaremaa        Sandfly fever Naples         Seoul
Shuni             Simian foamy                 Simian virus 41          Sin Nombre          Sindbis          St. Louis encephalitis        Tacaiuma
Tai Forest Ebola     Tembusu         Thailand         Thogoto       Tick-borne encephalitis          Tonate        Tula      Uganda S
Una Usutu Uukuniemi      Vesicular stomatitis Alagoas Vesicular stomatitis Indiana       Vesicular stomatitis New Jersey
Wesselsbron          Western equine encephalitis          Whataroa          Whitewater Arroyo          Wyeomyia
LEVEL 3
Andes     Barmah Forest       Bwamba       Chikungunya      Colorado tick fever     Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
Guanarito          Junin          Lake Victoria Marburg          Lassa         Lymphocytic choriomeningitis          Machupo
Nelson Bay orthoreovirus          Nipah          O’nyong-nyong         Oropouche          Rabies        Reston Ebola         Ross River 
Sabia          Semliki forest          Sudan Ebola        Venezuelan equine encephalitis          West Nile          Zaire Ebola          Zika
FIGURE 2 All currently recognized human-infective RNA viruses categorized with re-
spect to their ability to infect and transmit from humans (levels 2, 3, and 4 of the virus
pyramid—see Fig. 1) and distinguished in terms of transmission route (green for vector-
borne transmission, blue for other routes) and nature of diagnostic evidence (the viruses
not in boldface type have only been reported in humans using serology-based methods).
doi:10.1128/microbiolspec.OH-0001-2012.f2
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“human” viruses. In our terminology these are, by def-
inition, the level 4 viruses, comprising 47 species, 20 of
which are not known to have any natural hosts other
than humans. These 47 viruses—referred to here as
“human adapted”—represent 12 families and 29 genera.
Their most striking common characteristic is that al-
most all of them are transmitted by ingestion, inhalation,
or direct contact; just 2 are transmitted by vectors.
There are several possible routes for a virus to reach
level 4 on the pathogen pyramid (indicated by the
arrows in Fig. 1). One possibility is that humans are
exposed to a virus that is already capable of effective
transmission between humans; i.e., the virus is pre-
adapted to humans (noting that this does not preclude
further adaptation once the virus has entered the human
population). These have been termed “off-the-shelf”
viruses. Such viruses may be rare, perhaps extremely
rare, variants of the population in the nonhuman res-
ervoir, in which case the main determinants of the rate at
which such viruses enter the human population is the
amount of genetic variability within the reservoir and
the rate at which humans are exposed to the preadapted
variants.
Another possibility is that the virus first enters the
human population with limited ability to transmit be-
tween humans (i.e., level 3) but that it is able to evolve
that ability before the otherwise self-limiting chain of
infections dies out (12). These have been termed “tailor-
made” viruses. Key determinants of the rate at which
such viruses invade the human population are the fre-
quency of primary infections and the virus mutation
rate. We note that for a level 2 virus to evolve human
transmissibility, this would have to happen during the
course of a primary infection. Such infections presum-
ably give evolution relatively little material to work with,
and it may be that level 2 viruses are “dead ends” in an
evolutionary sense as well as an epidemiological sense.
For example, rabies infections are relatively common in
humans and are likely to have been so for thousands of
years, but human-transmissible variants have failed to
materialize (with the proviso that rabies is technically a
level 3 pathogen because of rare instances of human-to-
human transmission via organ transplants).
The origins of the human-adapted RNA viruses are of
considerable interest, not least as a possible pointer to
the likely sources of future viral threats to human health.
It has previously been noted (10) that we have infor-
mation on the origins of only a small minority of human
pathogens, including RNA viruses. However, as stated
above, it seems likely that many of them arose by species
jumps from other mammals or (less often) birds, perhaps
followed by some diversification within humans (e.g.,
human enteroviruses or parainfluenza viruses). The di-
rect transmission routes used by most of these viruses are
consistent with their being crowd diseases; that is, in
contrast to vector-borne viruses, the basic reproduction
number increases with human population density.
MECHANISMS
As explained above, whether a virus is found at level 2,
3, or 4 of the pyramid reflects its ability to transmit from
one human to another. Human demography and be-
havior play a key role in this, but of course, intrinsic
properties of the virus are also crucial.
The first consideration is the ability of the virus to
infect humans at all. Given the importance of this topic,
we know surprisingly little about it. In effect, the ques-
tion comes down to factors that restrict host range.
Empirically, it does seem that the species barriers be-
tween different mammals, including humans, are very
leaky: the majority of known mammal RNA viruses are
capable of infecting multiple species. Only two studies
(3, 13), however, have looked systematically at mech-
anisms, showing that use of a phylogenetically con-
served receptor to gain entry to host cells is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for a virus to be able to infect
both humans and nonprimates. This result appears ro-
bust, but the data are incomplete because the cell re-
ceptor has yet to be identified for the majority of human
viruses.
Gaining entry to host cells is only the first step in
initiating an infection. The virus must also be capable of
replicating in host cells, being released from host cells,
evading the innate immune response, and perhaps be-
coming systemic. All of these processes depend on the
specifics of the molecular interplay between virus and
host, and all can contribute to the species barrier and
host range restriction (14). The species barrier may be
quantitative rather than qualitative, perhaps expressed
by the need for a higher infective dose. In one of very few
experimental studies of the species barrier (15), it was
found that the 50% lethal dose for rabies virus obtained
from foxes was up to a million times lower for foxes
than it was for cats and dogs. Similarly, there is evidence
that human influenza A viruses can replicate in
chimpanzees but do so at a much lower rate (14).
The ability to get into (i.e., infect) a host does not
equate with the ability to get out of (i.e., transmit from)
that host. A key determinant of the ability to transmit is
the virus’s capacity to invade and replicate in cells of
6 ASMscience.org/MicrobiolSpectrum
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particular tissues, notably the lower gastrointestinal
tract, the upper respiratory tract, the urogenital tract, or
possibly the blood or skin. In a few cases, the deter-
minants of tissue tropisms are well understood. For ex-
ample, H5N1 influenza A transmits well from ducks and
poultry but not from humans. This is because it utilizes a
variant of the sialic acid receptor in the host cell mem-
brane that occurs in the upper respiratory tract of ducks
and poultry but is confined to the lower respiratory tract
of humans (14).
Tissue tropisms inevitably play a key role in deter-
mining the route of virus transmission (e.g., respiratory,
fecal-oral, or arthropod vector). It has been suggested
that altering tissue tropism is harder for a virus to
achieve than switching host species (9). This idea is
borne out by the observation that transmission route
tends to be a relatively deep-rooted trait in virus phy-
logenies, often to the level of family, in marked contrast
to host range, which tends to be far more labile.
These fewmechanistic and ecological insights fall well
short of a proper understanding of why some kinds of
viruses tend to occur at higher or lower levels of the
pathogen pyramid. Host relatedness seems to play a
role; hence, viruses from other primates do seem more
likely to be transmissible in humans than those acquired
from nonprimates, an idea supported by other studies of
host relatedness and pathogen transmissibility (16). But
not all highly transmissible human viruses have been
acquired from other primates. Transmission route is also
important; vector-borne viruses in particular seem to be
relatively good at infecting humans but relatively poor at
being transmitted by humans (17). It is possible that
although humans are frequently exposed to vector-
borne viruses, some of which are capable of setting up an
infection, these viruses are not easily able to adapt to a
new host (perhaps because any adaptation to a new
vertebrate host must not compromise their interaction
with the invertebrate vector [14]). Those that have
adapted to humans—dengue and yellow fever—are ones
that probably originated in other primates.
VIRULENCE
In public health terms the ability of a virus to spread
through human populations is, of course, only part of
the story; human RNA viruses also vary enormously in
the degree of harm they cause, a characteristic referred to
as virulence. In the context of human infections we
generally regard a pathogen as virulent if it has a high
case-fatality ratio or if infection routinely results in se-
vere clinical disease. On this basis, HIV-1, severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), and
rabies would be regarded as virulent, whereas para-
influenza and rhinoviruses would not.
Pathogen virulence is a very complex phenomenon,
reflecting properties of the pathogen, the host, and the
interaction between them. It has been variously pro-
posed that virulence is influenced by transmission route,
host range, level of the pathogen pyramid, and the time
that the pathogen and the host have had to coevolve (see
reference 18 for an introduction to a large body of lit-
erature). These characteristics are not independent, so
hypothesis testing is not straightforward, although some
theories do look promising. For example, the only two
recent instances of newly emerging level 4 pathogens—
HIV-1 and SARS-CoV—are/were both spectacularly
virulent, in line with ideas that the virulence of novel
host-pathogen combinations need not be near any evo-
lutionary optimum. The only two level 4 RNA viruses
that are vector borne—dengue and yellow fever—are
also relatively virulent, in line with ideas that vector-
borne diseases can be more virulent because an ambu-
lant host is not needed for transmission. There are also
good examples of very virulent RNA viruses, such as
rabies, for which humans are effectively dead-end hosts,
in line with ideas that such infections are not subject to
any evolutionary constraints because they do not con-
tribute to the next generation of infections. On the other
hand, many level 2 viruses, such as Newcastle disease
virus, Sindbis virus, and others, result in only mild
infections, so rabies may just lie at one end of a broad
spectrum.
Another idea is that viruses acquired from particular
kinds of reservoirs, primates versus nonprimates or
mammals versus birds, might be especially virulent. The
evidence, however, is inconsistent in this regard. It is true
that some highly virulent human viruses, such as HIV-1
and dengue, were acquired from or are shared with other
primates, our closest relatives. On the other hand, some
highly virulent viruses are ultimately acquired from
hosts much more distantly related to humans, such as
H5N1 influenza A from birds or SARS and Nipah
viruses from bats.
This important topic would clearly benefit from a
systematic survey of the virulence of human RNA
viruses (none has been published to date), which could
be used to construct formal tests of the various hy-
potheses about pathogen virulence to be found in the
evolutionary biology literature.
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EMERGENCE AND THE CHANGING CAST OF
RNA VIRUSES
New RNA virus species continue to be discovered,
identified, or recognized in humans. Recent examples
include Nelson Bay orthoreovirus, Irkut virus, primate
T-lymphotropic virus 3, human coronavirus HKU1, and
human rhinovirus C. Moreover, there is usually a
backlog of reports of new human viruses that have yet to
be formally recognized as species. Not all of these viruses
will have recently invaded human populations; many
will turn out to be long-standing human pathogens that
have only recently been recognized or accepted as
“species.”
It is therefore important to understand that the con-
tinued accumulation of recognized human RNA virus
species may reflect less the possibility that genuinely new
viruses are continually emerging, most likely acquired
from nonhuman reservoirs, than the fact that we are still
getting to grips with the taxonomic diversity of viruses
that have been with us for some time. This distinction
between viruses that we have only just discovered and
viruses that have only just discovered us is, of course,
crucial in the context of emerging infectious diseases. If
most of the so-called new viruses are not new at all, then
this implies that events such as the advent of HIV/AIDS
in the early 1980s or the curtailed SARS epidemic in
2003may be just unusual, one-off occurrences with their
own specific causes. If, on the other hand, genuinely new
viruses are appearing all the time, then the HIVs and
SARS-CoVs are more accurately regarded as just the
highly visible tip of a much larger iceberg. Without a
much more detailed and thorough understanding of the
phylogenies and origins of all human viruses, not just
those with high public health profiles, we cannot resolve
this question.
Perhaps the most striking feature of recently discov-
ered RNA viruses is that they tend to be much like the
RNA viruses that we already knew about. They are
members of the same virus families, have the same
transmission routes, and share the same kinds of non-
human hosts. If these newly recognized viruses are in-
deed emerging, then it seems as though there is nothing
special about emergence, at least from a biologist’s
perspective. Even if this is correct, it is still often
suggested that the rate, if not the biology, of pathogen
emergence is higher in the early 21st century than it has
been in the past. This reflects the notion that a variety of
so-called drivers of emergence, ranging from human
population growth to changes in farming methods, are
combining to create a “perfect storm.” This idea is dif-
ficult to evaluate critically. Arguably there have been
only a handful of global emergence events in the past
century, notably those involving HIV-1, variants of in-
fluenza A, and SARS-CoV. This is not a strikingly large
number given that many of the other 40 or so human-
adapted RNA viruses may have emerged only in the past
few millennia. Of course, it could be argued that less
dramatic events such as the geographical spread of West
Nile virus or outbreaks of Ebola are more frequent now
than they have been in the past, but that claim is even
harder to test with any rigor.
Another side to this issue is rarely discussed. One
recent study (8) reports that while the number of virus
species accumulates, at the same time many of those
recognized in past years or decades seem to have
disappeared, these making up about one-third of the
total. There is, of course, one well-known example of the
eradication of a human RNA virus through human in-
tervention, SARS-CoV, accompanying the even more
impressive story of the eradication of smallpox, a DNA
virus. However, there are many more examples of
viruses that seem to have disappeared of their own ac-
cord, an unexpected observation worthy of careful
consideration. There are several possibilities. First of all,
rare infections, especially those with mild or common
clinical presentations, may simply have been missed or
no one has bothered to report them. Another possibility
is that reports from earlier times are unreliable; for ex-
ample, it is striking that no human cases of foot-and-
mouth disease have been noticed since a handful of
reports in the mid-1960s. But it seems likely that many
of the missing viruses have indeed disappeared, at least
temporarily, from humans, even if they are still present
in nonhuman reservoirs. Some, of course, could reap-
pear in humans at some point in the future: this has
happened for the bat lyssaviruses, for example, and is a
worrying possibility for SARS-CoV.
The implication of these missing viruses is that the
extant diversity of human RNA viruses is perhaps closer
to 100 species than the figure of 180 given earlier. The
number of missing species corresponds, very roughly, to
an average loss rate of 1 per year (8). Another way of
expressing this is that there would have to be one new or
rediscovered species of human RNA virus reported every
year just to maintain the level of diversity that we are
aware of at present.
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
All of the above is consistent with the following con-
ceptualization of the relationship between RNA viruses
that can infect humans and those found in other kinds of
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hosts, particularly other mammals. Rather than being
distinct groups, viruses of humans and viruses of other
mammals are readily interchanged over evolutionary
time. Some of the viruses that cross the species barrier
into humans persist and may become human-adapted
viruses, though this seems to be a relatively rare occur-
rence. Many of the others remain as zoonoses, and yet
others disappear again. The repertoire of human viruses
is therefore not fixed but is dynamic, over time scales
measured in decades (8). However, this process is far
from random. Although humans share their RNA
viruses with many different mammalian taxa, those from
other primates appear most likely to be capable of
spreading through human populations. Similarly, al-
though almost every family of viruses found in mammals
contains species found in humans, some virus families
seem to be capable of, at best, limited spread in human
populations. This conceptual model is illustrated dia-
grammatically in Fig. 3.
SURVEILLANCE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Our conceptual model has practical implications for
both disease surveillance and risk assessment, especially
in the context of newly emerging infectious diseases.
The importance of early detection of potential
epidemics or pandemics cannot be overstressed, a point
made by several major studies (2). The early detection
through clinical surveillance of SARS, coupled with ef-
fective intervention based on case isolation and quar-
antine, prevented a potentially catastrophic pandemic
(19). A matter of some debate is whether or not sur-
veillance should be extended into the nonhuman
reservoirs of infection from which novel human patho-
gens are most likely to emerge—a concept sometimes
referred to as “getting ahead of the curve.”
It helps, of course, if we know what we are looking
for and where best to look for it (20). We currently have
only the beginnings of answers to these questions.
Viruses, especially respiratory viruses, are often picked
out as the most obvious threat to global public health
(2). New viruses are very likely to have a zoonotic origin,
almost certainly acquired from mammals or birds.
Emergence events are most likely to occur in regions—
so-called hot spots—that combine high human popula-
tion densities with high densities of domestic animals
and/or a high diversity of wildlife (4). All of this infor-
mation is useful but falls well short of a recipe for de-
signing a feasible global surveillance system (20).
One strategy to increase the likelihood of early de-
tection is to implement sentinel surveillance in people in
close, high-risk contact with animal populations, such as
bush meat hunters or slaughterhouse workers. In tan-
dem with recent advances in the technologies available
for virus detection—especially those based on high-
throughput nucleic acid sequencing—such programs
should at least improve our knowledge of the diversity of
viruses “out there” that humans are exposed to, a pro-
cess sometimes referred to as “chatter” (10). Pathogen
discovery programs, particularly in understudied taxa
such as wild rodents and bats (21), should also add
greatly to our knowledge of potential threats to human
health.
Once a novel or previously unknown virus is iden-
tified, it is obviously important to assess any poten-
tial risk to public health. Initial assessments are
generally based on the kind of comparative biology
approach discussed here. A recent example of this is
Schmallenberg virus, a novel virus first detected in sheep
and cattle in northern Europe in 2011. Schmallenberg
is a member of Orthobunyavirus, a diverse genus of
vector-borne bunyaviruses that are found in a variety of
FIGURE 3 A schematic representation of the relationship
between human viruses and viruses from other mammals.
Human viruses are depicted as a subset of mammal viruses,
only partially protected by a species barrier. There are frequent
minor incursions of zoonotic viruses (small arrows), and many
of these may not persist in human populations. Occasionally
there may be a much more significant event (large arrow)
whereby a mammal virus proves capable of establishing itself
as a new human virus, perhaps involving adaptation to infect
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hosts but especially in ungulates. Given these char-
acteristics, and despite the fact that some distantly
related orthobunyaviruses—notably Oropouche virus—
do cause disease in and may even be transmitted by
humans, Schmallenberg was provisionally designated
low risk to humans and no human cases have yet been
found (22). The even more recently reported Middle
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus (23)
has rightly caused much more concern.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Emerging diseases caused by RNA viruses are a One
Health issue. There is a continuous interchange, over
both epidemiological and evolutionary time scales, be-
tween viruses in humans and viruses in other animals
that we cannot ignore. RNA viruses that pose serious
threats to global public health have arisen repeatedly by
jumping into humans from other animals. This has been
going on for millennia and it continues today, as fast as
ever and perhaps even faster. We have to anticipate that
new viral threats will emerge in coming years or decades
and we need to be prepared to rise to these new
challenges as they appear.
It is worth pointing out that the first virus was dis-
covered in nonhuman animals (foot-and-mouth disease
virus at the very end of the 19th century) before they
were identified in humans. The same is true (24) for
several important kinds of viruses, such as retroviruses
(and lentiviruses specifically), rotaviruses, papilloma-
viruses, and coronaviruses. A corollary of this is that
veterinary rather than medical expertise may, at least
initially, be our best source of knowledge about newly
discovered viruses.
We have discussed the need for more effective sur-
veillance for novel viruses but concluded that although
attempts to characterize the kinds of viruses most likely
to emerge are useful, precise prediction is not a realistic
objective, for now at least. On the other hand, there
could be considerable benefit from a better under-
standing of RNA virus diversity in the most important
host species. At present we do not even have a complete
inventory of the viruses in humans, and while we have
some knowledge of the viruses in major livestock spe-
cies, we know very little about the viruses present in wild
mammals or birds. These gaps can and should be filled:
we need to know what is out there now, and what might
be waiting around the corner.
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Appendix F. Publication: Assessing the 
epidemic potential of RNA and DNA viruses 
 
 
The following publication is a review that quantifies and critically assesses 
evidence of human-to-human transmissibility for each human RNA virus. The 
systematic literature review and assessment protocol described by this manuscript 
was conducted by myself as part of this thesis, and is further described by the 
chapters herein.  
 
Citation: Woolhouse MEJ, Brierley L, McCaffery C, Lycett S. Assessing the 
epidemic potential of RNA and DNA viruses. Emerg Infect Dis. 2016;22(12):2037–
44. 
Many new and emerging RNA and DNA viruses are zoo-
notic or have zoonotic origins in an animal reservoir that is 
usually mammalian and sometimes avian. Not all zoonotic 
viruses are transmissible (directly or by an arthropod vec-
tor) between human hosts. Virus genome sequence data 
provide the best evidence of transmission. Of human trans-
missible virus, 37 species have so far been restricted to 
self-limiting outbreaks. These viruses are priorities for sur-
veillance because relatively minor changes in their epidemi-
ologies can potentially lead to major changes in the threat 
they pose to public health. On the basis of comparisons 
across all recognized human viruses, we consider the char-
acteristics of these priority viruses and assess the likelihood 
that they will further emerge in human populations. We also 
assess the likelihood that a virus that can infect humans 
but is not capable of transmission (directly or by a vector) 
between human hosts can acquire that capability.
A series of recent emerging infectious disease outbreaks, including the 2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epi-
demic in West Africa and the continuing Zika virus disease 
epidemic in the Americas, have underlined the need for 
better understanding of which kinds of pathogens are most 
likely to emerge and cause disease in human populations. 
Many, although not all, emerging infectious diseases are 
caused by viruses, and these frequently emerge from non-
human host reservoirs (1–3). The enormous diversity (4) 
and high rates of evolution (5) of viral pathogens discour-
age attempts to predict with any precision which ones are 
most likely to emerge in humans. However, there is some 
consensus, at least in general terms, regarding the kinds of 
traits that are most essential in determining the capacity of 
a virus to infect, cause disease, and spread within human 
populations (Table 1). We focus on one of these traits, the 
capacity of a virus to spread from one human to another 
(by any transmission route other than deliberate laboratory 
exposure), a key determinant of the epidemic potential of 
a virus.
A theoretical framework for studying the dynamics of 
infectious disease outbreaks is well established (6). The ca-
pacity of an infectious disease to spread in a host population 
can be quantified in terms of its basic reproduction number, 
R0. R0 is defined as the average number of secondary cases 
generated by a single primary case in a large, previously 
unexposed host population, and its value tells us a great 
deal about the epidemiology of a pathogen. R0 = 0 indicates 
no spread in that population; this value would apply to zoo-
notic infections that do not spread between humans. R0 in 
the range 0<R0<1 indicates that chains of transmission are 
possible but that outbreaks will ultimately be self-limiting. 
R0>1 indicates that major epidemics can occur or that the 
disease may become endemic in that host population. A 
higher value of R0 also indicates that a greater reduction in 
transmission rates must be achieved to control an epidemic 
(6). R0 values have been estimated for >60 common human 
pathogens (7), including human influenza A virus (R0<2), 
measles virus (R0<18), and dengue virus (R0<22).
R0 is determined by a combination of pathogen traits, 
such as its transmission biology, which is itself a complex 
interplay between the within-host dynamics of the patho-
gen and the host response to infection, and host traits, such 
as demography, behavior, genetics, and adaptive immunity. 
Consequently, for any given infectious disease, R0 can vary 
between host species and between host populations. Infec-
tious diseases with R0 close to 1 are a particular concern 
because small changes in their epidemiologies can lead to 
major changes in the threat they pose to public health (8).
R0 is closely related to another conceptual approach to 
disease emergence, the pathogen pyramid. There are differ-
ent versions of this scheme (3,9). We consider a pyramid 
of 4 levels (Figure 1). Level 1 represents the background 
chatter of pathogens to which humans are continually or 
sporadically exposed but most of which are not capable of 
causing infection. Other levels can be considered in terms 
of the R0 of the pathogen in humans: level 2 corresponds to 
R0 = 0, level 3 to 0<R0<1, and level 4 to R0>1.
Data and Analysis
Identifying and Characterizing Level 3 and 4 Viruses
We updated our previous systematic literature review 
(10) of the capacity of virus species to transmit be-
tween humans (i.e., level 3 and level 4 viruses; online 
Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/ar-
ticle/22/12/16-0123- Techapp1.pdf). Such viruses are 
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found in 25 of 29 families containing viruses that infect 
mammals or birds (discounting 2 reports of family No-
daviridae species in mammals/birds). The 4 exceptions 
comprise 2 families that have no known human-infective 
viruses (Arteriviridae and Birnaviridae) and 2 with spe-
cies that have been reported in humans but only at level 2 
(Asfarviridae and Bornaviridae).
A total of 22 of these families contain level 4 viruses 
with epidemic potential in humans (sometimes described 
as human-adapted viruses) (11). This finding indicates that 
this capability is widely distributed among virus taxa. The 
3 families with level 3 viruses but no level 4 viruses are the 
Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, and Rhabdoviridae.
A list of 37 presumptive level 3 virus species is pro-
vided in Table 2. These species cover a wide taxonomic 
range and a variety of transmission routes, including vec-
torborne. Several level 3 viruses have historically been as-
sociated with sizeable outbreaks (>100 cases) in human 
populations: Bwamba, Oropouche, Lake Victoria Marburg, 
Sudan Ebola, and o’nyong-nyong viruses. For some other 
viruses, including Guanarito, Junin, lymphocytic chorio-
meningitis, and Sabia (all arenaviruses); simian virus 40; 
Titi monkey virus; and influenza A(H5N1) virus, human-
to-human transmission is rare or merely suspected. In addi-
tion, several viruses are only known or believed to transmit 
between humans by iatrogenic routes or vertical transmis-
sion; this group (Table 2) might be regarded as unlikely 
epidemic threats.
When a virus is transmitted by a vector, it can be par-
ticularly difficult to confirm or exclude the infectiousness 
of human cases, as with Semliki forest, Barmah forest, and 
Rift Valley fever viruses. Similarly, even when human–
vector–human transmission is believed to occur, it is often 
difficult to quantify its contribution to a given outbreak, as 
with Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus.
Level 2 viruses are those that can infect humans (>100 
species) but have never been reported to be transmitted by 
humans (10). In at least some instances, such as influenza 
A(H5N1) virus (12), this finding is attributable to tissue 
tropisms during human infection that are incompatible with 
onward transmission.
Shifts in pyramid level equate to shifts in the public 
health threat posed by a virus. We consider possible shifts 
in the following sections.
Level 1 to Levels 3 and 4
Virus species of mammalian and, more rarely, avian origin 
are sometimes observed to be transmissible between humans 
when first found in humans, which constitutes a jump from 
level 1 straight to level 3 or 4 (Figure 1), and events of this 
kind have been reported regularly. Recent examples that 
appear on the basis of available evidence to fit this model 
include severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(first reported in humans in 2003), Bundibugyo Ebolavirus 
(2008), Lujo virus (2009), severe fever with thrombocyto-
penia syndrome virus (2011), and Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) (2012).
We still have incomplete knowledge of the diversity of 
viruses that infect mammals and birds; the few hundred rec-
ognized species (4) surely represent only a small fraction of 
the total (3). Moreover, we have few predictors of potential 
human-to-human transmissibility. One possible indicator 




Table 1. Virus traits potentially relevant for capacity to emerge and cause disease in human populations* 
Trait Definition 
Reservoir host relatedness Viruses derived from specific host taxa (e.g., other primate species might be of increased concern) 
Virus relatedness Particular virus taxa might be predisposed to infect, cause disease, and transmit among humans 
Virus host range Viruses with a broad or narrow host range might be of greatest concern 
Evolvability Higher substitution rates might make it easier for some viruses to adapt to human hosts 
Host restriction factors Host factors, many still to be identified, are a barrier to viral infection and help determine which viruses 
can and cannot emerge 
Transmission route Certain transmission routes might predispose viruses to emerge in humans 
Virulence Certain virus or host factors might determine whether a virus causes mild or severe disease in humans 
Hostvirus coevolution Lack of a shared evolutionary history might be associated with higher virulence 
*Adapted from Morse et al. (3). 
 
Figure 1. Pathogen pyramid for RNA and DNA viruses. Level 1 
indicates viruses to which humans are exposed but which do not 
infect humans. Level 2 indicates viruses that can infect humans 
but are not transmitted from humans. Level 3 indicates viruses 
that can infect and be transmitted from humans but are restricted 
to self-limiting outbreaks. Level 4 indicates viruses that are 
capable of epidemic spread in human populations. Transitions 
between levels (indicated by arrows) correspond to different 
stages of virus emergence in human populations. Reprinted from 
Woolhouse et al. (10).
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is emergence from nonhuman primates, with suggestions 
that primate viruses are more likely to be able to, or to ac-
quire the ability to, spread in human populations (13,14). 
However, emergence of human transmissible viruses from 
bat (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus) 
or bird (e.g., influenza) reservoirs indicates that this trait is 
associated with a wide range of reservoirs.
Level 2 to Levels 3 and 4
The possibility that level 2 viruses might acquire the ca-
pacity to be transmitted between humans (i.e., move into 
level 3 or 4) is a major concern, especially in the context 
of influenza A(H5N1) virus and other avian influenza virus 
subtypes. However, there are few examples of this transi-
tion throughout the entire recorded history of human virus-
es going back to 1901. One possible example involves the 
simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) and HIV. A SIVsmm-
derived laboratory strain of SIV has been reported to infect 
humans, but without onward transmission (15). SIVsmm is 
related to HIV-2. SIVcpz, which is related to HIV-1, has not 
been directly observed in humans. However, different HIV-
1 lineages, independently derived from SIVcpz, are variably 
transmissible in humans, and the pandemic HIV-1 M lin-
eage was the only virus to overcome a key host restriction 
factor (human tetherin) (16). The only other examples of 
viruses newly transmitted between humans relate to rare 
instances of iatrogenic transmission (e.g., Colorado tick fe-
ver or rabies viruses).
Epidemiologic and phylogenetic considerations rou-
tinely inform our assessment of the likelihood of human-
to-human transmission being observed in the future. For 
example, there is markedly less concern about rabies virus 
than about avian influenza virus, and we suggest 2 reasons 
for this observation. First, rabies virus has a much longer 
history of and a much higher incidence of human infection, 
but human-to-human transmission is extremely rare. Sec-
ond, there is no evidence that other rhabdoviruses viruses 
(with the possible exception of Bas-Congo virus, which 
represents a novel genus) are transmissible in humans (or 
primates more generally).
Level 3 to Level 4
Level 3 viruses can also become level 4 viruses. We note 
that virus evolution is not (necessarily) required for R0 
to become >1 in human populations. Differences in host 
(or vector) behavior, ecology, or demography might be 
sufficient (8).
Instances of shifts from level 3 to level 4 in recent 
times have been infrequent. Three candidates are Ebolavi-
rus, Zika virus, and chikungunya virus. However, although 
these viruses have caused epidemics of unprecedented size 
in humans populations in the past decade, the condition 
R0>1 in human populations might had been previously met 
for all 3 viruses (17–19).
For Ebola virus, the epidemic in West Africa in 2014 
constituted the first appearance of this virus in high-den-
sity, urban populations, which is expected to correspond 
to a higher value of R0. The chikungunya virus epidemic 
in the Indian Ocean region in 2005 was associated with a 
vector species jump (from Aedes aegypti to Ae. albopictus 
mosquitoes) that has been linked to a mutation in the vi-
rus envelope 1 protein gene (18). The chikungunya virus 
epidemic in the Caribbean region in 2013 followed the first 
appearance of chikungunya in the Americas and infected 




Table 2. Viruses (n = 37) that are known or suspected of being transmissible (directly or indirectly) between humans but to date have 
been restricted to short transmission chains or self-limiting outbreaks 
Genome, virus family  Virus name 
Single-stranded RNA (ambisense)  
 Arenaviruses Guanarito, Junin, Lassa, Lujo, Machupo, Sabia, Dandenong,*  
lymphocytic choriomeningitis* 
 Bunyaviruses Andes, Bwamba, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Oropouche, Rift Valley,  
severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome 
Single-stranded RNA (positive sense)  
 Flaviviruses Japanese encephalitis,* Usutu,* West Nile* 
 Coronaviruses Middle East respiratory syndrome 
 Togaviruses Barmah Forest, o’nyong-nyong, Ross River, Semliki Forest,  
Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
Single-stranded RNA (negative sense)  
 Filoviruses Bundibugyo Ebola, Lake Victoria Marburg, Sudan Ebola 
 Paramyxoviruses Nipah 
 Rhabdoviruses Bas-Congo, rabies* 
Double-stranded RNA  
 Reoviruses Nelson Bay, Colorado tick fever* 
Double-stranded DNA  
 Adenoviruses Titi monkey 
 Herpesviruses Macacine herpesvirus 1 
 Polyomaviruses Simian virus 40 
 Poxviruses Monkeypox, Orf, vaccinia 




populations that had no history of exposure to the virus. 
The current Zika virus epidemic in South America appears 
to be another example of a transition from a level 3 to a 
level 4 arbovirus associated with geographic spread into 
areas with high densities of vectors (19). Occasional Zika 
virus transmission directly from infected humans to other 
humans are of considerable interest, but probably contrib-
ute little to R0.
Chikungunya, Zika and the other level 4 arboviruses 
(yellow fever and dengue viruses) illustrate that, for arbo-
viruses, a high potential for spread in human populations 
is linked to carriage by anthropophilic vector species, par-
ticularly mosquitoes of the genus Aedes. In contrast, no 
tick species are regarded as anthropophilic, and there are 
no level 4 and few level 3 tickborne arboviruses.
Epidemiologic Patterns
The preceding sections illustrate that identifying transitions 
of viruses between level 2 and level 3 or between level 3 
and level 4 is not always straightforward. Standard epide-
miologic theory can help clarify our expectations.
As we discussed, pyramid level is related to the ba-
sic reproduction number R0 in human populations. In turn, 
the value of R0 is indicative of expected outbreak dynam-
ics. Some key results (Figure 2) are the probability that a 
single primary case will generate >1 secondary cases (for 
any value of R0), the expected average size of an outbreak 
generated (over the range 0<R0<1), and the probability 
that an epidemic will spread in the human population (for 
R0>1). These results strictly apply to homogeneous infec-
tions in a homogeneous host population, although more 
general frameworks can accommodate host or pathogen 
heterogeneity (20–22). Nonetheless, the key predictions 
that secondary cases do not always occur even if R0>0 
and that major epidemics do not always occur even if R0>1 
are robust.
From an epidemiologic perspective, our confidence 
that a putatively level 2 virus is truly incapable of human-
to-human transmission is thus a function of the number of 
index cases observed. The transition between level 3 and 
level 4 can be studied in terms of the expected distribu-
tion of outbreak sizes (23). In the range 0<R0<1, an over-
dispersed distribution of outbreak sizes is expected: most 
outbreaks are small (often just single cases) with a long 
tail of larger outbreaks. This pattern has been reported for 
a range of emerging viral diseases (Figure 3). As the criti-
cal threshold R0 = 1 is approached, this value is signaled in 
the outbreak size distribution (Figure 3). This framework 
has been used successfully to monitor the epidemiology of 
measles virus in the United Kingdom after a decrease in 
childhood vaccination rates in the late 1990s and indicated 
the approach to the critical threshold that corresponded to 
loss of herd immunity (23).
Outbreak size distribution analysis has been applied 
to human case data for Andes virus (24), monkeypox vi-
rus (20), and MERS-CoV (25) (Figure 3). For EVD up to 
2013, data are clearly inconsistent with theoretical expecta-
tion for R0<1 (Figure 3), which suggests that large num-
bers of small outbreaks have remained undetected or that 
R0 was already >1 in at least some settings. Either way, 
R0≈1 for EVD in humans implies that small differences 
in the biology or epidemiology of the virus would lead to 
large changes in scale of outbreaks (8), which could make 
events such as the EVD epidemic in 2014, if not predict-
able, then much less unexpected.
Evolution
Changes in pyramid level might be mediated by virus evo-
lution or changes in virus ecology (28). A major issue is 
whether the capacity of a virus to spread in human popula-
tions arises as a result of adaptation (evolution of trans-
missibility that occurs during human infection) or pread-
aptation (genetic variation within nonhuman reservoirs that 
predisposes a virus not only to infect humans but also trans-
mit between humans, noting that RNA viruses often show 
high levels of genetic variation such that they are some-
times described as quasi-species [29]). These alternatives 
have been characterized as tailor-made and off-the-shelf, 
respectively (28). The first alternative implies a progres-
sion from no or low transmissibility between humans to 
moderate or high transmissibility. The second alternative 
implies moderate or high transmissibility at first infection 
of humans.
We consider that our survey of documented changes 
of pyramid level is most consistent with the off-the-shelf 
model of virus emergence. In particular, we can find no 
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Figure 2. Expected outbreak dynamics for RNA and DNA viruses 
given a single primary case in a large, previously unexposed host 
population, as a function of the basic reproduction number R0. 
Mean size of outbreak as total number of cases (N) is given by 
N = 1/(1 − R0) for R0<1 (light gray line, left axis). Probability of 0 
secondary cases (i.e., outbreak size N = 1) is given by P1 =  
exp(−R0) (black line, right axis). Probability of a major outbreak is 
given by Ptakeoff = 1 – 1/R0 for R0>1 (dark gray line, right axis).
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convincing examples of level 2 viruses becoming level 3 
or 4 viruses, which suggests that, if this happens at all, it 
typically happens sufficiently rapidly (i.e., requires a suf-
ficiently small number of introductions) that we fail to ob-
serve the level 2 phase. In contrast, we regularly observe 
viruses at levels 3 or 4 the first time they are detected in 
human populations.
Nonetheless, the possibility of virus evolution of 
transmissibility in a new host has been demonstrated ex-
perimentally for influenza A(H5N1) virus in ferrets (30). A 
theoretical study (31) suggested that the fact that this virus 
subtype has been circulating widely in poultry populations, 
with frequent human exposure and sporadic human infec-
tion for almost 20 years, provides little or no reassurance 
about its future evolutionary trajectory.
HIV lineages show clear evidence of adaptation to hu-
mans (16), but as discussed earlier, it is not clear whether 
the SIV lineages that gave rise to HIV-1 or HIV-2 were ca-
pable of transmission between human hosts. We speculate 
that extended infection times make tailor-made emergence 
more likely for retroviruses.
Transmission
Demonstrating that an infected human has the potential 
to transmit the infection to another human is not always 
straightforward. High virus titers in body secretions and 
excretions, blood, or skin are considered indicative. Case 
clusters are suggestive, but if persons occupy the same 
environment (e.g., household), then it might be difficult 
to rule out common exposure. Case clusters must be epi-
demiologically plausible (i.e., delimited in space and time 
in a manner consistent with the known or assumed epide-
miology of the virus). Genotyping techniques are useful 
tools for confirming a cluster but do not resolve the source 
of infection.
For several of the viruses we studied (e.g., Bas-Con-
go, Lujo, Nelson Bay, and severe fever with thrombo-
cytopenia syndrome viruses) (Table 2), the evidence for 
human-to-human transmission is best regarded as tenta-
tive, particularly where putative clusters were small. Such 
assessments can be even more difficult for vectorborne 
viruses. In many situations, the best evidence for the hu-
man-to-human transmission will come from analysis of 
virus genome sequences.
Phylogenetic Analysis
One approach to resolving the question of human-to-hu-
man transmission is analysis of nucleotide sequence data, 
sometimes referred to as forensic phylogenetics. Nucleo-
tide substitution rates in fast-evolving RNA viruses, such 
as MERS-CoV and Ebola virus, are ≈1–5 × 10–3/site/year 
(32,33), making it possible to use sequences isolated from 
different hosts at different times to estimate time-resolved 
phylogenetic trees. Estimates of the transmission chain 
from temporal sequence data can be improved by incorpo-
rating additional information on the date of onset of indi-
vidual cases, duration of latent and infectious periods, and 
overall prevalence (34).
We provide some example phylogenetic trees gener-
ated from simulated epidemics (Figure 4). In an epidemic 
in an animal reservoir with occasional transmission to hu-
mans (Figure 4, panel A), for each human sequence, the 
most closely related next sequence is of animal origin. 
Clusters of closely related human sequences are shown, 
and the distribution of the expected cluster sizes is a func-
tion of R0 (Figure 4, panels B, C) (35).
In an outbreak, it might be difficult to find and sample 
the putative source animal cases. However, estimating the 
time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of the hu-
man cases will indicate how long the infection has been 
spreading. For sporadic zoonoses (Figure 4, panel A), most 
transmission has occurred unobserved in the animal res-
ervoir, and the TMRCA of pairs of human cases will be 
long because these sequences are not closely related. For 
outbreaks involving human-to-human transmission (Fig-
ure 4, panels B, C), the TMRCA of the cluster of human 
cases will be closer to the date of the first human infection 
(whether sampled or not) and provides the estimated date 
of the zoonotic event.
Use of sequence data to distinguish between multiple 
instances of human infection from a common animal source 
and human-to-human transmission in the early stages of an 
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Figure 3. Distribution of outbreak sizes for RNA and DNA viruses 
as plots of outbreak size x (horizontal axis) versus fraction of 
outbreaks of size >x (vertical axis), both on logarithmic scales. 
Data are shown for 4 infectious diseases. Squares indicates 
Andes virus disease in South America (24); diamonds indicate 
monkeypox in Africa (26); circles indicate Middle East respiratory 
syndrome in the Middle East (25); and triangles indicate filovirus 
(all species) diseases in Africa before 2013 (27). For comparison, 
expected values for the case R0 = 1, obtained from the  
expression for the probability of an outbreak of size >x, P(x) =  
Γ(x – ½)/√πΓ(x), are also shown (dashed line). Data for filoviruses 
are not consistent with expectation for R0<1.
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outbreak is extremely challenging because of short times-
cales, and involvement of few mutations. However, genetic 
differences and phylogenetic evidence show that at least 2 
of the first 3 reported cases of influenza A (H7N9) virus in-
fection in humans were believed to originate from distinct 
domestic avian sources (36).
Further sequencing of avian samples implied that a 
low-pathogenicity influenza A(H7N9) virus strain had 
been spreading in domestic birds for ≈1 year before spo-
radic cases were detected in humans (37). Similarly, detec-
tion of genetically distant lineages of MERS-CoV, which 
persisted for only a few months each, suggest multiple 
introductions from an animal reservoir and only limited 
human-to-human transmission to date (32). In contrast, 
the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009 and the EVD 
epidemic in West Africa in 2014 were believed to be the 
results of single zoonotic events, followed by sustained 
human-to-human transmission (33), as shown by a single 
rapidly expanding lineage.
Conclusions
Our survey of the capacity of RNA and DNA virus infec-
tions to be transmitted, directly or indirectly, between hu-
mans leads to several conclusions and practical suggestions 
for improving surveillance of emerging infectious diseases 
and targeting efforts to identify future public health threats. 
In support of these conclusions, the World Health Orga-
nization recently published list of priority emerging infec-
tious diseases and corresponding viruses (38) included 6 of 
the viruses in Table 2.
A major observation is that the taxonomic diversity of 
viruses that are possible threats to public health is wide, but 
bounded. Most human infective viruses are closely related 
to viruses of other mammals and some to viruses of birds. 
There are no indications that humans acquire new viruses 
from any other source. However, diversification within hu-
man populations occurs and is a prominent feature of some 
DNA virus taxa (e.g., family Papillomaviridae) (4).
In general, however, our knowledge of origins of hu-
man viruses is still incomplete. Although the origins of 
HIV-1 have been extensively investigated (16), for most 
other viruses, even level 4 viruses, little or no research has 
occurred. An origins initiative (9) would help establish 
the routes into human populations that have been used by 
other viruses.
Transmissibility within human populations is a key de-
terminant of epidemic potential. Many viruses that can in-
fect humans are not capable of being transmitted by humans; 
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Figure 4. Phylogenetic trees for 
simulated emerging infectious 
disease outbreaks caused by 
RNA and DNA viruses in a mixed 
population of 1,000 human and 
5,000 nonhuman hosts. Trees 
were constructed by using a 
standard susceptible–infected–
removed model (6). For each of 3 
infection scenarios in nonhuman 
hosts (black lines), rare zoonotic 
transmission events (blue lines), 
human-to-human transmission 
(red lines), and human cases 
(red circles) are indicated. For 
the nonhuman population R0 = 2 
throughout. Transmissibility within 
the human populations varies from 
A) spillover: no human−human 
transmission (R0 = 0); B) limited 
human−human transmission with 
R0 = 1; and C) epidemic spread 
within humans (R0>1). A maximum 
of 100 infections are randomly 
sampled from each population in 
each simulated outbreak. 
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most human transmissible viruses that emerge already have 
that capability at first human infection or acquire it relatively 
rapidly. If transmission from humans would require a change 
in a phylogenetically conserved trait, such as tissue tropism 
or transmission route (4), then such viral paradigm shifts will 
probably be extremely rare (39).
Even when a virus is capable of transmission between 
humans, the critical threshold R0>1 is not always achieved. 
However, because changes in virus traits or host population 
characteristics can influence R0, level 3 viruses (Table 2) 
are of special interest from a public health perspective, and 
of special concern when, like MERS-CoV, they also cause 
severe illness. Demonstrating human transmissibility is of-
ten difficult, but essential. The best evidence is likely to 
come from virus genome sequencing studies. These studies 
should be a public health priority (40).
We currently have few clues to help us predict which 
mammalian or avian viruses might pose a threat to hu-
mans and, especially, which might be transmissible be-
tween humans. One argument in favor of experimental 
studies of these traits, including controversial gain of 
function experiments (30), is that they could help guide 
molecular surveillance for high-risk virus lineages in non-
human reservoirs.
The first line of defense against emerging viruses is ef-
fective surveillance (40). A better understanding of which 
kinds of viruses in which circumstances pose the greatest 
risk to human health would enable evidence-based target-
ing of surveillance efforts, which would reduce costs and 
increase probable effectiveness of this endeavor.
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